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This dissertation examines the relationship between Black America and East Germany 
from 1949 to 1989, exploring the ways in which two unlikely partners used international 
solidarity to achieve goals of domestic importance.  Despite the growing number of 
works addressing the black experience in and with Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, 
West Germany, and contemporary Germany, few studies have devoted attention to the 
black experience in and with East Germany.  In this work, the outline of this transatlantic 
relationship is defined, detailing who was involved in the friendship, why they were 
involved, and what they hoped to gain from this alliance.  This dissertation argues that 
the GDR’s ruling party utilized the relationship as a means of authenticating claims of 
East German anti-racism, a component of the Party’s efforts to acquire legitimacy and 
diplomatic recognition from the international community in the wake of World War II, 
the Holocaust, and the division of Germany.  African American radical leftists saw in 
East Germany a means of support and solidarity in the struggle for rights at home, as well 
as a society that was allegedly racism-free, upon which they could model their own 
attempts to eradicate racism in the US.  Utilizing a transnational framework and 
analyzing government documents, newspapers, correspondence, photographs, and 
autobiographies, this work probes the ways in which two groups, pushed to the margins, 
sought to navigate the geopolitics of an ideologically-charged world.   
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Introduction: The “Other” Germany and the “Other” America 
 
“U.S. ‘racism’ is hardly…threatening to East Germany….But at least it keeps the indoctrinated 
minds of the East Germans occupied until a more pressing issue comes along.”1 
--Time Magazine, 1972 
 
 In November 1963, like Americans elsewhere, a group of old friends sat down to 
enjoy Thanksgiving dinner.  Sitting around the table were Paul and Eslanda Robeson, 
Oliver Harrington, and Aubrey and Kay Pankey.  Each of the diners seated at the table 
were supporters of the African American civil rights movement; Paul was an 
internationally-renowned actor and folk singer, and Eslanda was a prolific writer.  
Harrington earned his living as a cartoonist, creating characters that exemplified the 
Black American struggle.  Aubrey was a classically trained singer, while his wife Kay 
was an editor at a book publishing company.2  It had been a dozen years, at least, since 
the friends and activists had last seen one another, and they spent the evening making up 
for lost time.  Harrington regaled the group with stories about the exploits he and Paul 
had shared during their much younger years in Harlem.  Meanwhile, the Pankeys were 
both silently noting how much Paul had aged in the years since they had last seen him, 
and were concerned about his health.3    
Surely, this was a scene that played out similarly in many homes across the 
United States.  This particular Thanksgiving dinner, however, was celebrated in East 
Berlin, East Germany.  Not only were Harrington, the Pankeys, and the Robesons part of 
the civil rights struggle, they were also participants in a relationship between Black 
America and the communist Germany.  This relationship has gone unnoticed by many 
historians and has been relegated to the status of historical curiosity by others, especially 
                                                 
1 “East Germany: St. Angela,” Time, 3 April 1972. 
2 While Aubrey was African American, Kay was white American. 
3 Martin Duberman, Paul Robeson: A Biography (New York: The New Press, 2005), 518-519. 
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those writing in the English language.  Nevertheless, the alliance that developed between 
Black America and East Germany was more than a passing fascination of little historical 
consequence.  Instead, this relationship was a fundamental result of Cold War tensions, 
made possible by a long history of black internationalism.4  An analysis of this friendship 
reveals the ways in which African Americans and East Germans together sought to 
navigate a world riven by ideological conflict. 
In examining the friendship between Black America and East Germany, this work 
has approached the alliance by asking: who in East Germany and among Black 
Americans was involved in this relationship, and how did these individuals influence the 
shape the relationship took?  Why did the East German government reach out to Black 
America?  What of value did African Americans see in a relationship with East Germany, 
a state closely associated with the United States’ declared enemy, the Soviet Union?  For 
a relationship that spanned nearly all of East Germany’s forty-year life span, in what 
ways did an alliance with Black America actually impact the state’s interests?  Did 
African Americans acquire anything useful from their friendship with a state that was 
constantly fighting for its own relevancy among both international and domestic 
observers? 
Utilizing a transnational approach, this study argues that the alliance between 
Black America and East Germany was a component of the East German struggle for 
legitimacy and diplomatic recognition, as well as a means of support and solidarity for 
black leftists struggling for rights in the US.  The friendship was instigated by the East 
German government and, in East Germany, was primarily populated by members of the 
                                                 
4 Black internationalism will be defined in this work as the desire to look beyond one’s national borders for 
cooperation, aid, and assistance in order to accomplish goals and objectives at home. 
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elite.  Constantly engaged in a tug-of-war battle with West Germany for international 
influence and prestige as the true representative of all German citizens, East Germany 
was at pains to build a positive reputation among international and domestic observers.  
Friendship with Black America became part of this strategy to do so; for the East German 
government, the relationship was intended to underline its assertion of an anti-racist 
identity.  This identity was a component of the government’s claim of a commitment to 
anti-fascism, which was meant to justify its rule over a citizenry that had not voted them 
into power and to differentiate East Germany from its Nazi predecessors.5   
In highlighting East Germany’s alleged anti-racism, officials believed a 
relationship with America’s blacks lent an authority to the claim, helping to garner 
international recognition in a world still reeling from the Nazis.  Domestically, East 
German leaders intended the relationship to instill within its citizens pride and respect for 
the government, by flaunting the government’s friendship with the “celebrities” of the 
movement.  Within the government itself, the relationship also served as a means of self-
justification, as officials’ own sense of insecurity regarding their authority meant that 
they often understood their relationship with Black America as a measurement or 
reflection of the government’s legitimacy.     
Importantly, though East Germany’s desperate search for international legitimacy 
drove the establishment of this relationship, without African Americans responding to 
                                                 
5 East German anti-racism followed from the communist rhetoric that in a society where only class 
mattered, racism could not exist.  To be an East German anti-racist meant not only to oppose racism in all 
of its forms, but to work to eradicate racism and support racism’s victims in their efforts to acquire social 
and economic equality.  This was an approach utilized by various international communist parties since the 
1920s, with the goal of finding allies in the anti-racism struggle, creating “fronts” that would allow 
Communists “to exert an influence far beyond their actual numbers.”  George M. Fredrickson, Black 
Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 179. 
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East German overtures and becoming active participants in this friendship, the 
relationship would have been of limited value to East German officials.  It is this point 
that is often considered most puzzling about the friendship: what could possibly have 
driven African Americans to participate in an alliance with East Germany?  What interest 
would they have in a state born on the ashes of Hitler’s Germany, at a time when Cold 
War tensions meant that the consequences of socialist or communist associations could 
be disastrous?  By reflecting on who was attracted to the East German overtures—black 
radical leftists—the answer becomes clearer.  The SED’s claims of support for the 
world’s blacks and its Marxist-Leninist approach to eliminating racial discrimination held 
great appeal to African Americans subscribing to politics on the far-left.  Quite often, 
these African Americans themselves were among the elite of black radicals.   
Of great importance too was the belief that East Germany’s anti-racist society was 
a model of sorts, proof that Black America’s civil rights objectives were indeed 
attainable—through socialism or communism.  Though the SED’s view that racism grew 
out of the economic disadvantages wrought by capitalism was not new, East Germany 
provided an extraordinary model for African Americans, given the state’s Nazi past.  
Those who were intrigued by the East German model were confident that if communism 
could achieve in just a few years what many had believed was impossible—the 
eradication of virulent Nazi racism—then surely the same could be done in the US.6  
These African American friends of the GDR believed that with a case-study of East 
Germany, as well as the country’s solidarity and support, they could accomplish the 
                                                 
6 As will become evident, racism was far from eradicated in East Germany, despite SED propaganda and 
testimonials from some African American visitors.  The average East German still held on to their pre-1945 
views on race, some in defiance of the SED’s anti-racist rhetoric and others because it was a worldview to 
which they attributed a great deal of merit.  Even within the ranks of the SED, racism remained entrenched 
among some of the Party’s functionaries. 
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elimination of American racism. 
Before going any further, however, it is necessary to define how this work will 
use the terms “relationship,” “friendship,” “alliance,” and “solidarity.”  It is important to 
view these terms through the lens of the Cold War, not only to understand what could 
bring two seemingly disparate groups together, but also to acknowledge the slight shift 
taken by the traditional definitions of these every-day terms.  A relationship should be 
understood as a bond formed between two groups with similar or shared attitudes, 
sentiments, or goals.  Friendship is defined in this work similarly to “comradeship;” those 
who comprised a friendship shared a common adversary.  Going further, a friendship 
implied the existence of reciprocal support—a notion that held great significance for the 
SED.   Much like a comradeship, many Cold War friendships formed that would have 
been considered unlikely in previous years.7     
This work’s definition of alliance takes the common understanding—a 
partnership between political entities with the goal of accomplishing jointly-held goals—
and allows that groups and political entities can enter into alliances together to 
accomplish goals as well.  Relationship, friendship, and alliance will be used 
interchangeably in this text.  Lastly, solidarity will be used in this work to refer to a sense 
of unity between groups that define themselves similarly based on common objectives, 
                                                 
7 Yet, a friendship could be, and often was, more than a general expression of goodwill and mutual 
understanding.  Many states utilized the notion of friendship—or, in German, freundschaft—as a means of 
diplomacy and a tool in managing foreign affairs.  In the East German case, freundschaft often evoked 
negative feelings for the average citizen, as it was closely associated with the German-Soviet Friendship 
Society (Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft, or DSF), which attempted a Sovietization that 
many resisted, even if only passively, despite nearly-mandatory involvement in the society.  In regards to 
the relationship with Black America, one finds that the SED’s notion of friendship may have been 
expressed as goodwill and support, but was certainly a tool in the SED’s attempts to position the GDR 
internationally.  African Americans’ notion of friendship with the GDR was a political tool as well, 
utilizing support and solidarity in efforts to rethink American society. 
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desires, or interests.  These feelings of unity are often used to offer support and work as 
deterrents against those who fall outside of the groups.  
As this dissertation will show, the relationship in question was one between Black 
American leftists and East German elites.  Why frame this as a project about Black 
America, the Civil Rights Movement, and East Germany, when it is really about two very 
specific groups of African Americans and East Germans?  A broader framework is useful 
for several reasons: first, that is how the alliance was depicted—when the SED spoke 
publicly about its relationship with Black America, it rarely made the explicit distinction 
between African Americans more generally, and the group’s communist subset, just as 
black leftists usually spoke of their experiences with and observations about East 
Germans in sweeping terms.  The fact that black leftists and civil rights activists will at 
times be referred to in this work as if they are the same is indicative of the SED’s 
depiction of the black freedom struggle in the US.  Understanding the reality of the 
relationship is just as important as understanding the image both sides created. 
To address this relationship, a variety of sources, including newspaper and 
magazine articles, government records, pamphlets, photographs, biographies and 
autobiographies, speeches, and personal remembrances have been utilized.  Newspaper 
and magazine articles reveal the self-image that the East German government sought to 
portray as part of its legitimacy efforts.  Newspaper and magazine articles were also a 
space where African Americans worked out their thoughts about East Germany, the same 
places where other blacks became acquainted with the GDR and its solidarity work. 
Government records and solidarity pamphlets from East Germany allow for an 
assessment of the ways the state utilized the rhetoric, language, and figures of the African 
7 
 
American civil rights movement to underline its own anti-racist identity and to what ends.  
Photographs offer a means of gauging societal response to visits made by African 
Americans, presenting visual testimony of citizens’ reactions to the visitors.  Where these 
photos have been staged by the government, they offer insight into the image the 
government sought to propagate.  Biographies, autobiographies, and speeches reveal how 
each side understood both their role and their partner in this relationship. 
While the lives of many of the African Americans to be discussed in this study 
have generally been well documented in the secondary literature, in many cases this does 
not extend to their time in East Germany.  Records of personal remembrances will help to 
fill these holes, though it is important to acknowledge that these are memories of events 
that had occurred many years earlier and as such, are vulnerable to inaccuracies.  
Additionally, while many of the African Americans in this relationship were at one time 
dedicated to socialism or communism, many of these personal remembrances were 
recorded in a post-Soviet Union world, which may have influenced the recollection of 
their experiences or what they deemed suitable to share.  The way incidents are 
remembered, however, can be just as revealing as more “factually accurate” accounts, 
allowing us to peer into the memories that have developed around African Americans, the 
civil rights struggle, and East Germany.  
Methodologically, this project utilizes a transnational approach, examining the 
processes of transfer and interaction that occurred between African Americans and East 
Germans.8  While the nation-state is still important to this work, this transnational 
approach reveals something missed by a national framework.  It has long been argued 
                                                 
8 In this case, transnationalism will refer to the exchange of ideas and people across national borders.  
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that the US and East Germany had a very limited relationship, yet, a transnational 
approach reveals that while the American government may have conducted little official 
business with East Germany, the same cannot be said of particular groups within the US, 
like African Americans.  This methodology is also valuable in examining anti-racism in 
the Cold War, as it was a concept that was influenced by the transfer and flow of ideas 
between various groups, states, and government organizations.9   
As the reader will notice, this dissertation’s focus in East Germany is largely upon 
the ruling party, the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands/Socialist Unity 
Party).  In large part, this owes to the fact that the SED comprised much of the East 
German side of the friendship.  However, there were times when East German citizens 
weighed in on the alliance, African Americans, or topics of race more generally.  Where 
possible, these sentiments from East German citizens are included, though because a free 
public discussion on the topic of racism was virtually impossible, there are few critical 
statements available on record from that time.  Assessing proclamations about East 
German racism (or the lack thereof) made by East German citizens becomes challenging 
because many people were well aware that speaking against the SED in a public manner 
was unwise.  East Germans quickly became skilled at saying what the SED wanted to 
hear, making it difficult to ascertain who was speaking honestly and who was merely 
reciting rhetoric.   
Additionally, the number of people actually encompassed under the term “SED” 
was quite large, with “citizens” also operating as “functionaries,” making it necessary to 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of the value of a transnational approach to the study of racism, see Simon Wendt, 
“Transnational Perspectives on the History of Racism in North America,” Amerikastudien/American 
Studies 54, no. 3 (2009): 473-98.  I am utilizing this approach in my consideration of the study of anti-
racism. 
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determine whether a statement was made as a citizen or as a representative of the Party.  
This is not to imply that the SED had full control over the beliefs of the average East 
German, but rather that the regime limited the sphere of acceptable public expression.  
Lastly, surveys or oral histories about East German racism were generally carried out 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as, ideologically, racism did not exist in East Germany, 
making a survey examining East German racism unnecessary.  These particular 
comments must be read critically, as some are undoubtedly colored by the fall of 
Communism and a general pervasive sense in the early 1990s that communism was 
“bad,” creating an impetus to construct ideological distance between one’s self and the 
defunct SED regime. 
Though German history has long been understood as one largely devoid of people 
of color, over the last twenty-five years historians have begun to acknowledge the role 
played by blacks in German history.  Historical studies of Germany now include 
examinations of encounters between Germans and various groups of blacks, including 
blacks in Germany’s African colonies, the black French colonial troops who occupied the 
Rhineland after World War I, African Americans who occupied West Germany following 
World War II, as well as the Black Africans who arrived in West Germany as students 
and “guest workers” after WWII.  The life experiences of mixed-race children born to 
white German women and foreign black men have also engaged historians.10  However, 
curiously, only a few have ventured beyond a superficial discussion of East Germany’s 
relationship with blacks.  While offering a serious examination of East Germany’s 
                                                 
10 This text will refer to these individuals of mixed race as either Black German or Afro-German.  In its 
current usage, Black German can sometimes encompass individuals who are not of African descent—a 
Turkish German, for instance.  As it is used in this work, it will refer to Germans of African descent.  
10 
 
relationship with Black America, this dissertation will contribute to discussions about 
race and racism in East Germany, reflecting on changes and continuities in German race 
thinking, while contemplating how the East German understanding of race was affected 
and molded by Cold War pressures.  Also important, this work will be an addition to the 
discussion about “red racism,” racism in communist or socialist states.11 
 
Cold War Alliances and the Beginnings of an Unexpected Friendship 
Put simply, the friendship between Black America and East Germany was a 
consequence of the tensions and politics of the Cold War, one that became as robust as it 
did because of an African American tradition of internationalism.  After the Second 
World War came to an end, the US and the Soviet Union quickly emerged as 
superpowers on opposite ends of political and ideological spectrums, resulting in decades 
of magnified international political consciousness.  The ongoing struggle for supremacy 
between these two power blocs was never any clearer than in the middle of Europe, in a 
divided Germany.  When WWII ended, the four Allied powers—the US, Britain, France, 
and the Soviet Union—divided Germany into four zones of occupation.  Eventually the 
American, British, and French zones were fused, and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG—West Germany) was established in 1949; several months later, the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR—East Germany) was created on the soil of what had been 
the Soviet Zone of Occupation.  Whereas West Germany was largely viewed as a 
legitimate state by members of the international community aligned with the capitalist 
                                                 
11 For example, see Ian Law, Red Racism: Racism in Communist and Post-Communist Contexts (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).  Law discusses racism in a variety of communist states but does not 
include a significant discussion of East Germany. 
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West, East Germany was not; in fact, by the 1970s, only a handful of communist states 
and several in the Middle East had offered East Germany diplomatic recognition.  
Without a more global recognition of East Germany, its government had little 
international influence and authority, rendering the state ineffective and inconsequential 
in the minds of many in both the capitalist and communist corners of the world. 
 Valuing the clear international diplomatic advantage that West Germany held 
over East Germany, the West German government expended substantial amounts of time, 
effort, and money to guarantee that foreign governments would continue to deny East 
Germany diplomatic recognition.  Bonn, the seat of the West German government, 
ensured that foreign states limited their diplomatic and economic dealings with East 
Germany, isolating East Germany internationally.12  Using an approach known as the 
Hallstein Doctrine, the FRG offered diplomatic recognition to countries that did not 
recognize the GDR, excepting the Soviet Union, which effectively politically and 
financially isolated East Germany.  In response to the Hallstein Doctrine and East 
Germany’s severely limited fount of legitimacy, East Germany’s ruling party, the SED, 
worked relentlessly to convince non-Communist states to grant its government diplomatic 
recognition.   
In doing so, the SED focused in part on the newly-emerging states in a 
decolonizing Africa that largely fell into the “non-aligned” category, meaning that they 
had yet to commit to either the American or the Soviet model.13  SED officials believed 
                                                 
12 William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 2. 
13 National liberation movements in Africa were worthwhile targets for the world’s communists because 
they believed that “victories against Western imperialism could weaken the world capitalist system and 
bring it closer to collapse.”  Lenin had earlier written that communists might find these movements to be 
quite useful to their own goals, because the liberation movements marked the locations at which capitalism 
12 
 
that obtaining recognition from even just one non-Communist state would lead to an 
“avalanche of further recognitions and result in a more general acceptance of [East 
Germany] as an independent state.”14  The SED subscribed to what has been called a 
gradualist vision, in which the government simply offered the new African states 
solidarity and economic cooperation, believing that by not advertising its political 
ambitions up front, the SED would then obtain the diplomatic legitimacy it craved, 
thereby justifying its political objectives.15   
 In reality, however, East Germany could not compete with West Germany in a 
battle of financial assistance; as a result, East Germany’s emphasis on solidarity as a 
means of assistance grew.  Part of this solidarity effort, observed Michael Sodaro, 
consisted of organizing a series of activities that included the creation of solidarity weeks 
and friendship days, in which guests from African nations visited East Berlin.  The 
intention was to foster a relationship between people in East Germany and the target 
states, instituting a series of cross-cultural contacts.16  Officials hoped that these moments 
of friendship would lead to desirable, and diplomatically meaningful, responses to East 
German overtures.  To a certain extent, this approach was successful; East Germany’s 
declarations about the evils of imperialism encouraged some newly-independent states to 
step forward and offer East Germany their support.  Despite the fact that West Germany 
too declared itself to be against imperialism, its close relationship with the United States, 
as well as France, Belgium, Britain, and Portugal—the first practicing a foreign policy 
                                                                                                                                                 
was the most fragile and vulnerable.  Fredrickson, “‘Self-Determination for Negroes’: Communists and 
Black Freedom Struggles, 1928-1948,” in Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in 
the United States and South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 186.   
14 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 3. 
15 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 59. 
16 Michael Sodaro, “The GDR and the Third World: Supplicant and Surrogate," in Eastern Europe and the 
Third World: East vs. South, ed. Michael Radu (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 115. 
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that many argued resembled imperialism, and the last four actual colonial powers in 
Africa—severely undermined any West German anti-imperialist declarations.17 
 Yet, regardless of the inroads made in Africa through East Germany’s use of 
solidarity and anti-imperialist rhetoric, the threat of the Hallstein Doctrine meant that 
young African states had much more to lose from a relationship with East Germany than 
with West Germany.  Important to note, however, is that for many states it was not a 
matter of politics or a consideration of the “German question”18 that influenced their 
decision to enter into a diplomatic or economic partnership with one of the Germanys.  
As Christian Ostermann has noted, even African leaders who could have been labeled as 
left-leaning were rather “indifferent to the complexities of the German question.”19  
Instead, many states utilized the German power struggles as a bargaining chip, a means of 
acquiring the best possible deal regarding aid and diplomatic relations, by threatening to 
establish links with the other German state.20  When it truly came down to it, what East 
Germany had to offer was a political and ideological worldview, in addition to solidarity 
and moral support.21  For many states, solidarity paled in comparison to financial aid. 
Already faced with the limited success of its economic assistance and language of 
solidarity, the growth of a détente in the 1960s meant that the SED’s anti-Western 
rhetoric increasingly accomplished less and less.22  By the late 1960s, official recognition 
of the East German state was still largely confined to communist corners of the world, 
                                                 
17 Sodaro, "The GDR and the Third World," 116, 122. 
18 The German Question refers to the issues (political, ideological, financial, etc.) surrounding the division 
of Germany. 
19 Christian F. Ostermann, "East Germany and the Horn Crisis: Documents of SED Afrikapolitik," Cold 
War International History Project Bulletin 8/9 (n.d.), 48. 
20 Gray, Germany's Cold War, 124. 
21 As this work will show, this is exactly what African American friends of the GDR were willing and able 
to accept. 
22 Gray, Germany's Cold War, 124, 149. 
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and would remain the status quo until the early 1970s.  Change came about on 21 
December 1972, when East and West Germany signed the Basic Treaty, which “laid the 
groundwork for practical cooperation between the two German states on cross-border 
issues.”23  In informally acknowledging the East German state, West Germany implicitly 
conveyed to its allies that they could safely establish links with the socialist Germany.  In 
the month of December alone, twenty-one states established diplomatic relations with 
East Germany, and two years later, the United States followed suit.24   
Yet, as William Glenn Gray cautions, “As satisfying as these milestones must 
have been for the SED leadership, the landslide recognitions should not be construed as a 
defeat for the Federal Republic [West Germany].  The East German regime had remained 
on the fringes of international life precisely as long as West Germans wanted it to.”25 
Owing to this, rather than relaxing after the flood of diplomatic recognitions, the SED 
embarked upon the “more nebulous pursuit of international renown as a model socialist 
society.”26  Now, legitimacy in the form of international prominence was the goal.  
Writing in 1981, Michael Sodaro offered another reason for East Germany’s continued 
pursuit of legitimacy, arguing that despite the improvement in relations between East and 
West Germany, the SED believed that there was no guarantee that the détente would 
remain a fixture of inter-German relations.  Likely for both these reasons, SED officials 
deemed it unnecessary to avoid ideological confrontation with West Germany in other 
parts of the world, and allowed their anti-Western propaganda campaign to continue 
                                                 
23 Gray, Germany's Cold War, 218. 
24 Gray, Germany's Cold War, 218-19.  The United States held out until 1974 in hopes of compelling East 
Germany to pay restitution to Israel. 
25 Gray, Germany's Cold War, 219. 
26 Gray, Germany's Cold War, 220. 
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unabated.27  It is against this backdrop of East Germany’s efforts to acquire legitimacy 
and its continual struggle for influence that the relationship between East Germany and 
Black America rested.    
While East Germany struggled to navigate the realities of a Cold War world, 
African Americans involved in the civil rights movement were grappling with the 
tensions of this new world order as well.  Just as the power struggle between the US and 
the Soviet Union was evident within a divided Germany, so too was it apparent within the 
civil rights movement.  As with any group comprised of such a large number of people, 
various organizations within the civil rights movement gravitated toward different 
political poles.  Some of these groups, whether with real or alleged connections to the far 
left, quickly discovered that falling victim to the communist witch hunt had dire 
implications for the group’s survival.  The willingness of some of the more popular 
groups, like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
to move closer toward the political right meant that left-leaning civil rights activists were 
often forced to look elsewhere for allies in the freedom struggle, especially as the 
NAACP’s position came to be considered more and more “mainstream” in a country 
becoming ever more conservative.28  Therefore, some of the civil rights movement’s 
most outspoken and radical leaders looked to and accepted overtures from the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc for assistance in their fight for civil rights at home. 
This desire to look beyond American borders for a solution to an American 
                                                 
27 Sodaro, “The GDR and the Third World," 135. 
28 For a discussion of the NAACP’s response to the “anticommunist hysteria of the early Cold War,” see 
Manfred Berg, “Black Civil Rights and Liberal Anticommunism: The NAACP in the Early Cold War,” The 
Journal of American History 94:1 (June 2007): 75-96.  For a discussion of leftist activists’ situation in the 
US, see Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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problem had precedent for African American activists; for example, in the years after 
WWI, disappointed that participation in the war effort had not garnered African 
Americans more civil rights, many blacks looked to the Soviet Union and its anti-racist 
rhetoric for a solution.29  Just as they had before, after WWII civil rights activists 
understood that their goals and objectives, and the methods used to achieve them, 
coincided or overlapped with those of other states.30  When international observers—
especially communist ones—spoke out against American racism and in favor of black 
rights, a number of black activists happily embraced this support.  The statements of 
international backing lent credence to Black America’s arguments in favor of equal rights 
and treatment, and in some cases, added to the “political momentum being generated 
against racial prejudice and discrimination in the presumed land of the free.”31  Whether 
out of an honest desire to help or a self-interest that profited from placing pressure on the 
American government, international commentary played a role in the government’s 
management of the race question. 
 The pressure was applied in several ways, but most importantly, international 
observers forced the American government to acknowledge the gross discrepancy 
between its bombastic proclamations that the US was home to a thriving democracy and 
its policies regarding racial and ethnic minorities.32  Racism came to represent a political 
problem for the American government as officials grew increasingly concerned about the 
ways in which reports of racist violence and the continued denial of black rights hurt the 
                                                 
29 For a discussion about African Americans in the Soviet Union, see Maxim Matusevich, “Black in the 
U.S.S.R.: Africans, African Americans, and the Soviet Society,” Transition, Issue 100 (2009): 56-75. 
30 Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 5. 
31 Paul Gordon Lauren, “Seen from the Outside: The International Perspective on America’s Dilemma,” in 
Window on Freedom, 35. 
32 Lauren, “Seen from the Outside,” 36. 
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American reputation abroad.33  Especially disconcerting was the idea that the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc could use American racism as a propaganda platform, not 
just creating negative press for the US, but also potentially winning over undecided 
governments and peoples.  Mary Dudziak has argued that this international criticism and 
communist propaganda forced the American government to act in order to placate 
“foreign critics by reframing the narrative of race in America,” and to promote “some 
level of social change.”  Going on, Dudziak maintained that it was clearly understood that 
some reform was needed “in order to make credible the [American] government’s 
argument about race and democracy.”34 
Other historians, however, are not convinced that the Cold War had as positive an 
influence on the civil rights movement as Dudziak argues, maintaining that the stark 
divisions that were drawn within the movement ultimately had a negative impact on the 
movement’s ability to achieve its goals.  Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore has argued that the 
positive effects of the Cold War on the civil rights movement have been overemphasized 
and that, in fact, “[s]een through the lens of African American history, the influence of 
the Cold War weakens further.”35  Along these lines, for example, Carol Anderson’s 
discussion of Walter White, the leader of the NAACP, suggested that the Cold War’s 
anti-communist hysteria served to weaken the movement when figures like White 
became fixated on defending the US and pursuing an anti-communist agenda that 
misrepresented the state of American race relations.36  In the case of the black leftists 
                                                 
33 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 6. 
34 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 13-14.       
35 Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Defying Dixie: The Radical Roots of Civil Rights, 1919-1950 (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 7-8.   
36 Carol Anderson, “Bleached Souls and Red Negroes: The NAACP and Black Communists in the Early 
Cold War, 1948-1952,” in Window on Freedom, 93. 
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who would become friends with the GDR, it is evident that the Cold War had a negative 
impact on their efforts in the struggle.  
 This impact of the Cold War on the civil rights movement, however, created a 
situation in which a Black American-East German relationship and alliance became a 
possibility.  Though the tensions of the Cold War greatly limited what black leftists were 
able to accomplish within American borders and with whom, it also opened up a number 
of opportunities for international alliances that black leftists used in attempts to 
accomplish their goals at home.  It was this desire to work with peoples beyond American 
borders that was what, combined with the movement’s general move toward the political 
right, created a situation in which certain members of the African American civil rights 
movement felt comfortable entering into a relationship with East Germany.  Together, 
both East Germany and Black America were affected by the tensions created and 
exacerbated by the Cold War and found in each other an ally in their struggle to forge for 
themselves better circumstances. 
 
Intertwining East German Legitimacy and the African American Civil Rights 
Movement 
The East German concept of anti-racism was an oft-used outgrowth of the state’s 
founding myth, anti-fascism.  This myth proclaimed that East Germans were the 
inheritors of the resistance efforts carried out against the Nazis under the leadership of the 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD—Communist Party of Germany), which 
would later forcefully take over the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD—
Social Democratic Party of Germany) and form the SED.  As the successor to the KPD, 
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the SED believed that the myth gave them the legitimacy and authority necessary to 
assume rule over East Germany.  This myth also maintained that the West German 
government was the successor to the Nazi Party and its fascism, from which the West 
German government acquired the authority it used to create policies and lead its people.  
Painted as such, East Germans were faced with the choice of supporting their state, which 
claimed to stand in favor of “peace, democracy, friendship among peoples, and 
humanity,” and “against militarism, imperialist war, terror, race-baiting, and mass 
murder,” or supporting West Germany, a state that allegedly wanted nothing more than to 
destroy those who stood opposed to fascism.37   
Part of being anti-fascist included standing in opposition to racism.  Though anti-
fascism was mentioned frequently in reference to the relationship with Black America, it 
was anti-racism that was often placed in the spotlight.  One finds that SED propaganda 
aimed at black populations often emphasized the GDR’s anti-racism only to bring anti-
fascism and class to the forefront later.  Certainly, the SED’s heavy reliance on anti-
racism in furthering a relationship with Black America is in part evidence of the Party 
molding its message to make it more attractive to its target audience(s).  The focus on 
anti-racism more generally, however, also points quite specifically to the German context 
in which the SED ruled.  At a time when there was plenty of blame to share for the sins 
of the Nazis, the SED was at pains to create the starkest of divisions between East 
Germany and Hitlerian Germany, which stipulated an anti-racist outlook.   
Wrapped up in the SED’s notion of what it meant to be anti-racist was that one 
first and foremost had to be anti-capitalist, as the only effective way to eradicate racial 
                                                 
37 Alan Nothnagle, Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the 
German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 93-96. 
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intolerance was to remove the capitalist competition that bred racism.38  Because racism 
grew out of this competition, adherents to Marxist ideology “repudiated biological 
racism, characterizing it as a bourgeois ideological device to divide the working class 
along ethnic lines.”39  Given this view, the connection between East Germany and the 
black freedom movement, in the US and elsewhere, was a rather logical one for East 
German officials to make (and an easy one for black communists to accept).  They laid 
out this connection for their citizens, making news about the civil rights movement 
widely available in East Germany.  A large portion of the information about the 
movement and African American history was delivered via newspapers, magazines, and 
books, as East German publishing houses requisitioned translations of key works by 
activists like W.E.B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Coretta Scott 
King.  East German authors also wrote their own African American histories, telling their 
readers of a working-class people who, despite many obstacles, fought back against 
capitalist oppression.40   
Before long, an East German discourse about American race relations emerged, 
spurring the growth of a number of government-supported and –sponsored organizations 
and associations created with the expressed purpose of pledging solidarity with and 
support for Black America.  The propaganda that was created focused on both the 
                                                 
38 For a contemporary (socialist) discussion of the remnants of racism or racial discrimination in a socialist 
state, see the following article about the Jose A. Aponte Commission in Cuba, which was created in order 
to address “the issue of racial discrimination and racial prejudices in the cultural context.”  “Jose A. Aponte 
Commission: Defending what has been achieved,” Digital Granma Internacional, 28 June 2013, 
www.granma.cu/ingles/cuba-i/28jun-APONTE.html, accessed 12 July 2013. 
39 Fredrickson, “‘Self-Determination for Negroes,’” 184. 
40 For example, see Prof. Dr. Klaus Bollinger, Freedom now—Freiheit sofort!  Die Negerbevölkerung der 
USA im Kampf um Demokratie, (Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1968) and 
Horst Ihde, Von der Plantage zum schwarzen Ghetto: Geschichte und Kultur der Afroamerikaner in den 
USA, (Leipzig: Urania Verlag, 1975). 
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“reactionary” West German government in Bonn and the American government in 
Washington.  Though the FRG was the SED’s main focus, the US is often the expressed 
target in much of the East German anti-racist propaganda.  This focus on the US was 
two-pronged.  In one respect, the US was a target because, in a practical sense, it needed 
to be.  The civil rights movement was not struggling against the West German 
government, and successful propaganda needed to reflect a shared enemy for both Black 
Americans and East Germans.  Yet, the US was also a target because it allowed the SED 
to portray West Germany’s alliance with the US as an acceptance, and even approval of, 
the American government’s racist policies.41  As we will see, the East German discourse 
on African Americans quite intimately intertwined the civil rights movement with the 
German-German struggle, the relationship that blossomed between Black America and 
East Germany becoming a weapon in that fight.   
 
Chapter Outline   
 The chapters that follow outline the growth of the alliance between Black 
America and East Germany, as well as the peak of the relationship, which then leads into 
a discussion about the decline of the friendship.  To better understand the relationship, as 
well as East German views on blacks, blackness, race, and racism, Chapter Two delves 
into Germany’s history with blacks, beginning in 1871.  This chapter outlines German 
interactions with blacks in Imperial Germany, Weimar Germany, and Nazi Germany, 
                                                 
41 The power dynamics in the relationship between West Germany and the US were not reflected accurately 
in East German propaganda, which portrayed the relationship as far more voluntary than it actually was.  
On the relationship between the FRG and the US, see for example: Detlef Junker, ed., The United States 
and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1968: A Handbook, Vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) and Junker, ed., The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1968-
1990: A Handbook, Vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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arguing that Germans’ perceptions of blacks tended to shift according to whether they 
saw these blacks as outsiders who would always remain separate from the German 
nation, or as interlopers who would disrupt the definition of German as white and 
European.  It is this history upon which East German perceptions of blacks, as well as 
any racialized views of blacks, was built. 
 Chapter Three examines early thoughts on a Black American-East German 
friendship in the 1950s, contending that for much of this decade, the relationship was 
largely one that existed in the minds of the East German elite.  This theoretical belief that 
East Germans and Black Americans were on parallel tracks seeking to overthrow the 
capitalist West made African Americans an attractive ally for these GDR elite.  Though 
there were several African Americans who came to reside in East Germany, or at the very 
least passed through the country, the relationship long remained a theoretical one, as each 
African American lacked the necessary spark to make the relationship real.  It was not 
until Paul Robeson visited the GDR in 1960 that East German citizens became interested 
in the alliance and African Americans began to explore the value of ties to East Germany. 
 Chapter Four looks at Robeson’s visit, as well as East German efforts to organize 
the trip, in the face of rising numbers of East Germans fleeing for the West.  Appreciating 
the fact that many East Germans were fond of Robeson for less-than-political reasons, the 
SED sought to associate itself with the African American in the minds of its citizens, in 
the hope that love for Robeson would rub off onto the Party.  Chapter Four continues 
with an examination of East Germany’s most extensive solidarity effort on behalf of an 
African American—Angela Davis—at which point the relationship between Black 
America and East Germany was at its most popular.  Yet, despite the image of an anti-
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racist East Germany that was painted by the SED, as well as Robeson and other visiting 
African Americans, blacks who resided in the GDR knew that the real situation for 
people of color was nothing like the propaganda stated.  Anti-racism—a commitment to 
racial tolerance—existed only at the superficial level of policies and laws and was rarely 
enforced in East German society. 
 Though the early 1970s marked the peak of the friendship, by the mid-1970s, the 
relationship started slowly to deteriorate, as the civil rights movement began its own 
decline and East Germany acquired diplomatic recognition from a large portion of the 
international community.  With the very glue that had held both sides together starting to 
loosen, there was little to hold the relationship together in a way that resembled the 
heyday of the friendship.  Chapter Five examines this decline and the state of the 
relationship from the mid-1970s until the end of the 1980s, arguing that in this period, 
one finds a stagnation of sorts regarding what was left of the relationship, as the SED 
sought to maintain Paul Robeson’s legacy while discounting East German interest in 
contemporary African American cultural products, like hip-hop.   
A comparison between citizens’ views on Martin Luther King, Jr. and the image 
of King painted by the SED in the late 1980s also highlights the ever growing distance 
between the SED and its people.  A relationship that had once been used to bring the 
people and the SED closer would, by the end of the 1980s, come to emphasize the ever-
growing chasm between the Party and East German citizens. Chapter Five closes with a 
look at the SED’s general approach to the friendship to reveal the ways in which rhetoric 
about the civil rights movement failed to correspond to the SED’s real views on the black 
freedom movement. 
24 
 
 The conclusion closes out this work with a discussion about racism in the wake of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of East and West Germany.  Many have 
sought an explanation for the escalating racism in Germany in the early 1990s by 
pointing to the racism that had “festered” in East Germany ever since Hitler’s defeat.  
Through the lens of the relationship between Black America and East Germany, one finds 
that East German views on blacks, race, and racism are more complicated than many 
have believed.  
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Chapter Two: On Blackness with Blacks 
German Perceptions of Blackness Prior to 1945 
 
“…the Black remains a mythic figure in German thought.” 
--Sander L. Gilman, On Blackness without Blacks42 
 
 For many years, black history in Germany has been subtly, and sometimes not-so-
subtly, erased or rendered invisible.  Reflecting in the early 1980s on Germany’s 
relationship with peoples of African descent, historian Sander L. Gilman declared that 
Germany had developed a conception of blackness that existed without blacks.  In fact, it 
appeared to him and others that much of what Germany knew of blacks came from a 
series of very brief interactions with foreign blacks, which had had little influence upon 
Germans and their history.  This view has persisted not only among scholars, but among 
general observers as well, leading to a perception of Germany largely as a “white” state 
unfamiliar with minorities, most especially blacks.  Although the 1980s later gave rise to 
the recognition of the black historical figure in Germany, blacks often received 
inadequate academic treatment, if any at all, outside of specialized texts.   
At the start of the 2000s, historians began to examine more closely the German 
interaction with blacks, finally disproving to a more mainstream academic audience the 
notion that Germans had developed a conception of blackness without blacks.  Though 
Black Studies in Germany has since grown in popularity, the early hesitance to 
acknowledge the existence of blacks in German history can be attributed to several 
factors.  First, blacks living in Germany have admittedly comprised a smaller proportion 
of the German population than have other minority groups, which lulled scholars into 
believing that any black/German interactions had an insignificant impact and were 
                                                 
42 Sander L. Gilman, On Blackness without Blacks: Essays on the Image of the Black in Germany (Boston: 
G.K. Hall, 1982), 128. 
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therefore of little consequence.43  Instead, minority research in Germany has long focused 
on Jews, Roma and Sinti (the so-called “Gypsies”), and in the post-war years, primarily 
Turkish Gastarbeiter (guest workers).  However, an examination of German responses to 
blacks has shown that blacks often bore a significance that was out of proportion to their 
actual numbers.44  For example, when black French colonial troops occupied the 
Rhineland after World War I, though black numbers were small, blacks “became a 
convenient symbol for the alleged injustice of the French occupation regime and the 
Versailles peace order in general.”45  As this chapter will show, since the colonial period, 
the symbolic importance of blacks in Germany often bore no relationship to their 
physical numbers.  In many cases, blacks, as well as the images associated with blacks, 
were often tied to larger issues resonating within Germany.   
Second, research on blacks and Germany in the years prior to Adolf Hitler’s reign 
have often become subsumed in a teleological discussion determined to reveal 
connections between German racism against blacks and the horrors of the Holocaust.  
Treating Germany’s behavior towards blacks in their African colonies, or later along the 
Rhineland after WWI, as simply a prelude to the Holocaust relegates these blacks and 
their experiences to nothing more than a “training grounds” for what would occur later.  
                                                 
43 It is difficult to know the exact number of blacks that reside in the country today, as population statistics 
relating to race or ethnicity are no longer kept in Germany.  However, as of 2008, the Initiative Schwarzer 
Menschen in Deutschland (ISD) estimated that there were nearly 500,000 Germans of African descent.  
David Gordon Smith, “‘Uncle Barack’s Cabin’: German Newspaper Slammed for Racist Cover,” Spiegel 
Online International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/uncle-barack-s-cabin-german-
newspaper-slammed-for-racist-cover-a-557861.html, retrieved 7 December 2012. 
44 The same can be said of Jews in this period, as well.  In 1910, Jews represented just 1.07% of the 
German population, which in itself was a decline from 1.13% in 1871.  Regardless of their low numbers, 
they still represented a great threat to German anti-Semites.  Neil MacMaster, Racism in Europe: 1870-
2000 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 98. 
45 Raffael Scheck, “The Killing of Black Soldiers from the French Army by the Wehrmacht in 1940: The 
Question of Authorization,” German Studies Review 28:3 (Oct. 2005), 597. 
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For instance, many studies of German violence in colonial Africa in the late-nineteenth 
century have approached the topic with the expectation of linking the genocidal acts in 
Africa to the Holocaust nearly half a century later, in order to prove a tradition of German 
militarism and violence.46  Yet, as Matti Bunzl and H. Glenn Penny argue in the 
introduction to their edited work on anthropology in Imperial Germany, “the concern to 
locate the nineteenth-century origins of Nazism in Germany’s colonial encounters 
invariably flattens the complexities inherent in these situations.”47  As scholars sought a 
connection between German activity in the African colonies and the Holocaust, the Black 
Africans themselves became lost in the shuffle, as did anything about the Black 
African/German relationship that did not directly relate to the Holocaust.  In this way, 
blacks were also rendered invisible in or subordinate to the dominant German historical 
narrative.48   
Third, what appeared to be a series of contradictory German attitudes towards 
blacks compelled many scholars to again write off the black experience in and with 
Germany as an aberration of sorts.  The black relationship to and with Germany seemed 
to lack any sort of coherence, especially when scholars compared the black experience to 
that of other minority groups, like the Jews in the first half of the twentieth century, for 
which the German treatment carried a consistency of sorts.  However, once historians 
                                                 
46 For example, see Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in 
Imperial Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
47 Matti Bunzl and H. Glenn Penny, “Introduction: Rethinking German Anthropology, Colonialism, and 
Race,” in Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire, eds. Bunzl and Penny (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 29. 
48 For an example of a conversation about race rendering blacks invisible by or subordinating them to a 
discussion about anti-Semitism, see George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European 
Racism (New York: Howard Fertig, 1985).  Though this chapter seeks to carve out a space for blacks in 
Germany, it will nevertheless include a discussion of German anti-Semitism, so as to place German anti-
black racism in the context in which it lived in pre-1945 Germany. 
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began utilizing methodologies tailored to and growing out of Black and African diaspora 
studies, they discovered that there was in fact a continuity and consistency in German 
attitudes towards blacks.49  Therefore, using methodologies pioneered by African 
American and African diaspora historians, and tweaking them to suit the German context, 
allowed for a proper examination of the black experience in Germany, and served to 
write back into the historical record all those of color who had passed through or called 
Germany home.50       
As this chapter will show, blacks were more than simply a “mythic figure in 
German thought,” as Gilman famously stated.  When East Germans and African 
Americans first met, their relationship was built on the history of nearly a hundred years 
of interactions between Germans and blacks.  Collectively, German attitudes towards 
blacks and shared memories of past relationships had an undeniable impact on the 
formation of an alliance between East Germany and Black America.  Important too was 
the impact of previous German attitudes on the development and evolution of East 
German racism and conceptions of race.  Beginning with the German colonial period 
(1884-1918), and continuing through the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), and ending with 
                                                 
49 See Tina Campt on this approach in understanding the place of Black Germans in Nazi racial ideology in 
Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, Gender, and Memory in the Third Reich (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 5. 
50 It was the very application of a traditional understanding of African diaspora studies, which many have 
argued prioritizes the African American experience over others, that led to the development of a specific 
approach to the study of Black Germans.  On reading the first publication devoted to Afro-Germans, Farbe 
bekennen: Afro-deutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer Geschichte, Michelle Wright has written: “What 
first struck me was that, whether in poetic or prosaic form, these different analyses of how Afro-German 
identity is interpolated by white Germans—or more accurately, not interpolated—speak to a unique set of 
circumstances which I had not found in the diverse array of 19th- and 20th-century African-American 
literature and theory.  Indeed, even as my graduate and post-graduate studies moved to incorporate Black 
British and Black French communities for a comparative analysis of counter-discursive strategies in subject 
formation, the Afro-German situation remained unique.”  Wright, “Others-From-Within From Without: 
Afro-German Subject Formation and the Challenge of a Counter-Discourse,” Callaloo, 26:2 (Spring 2003), 
296.  See also: Wright, Becoming Black: Creating Identity in the African Diaspora (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004). 
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the Nazi era (1933-1945), this chapter will trace the growth and evolution of the varying 
German conceptions of blackness.  In each period, German views on blacks hinged on the 
status of blacks as insiders or outsiders, a distinction that would bear significance in the 
GDR as well. 
 
Imperial Germany, Colonization, and Blacks, 1871-1918 
 Though Germans had brief and irregular contact with blacks prior to the colonial 
period, interactions did not occur in significant numbers until Germans began to settle in 
the state’s new African colonies.  For those who did not travel to Africa, the colonies 
were brought to them through advertising, art, and traveling ethnographic and 
anthropological exhibitions.  Prior to this intersection between the two groups, Germans 
had engaged in intellectual discussions and debates about those whom they considered 
racial Others51 (a concept that was broadly conceived and included other people of color 
who were not black), discussions that firmly placed the white German in a position of 
superiority.   
Despite this belief in German power and authority, interactions with blacks soon 
unearthed a number of German racial anxieties.  Whether it was German men engaging in 
sexual relationships with Black African women, or German women admiring Black 
African men, officials were eager to create a clear line of demarcation between the two 
racial groups.  These officials believed that the “dangers” of crossing this line were most 
clearly seen in the bodies of the mixed-race children born in the colonies, citizens of 
Germany who, as many at that time argued, posed a threat to the future of the German 
                                                 
51 The use of the word “Other” in this text should be read as if it were framed by scare quotes.  For ease of 
reading, I have removed the quotes from the text, because the word occurs with great frequency. 
30 
 
nation and what it meant to be German, defined in large part as being white and 
European.    
Prior to 1884, when Germany established its first colonies in Africa, Germany’s 
interactions with blacks were fairly sporadic.52  With the unification of Germany (or the 
Kaiserreich—Imperial Germany) in 1871, it was another thirteen years before Otto von 
Bismarck, the first chancellor of Germany, consented to the acquisition of colonies.  In 
Africa, Germany established German East Africa, German South West Africa, German 
Togoland, and German Kamerun.  Certainly, Germany’s late entrée into European 
colonialism affected how Germans came to view racial others, since, as Susanne Zantop 
has argued, Germans had created images of the Other absent of any interactions with the 
Other.   
To an extent, Gilman’s proclamation that Germany developed a conception of 
blackness without blacks is correct, though Zantop recognizes that this conception of 
blackness was eventually confronted by the German introduction to the actual Other.  As 
she has argued, the images Germans created of the Other influenced future German 
dealings with those who appeared racially distinct from the German nation.  These 
images, Zantop maintained, were developed by an educated German middle class, who 
                                                 
52 Probably the most well-known pre-colonial Black figure in Germany was a man named Anton Wilhelm 
Amo, who, according to historians’ best guesses, was born in 1703.  Originally from Ghana, the Dutch 
West India Company presented Amo as a gift to two German dukes in 1707.  Considered status symbols, it 
was quite common at this time for Africans to be given as gifts to European nobility.  Amo has become a 
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the greatest thinkers in Germany at this time.  He earned a doctorate, and was fluent not only in German, 
but also in Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Dutch, and French.  Amo later returned to Ghana at the age of forty, but 
was unfortunately captured and re-enslaved, dying shortly afterward.  Marilyn Sephocle, “Anton Wilhelm 
Amo,” Journal of Black Studies 23:3, Special Issue: The Image of Africa in German Society (Dec. 1992),  
182-183; Clarence Lusane, Hitler’s Black Victims: The Historical Experiences of Afro-Germans, European 
Blacks, Africans, and African Americans in the Nazi Era (New York: Routledge, 2002), 54.  Lusane refers 
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read and discussed the colonial experiences of the other European powers.  These debates 
eventually contributed to a collective colonial imagination which outlined what the Other 
was “truly” like.  This definition of the Other, however, hinged on the German definition 
of themselves as white Europeans.53   
With the creation of German colonies in Africa, German society would soon face 
their first large-scale experience with an erosion of identity via the black body.  Unlike 
other European powers settling in Africa, Germany sent only a small group of Germans 
to the colonies; the majority of those who did go were men.  As was the case in other 
colonies, the men developed relationships with the colonized women, relationships that 
sometimes led to marriage and/or the births of mixed-race children.  For white Germans, 
these children represented a crisis in German identity, as one could not be both the Other 
and German, especially when the definition of German hinged precisely on not being the 
Other.   Fatima el-Tayeb has argued that in categorizing various races, Germans 
“assigned opposite mentalities to the races,” and any race-mixing necessitated a “loss of 
‘racial purity’” that “was therefore equated with a loss of identity.”  As a result, for 
Germans to accept—or even to merely tolerate—the presence of a mixed-race population 
calling themselves German “would have shown that cultural identity is not connected to 
‘race,’” thereby removing one—if not both—of the attributes that made one German.54   
Therefore, anxious to maintain a barrier between the colonized and the colonizers, 
the German government instituted a series of bans prohibiting mixed marriages, using 
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American anti-miscegenation laws as precedents.55  One worth examining is the ban 
introduced in German South West Africa in 1905, which stated that any mixed-race 
marriage that occurred after the ordinance came into effect would no longer be 
consecrated by the German state, while marriages entered into prior to 1905 would 
remain lawful.  Any children resulting from unlawful unions would be illegitimate, and 
the state would consider these children black.  Any of the offspring from the pre-
ordinance mixed-marriages were considered legitimate, and would be considered white 
by the German state regardless of their black parentage.56   
Evident in this ordinance is a clear desire to maintain a distance between the 
German male and the female Other.57  What this example also, importantly, shows is a 
German perception of race in which the state determined one’s racial designation, and 
could apparently change it at will.  One finds in this ordinance an almost desperate desire 
to quite literally whitewash the “problem” in the colonies for the sake of maintaining the 
notion of German racial homogeneity.  The reason for this need to precisely determine 
who was black and who was white becomes clearer when Germany’s citizenship law is 
taken into consideration.  This law, based on the notion of jus sanguinis, or, “right of 
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blood,” dictated that a child born to married parents received its father’s citizenship at 
birth.  However, if the parents were not married and the father was not recognized by the 
mother at birth, the child received its mother’s citizenship.58   
While this particular conception of citizenship certainly had the potential to be 
incredibly exclusionary (one was not German merely because they were born in the 
country), it also created a problem that became evident when German men began dating 
the women in the colonies.  Once a bloodline or race perceived as weak entered into the 
German “race,” as Germans increasingly came to understand themselves, these 
individuals and all of their offspring could be next to impossible to remove.  What is 
more, this confrontation between a member of the German “race” and someone 
considered un-German posed serious threats to German identity and the definition of 
German.  Such a conception of citizenship, and its inherent dangers, explains why the 
1905 ordinance in German Southwest Africa was concerned with marriage and why it 
labeled the “legitimate” children as white and the “illegitimate” ones as black.  The 
“white” children of the married couples had German citizenship while the “black” 
children of the unmarried couples did not.  Despite all of this linguistic and racial 
maneuvering that kept the traditional definition of German intact, this decision to ignore 
the children’s black racial heritage was difficult for many Germans to abide by.   
Discussions in the metropole about the mixed-race children born in the colonies, 
and the implications their existence had for the future of the German “race,” generally 
played out in the conservative mainstream press, while liberal and progressive 
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newspapers spilled little ink on the controversy.59  The opinions expressed in the press 
were largely concerned with the potential dangers represented by these Germans of 
African descent.  One group, influenced by social anthropologists, looked to the future, 
arguing that no matter the size of the mixed-race population in the colonies, or even 
Germany itself, one drop of black blood was enough to permanently contaminate the 
German nation.  They argued that miscegenation was unnatural, and, as such, that all 
sexual contacts between races had to be outlawed.60  Meanwhile, others addressed the 
ordinance’s ruling which declared that mixed-race children born prior to the marriage ban 
were white, and focused their arguments and efforts on excluding these mixed-race 
children from any rights to the German nation.61     
A third position, taken up by the Catholic and Protestant churches, maintained a 
strong opposition to who restricted marriage rights, rather than the restriction itself.  El-
Tayeb has described the churches’ view as ambiguous because, while they opposed the 
marriage bans, the churches also opposed interracial marriages and race-mixing.  The 
churches’ main opposition to the marriage bans was not made on the basis of a belief in 
racial equality, but rather because they resented that the government had determined 
whether or not religious marriage ceremonies could take place.  As this was a territory 
which the churches considered solely their own, they argued that officials had 
overstepped their bounds when issuing the ordinances.62  That a group of mixed-race 
children in the colonies, thousands of miles away from the metropole, could cause such 
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debate is a testament to the symbolic importance that blacks acquired within Germany.63   
Though few Germans had the ability to travel to the colonies and meet blacks for 
themselves, there were a number of ways in which the colonies were brought to 
Germany, allowing Germans in the metropole to have “interactions” with blacks that 
moved beyond mere debates.  An avenue through which Germans were able to live out 
the role of colonial master without actually setting foot in the colonies was the 
ethnographic exhibition, then more commonly referred to as Völkerschauen.  In an 1890 
exhibition, the “Africa section” of the exhibition included “live palm trees” and “various 
colonial products from Africa: copra, palm oil, cloves, tobacco, cotton, palm nuts, ivory, 
animal horns and pelts, and the like.”  Meanwhile, “strange masks and other startling 
artifacts of the primitive world shocked with their bizarre difference.”64  Though these 
Völkerschauen defined themselves as scientific and serious intellectual pursuits, the 
carnivalesque and sensationalistic ways in which the Völkerschauen represented Black 
Africans served to confirm the image projected by the German public of the “savage” 
black.65   
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The turn of the century, though, brought with it bans that forbade the import of 
peoples from the German colonies for the purposes of exhibition.  These bans were not of 
a humanitarian concern, but rather were influenced by the “tacit recognition of the 
dangers in such real human contact.”   Belief in these dangers grew out of the fear that 
the more familiar Africans became with Europeans and European practices, the less 
likely it was that they would willfully return to subordinate positions once they returned 
to the colonies.  Authorities were also worried by their observation that white German 
women seemed highly susceptible to the “exotic charms” of the black men.  Even in the 
contrived environment of the exhibitions, the contact between Germans and Africans had 
the ability to erode white status and esteem in both the colonies and the metropole.66   
At about the same time as the exhibitions arrived in Germany, African American 
entertainers were also traveling to the country.  One of the most storied African American 
groups to travel to Germany was the Black Troubadours, a group that had splintered off 
of the well-known Fisk Jubilee singers.67  The Black Troubadours toured much of 
Europe, but spent most of their time in Germany, where they soon picked up German and 
began performing songs in the language.  While some German spectators enjoyed these 
performances in their native tongue, others believed that “the strange harmony of the 
voices” made it difficult for them to truly appreciate the performance, and suggested that 
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the Troubadours should stick to singing “Negro” music.68  These blacks, unlike the black 
Africans in the Völkerschauen, had stepped outside of the bounds in which Germans 
preferred they remain.  Despite this criticism, there were certainly Germans who quite 
enjoyed the black musical performances, evidenced by the fact that in 1896 alone, some 
one hundred African American performers poured into the country.69  It is important, 
however, not to equate an enjoyment of black-performed music with a nuanced 
understanding and acceptance of people of color.   
The relationship between blacks and white Germans under the Imperial and 
colonial governments was one marked by official efforts to maintain a suitable distance 
between blacks and Germany, Germans, and German culture.  Though some Germans 
expressed an interest in blacks, whether through their participation in a romantic or 
friendly relationship, or by seeking out performances by black entertainers, this interest 
on its own was by no means an indication of racial enlightenment.  Though German 
attitudes towards blacks were similar to those of other European states, Germany’s 
“history” with blacks was much shorter.70  At a time when other Europeans were 
interacting with blacks in the colonies, Germans were developing perceptions of the 
racial Other, formed by reading travelogues and participating in spirited debates.  With 
time, German conceptions of blackness came to be based on concrete interactions largely 
brought about by Germany’s foray into colonialism.  From this stemmed national 
discussions in Imperial Germany about blacks and their impact on German national 
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identity. 
 
Weimar Germany and Blacks, 1918-1933 
In the period between WWI and WWII, Germany yet again confronted racial 
anxiety over the future of the German race and what it meant to identify as German.  
Following the end of the First World War, black troops occupied the Rhineland in 
Germany and eventually fathered children with white German women.  In this case, 
debates about the presence of these black occupying soldiers who were tied to Germany’s 
defeat in WWI, and the children they fathered with white German women, built upon the 
discourse developed during Germany’s colonial period.  This time, however, there were 
several factors that made the interracial sexual relationships and the resulting mixed-race 
children appear even more dangerous: the relationships were between black men and 
white women, the children resided in Germany with their mothers, and both the 
relationships and the children were reminders of Germany’s defeat, vulnerability, and 
weakness in the wake of WWI.  At a time when Germany sought to rebuild, blacks in 
Germany were understood as impediments to making the state great once again.  
After the German defeat in WWI, the Treaty of Versailles divested Germany of its 
colonies, but before long, Germans came face to face with yet another group of Black 
Africans.  A condition of the Treaty gave France the option to occupy the Rhineland, an 
industrial region of Germany with rich mineral deposits.  Before the finalization of the 
Treaty’s terms in 1918, German negotiators attempted to ensure that France would not 
use any of its black troops if it chose to occupy the Rhine, but France was unwilling to 
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make any assurances.71  Just as Germany had feared, when France began its occupation 
of the Rhineland it used, among others, men from France’s African colonies.  Keith L. 
Nelson has estimated that among the occupation forces, there were 42,000 Africans in 
Germany by the spring of 1920, and 45,000 a year later.  The bulk of these Africans were 
Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian; according to French records, the first blacks from 
sub-Saharan Africa arrived in Germany in April 1919.  Nelson has pegged the number of 
black troops at 10,000, though the Germans “never tired of pointing out…that many of 
the North Africans were so black as to be indistinguishable from the Negroes.”72  This 
opinion likely resulted in a higher number of perceived blacks in Germany. 
Though this was not the first time that a black man had set foot on German soil, it 
was the first time that blacks had arrived in Germany in such numbers.  Opposition in the 
early years of the occupation, though, did not center solely on the black troops, but rather 
on the French decision to use black troops.  The French had originally chosen troops from 
its colonies not only for practical reasons—many of their white French troops had either 
been killed or injured during the war—but also because they wanted to underscore for the 
Germans the extent of their defeat.73  Edmund Dene Morel, a British journalist and social 
activist, quickly took up the battle cry against this French policy, publishing in Britain 
several articles about the occupation.74  He later expanded on these articles and published 
a pamphlet entitled “The Horror on the Rhine.”  In the preface to this pamphlet, Morel 
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claimed that his stance was not an attack on the black troops, but rather a concern that if 
“Europe is to become accustomed to the employment of coloured soldiers for political 
purposes, there is a danger in store for the African populations, as well as the European 
[populations] ….”75  
  A large part of this danger, as perceived by those who opposed the French policy 
in the Rhineland, owed to the notion that the French had turned the “normal” racial 
hierarchy on its head, sending black troops to stand in authority over whites.  With such 
rhetoric, Morel’s campaign against the “horror” on the Rhine not only engendered 
support in Europe, but also the United States.76  Many groups, including the Rhenish 
Women’s League, spoke out against the occupation and published pamphlets in various 
languages, demanding that women everywhere “support as strongly as it is in their power 
the aim of the Rhenish Women’s League of ridding the Rhinelands [sic] of the coloured 
troops forced to occupy it by their white lords.”77  Here, as with Morel, the blame rested 
not with the black soldiers, but rather with the French government for bringing them to 
Germany.     
The blame, however, would soon be transferred to the black troops, as a number 
of these troops engaged in romantic and sexual relationships with white German women.  
In these years, many white Europeans and Americans were unable to fathom a situation 
in which a white woman would willingly engage in sexual relations with a black man—
unless she were a woman of “loose” morals—and so the common assumption was that 
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these women had been raped.  The interracial sexual relations were yet another reminder 
of the occupation’s inversion of the racial hierarchy, made especially egregious if one 
believed that the women had been raped (though it is telling that this belief was 
preferable to the idea that the women had willingly become sexually involved with the 
black men).  As Tina Campt has argued, the “access of Blacks to white female bodies” 
represented “a sexual equality between Blacks and white men in relation to (or, perhaps, 
in the possession of) white women.”78  This assumption of racial and sexual parity was 
considered a consequence of Germany’s physical defeat in WWI and the embarrassment 
of the Treaty of Versailles.   
The sexual humiliation that German men experienced had far-reaching effects.  In 
threatening white German masculinity, these black troops also presented a threat to the 
German military.  Campt has argued that in the military, “Wehrhaftigkeit (the ability to 
perform military service and protect one’s country and property) had long been regarded 
as a primary masculine attribute.”79  By extension, the emasculation of the German male 
translated into and in some ways reflected the weakness of the German military that had 
suffered defeat in WWI.  When this combined with the cultural shame that Germans felt 
more generally at the presence of these black troops—with German cultural identity tied 
so closely to being white, the inversion of the racial hierarchy represented by the black 
occupation troops was significantly worrying—the resulting resentment and fears firmly 
established themselves within the German psyche, finding expression years later in 
WWII and beyond.   
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The sexual relationships, unsurprisingly, resulted in the births of a number of 
mixed-race children along the Rhine, often referred to pejoratively as the “Rhineland 
Bastards.”   Reiner Pommerin has estimated the total number of mixed-race children born 
between 1919 and 1925 to have been 385: 201 male children and 182 female children.80  
Following the concept of jus sanguinis, these children were usually considered German 
citizens, because many of the troops did not marry the mothers nor did they remain in 
Germany.  Utilizing the pre-existing public and political discourses on race mixing, many 
challenged the children’s status as German citizens.  As in the colonies, but with a new 
intensity, the children were designated as a menace to the survival of the German 
nation.81  The danger this time was more pressing, however, because these children were 
German citizens who lived in Germany, unlike the Black Germans who resided in the 
German colonies.82   
Very quickly, the sense of defeat roused by the black troops was also associated 
with the children.  The German quest to deal psychologically with the presence of black 
occupation troops, the Rhineland children, and the defeat both groups symbolized, 
contributed to the racialization of the interwar period.83  In many ways, this negative, 
racialized perspective on the black presence influenced how Germans would 
subsequently understand blacks during the Nazi era and after—as savages with little self-
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control who were a danger to the future of the German people.  In working to reassert its 
pre-war status as a great power, Germany felt compelled to reaffirm its racial superiority 
over these black “invaders,” and in so doing, project itself as the “last protector of the 
white race.”  To do so, Germany sought to turn what it had once perceived of as 
victimization—France’s inversion of the racial hierarchy in Germany—into a martyrdom 
of sorts for the survival of the white race.84 
At the same time that the debate over Germany’s racial hierarchy raged, Germans 
were traveling to the US, observing America’s own race problem.  In 1963, Earl R. Beck 
wrote about these visits in an article entitled “German Views of Negro Life in the United 
States, 1919-1933,” in which he argued that for the most part, German visitors generally 
expressed sympathy toward the plight of the Black American.  While Beck’s article lacks 
any stringent analysis, he does provide several examples of German sentiments about 
American blacks in the interwar years before Hitler’s rise to power.  One finds that many 
of the opinions about and attitudes towards Black Americans in this period were still 
present in the GDR many years later.  
 In his article, Beck described the travelers’ observations and opinions as an odd 
“mixture of objective and unobjective reporting, of superficial and penetrating analysis, 
of quatsch and profound wisdom.”85  For the most part, Beck concluded that Germans 
under the Weimar government were sympathetic to the African American quest for 
rights.  Beck believed that for many Germans this owed to a “bitterness of wartime 
experiences [that] was reflected in a general tendency to excessive criticism of American 
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ideals and the American way of life.”  Pointing to fears of Americanization in the 
interwar period, Beck maintained that Europeans expressed this anxiety through “efforts 
to ‘debunk’ and disenchant” the US’ positive image.  And because Germans, too, “were 
by no means free of racial prejudices,” Beck further suggested their motives for 
expressing sympathetic statements were not entirely altruistic.86   
 According to Beck’s research, many of the Germans who traveled to the US were 
intellectuals who understood that the most pressing social problem facing Americans was 
the race question.87  A refrain that would be uttered repeatedly in the Cold War years, 
many in this interwar period spoke of the contradiction between American claims of 
democracy and the ways in which Americans implemented it.  Beck summed up German 
criticisms by quoting Agnes Salomon, “the chief woman-suffragist of her day,” as saying 
in 1924 that “‘[t]he racial problem is the sore spot on the body of American social life,’” 
“because all words of freedom, of equality, of democracy, all the idealistic 
viewpoints of the American constitution, the great and beautiful words of 
noble leaders, cannot be maintained when measured against the lot of the 
colored peoples.”88 
 
This acknowledgment of the impact of the race question on American life, however, did 
not necessarily correlate to a positive view of blacks for these German visitors.  There 
were some who openly looked upon African Americans unfavorably, agreeing with 
American restrictions on black freedoms, judging that in the years after the Civil War, 
Americans had been “‘too hasty [in] freeing…the slaves.’”  Despite this support for the 
southern policies, Beck’s research showed that among most Germans, the South 
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generally fared poorly in their travel accounts.89 
 Peering forward to Germany’s Nazi years, Beck remarked that “in view of the 
later racialist mania of Nazi Germany, the liberalism of German views of the Negro in the 
1920’s is surprising.”  Part of this surprise likely stems from the fact that Beck failed to 
engage with the undercurrents of racism and racialism contained in the examples he 
provided.  For example, he has written that most of the German visitors to the US “denied 
the existence of real anthropological distinctions between black and white in America,” 
yet the quote he provided to prove this showed that the German observer still believed in 
anthropological distinctions nonetheless.  His German observer stated that, “‘the many 
handsome individuals which one finds among the Negroes are evidence against the often-
maintained ethnical inferiority of the Negro, since bodily beauty is seldom an 
accompaniment of inferiority or degeneration.’”90  Not only does this observer exoticize 
the African American body, he points to the “fact” that bodily beauty and inferiority are 
incongruous.  Because bodily beauty is an apparent sign of a superiority of sorts, what is 
implied is that though Black Americans are as beautiful as other superior groups 
(whites?), they are anthropologically different from those the observer considered 
inferior. 
 In another example of Beck’s failure to interrogate German racialism, Beck noted 
that German visitors remarked upon the large number of peoples of mixed race and 
                                                 
89 Quoted in Beck, “German Views of Negro Life,” 24.  Christian Davis has noted that anti-Semites were 
known to compare the so-called “Negro Question” and policies of the American South to Germany’s 
“Jewish Question.”  In one instance, the Deutsch-Soziale Blätter took an excerpt from a travel essay on the 
American South written by German playwright and publisher Paul Lindau, substituting “Jew” for “black” 
and “Germans” for “whites.”  “The Blätter insisted that altering the text in this way transformed it into ‘an 
accurate picture of how it appears in our Germany and also the means for how it can become better.’”  
Davis, Colonialism, Antisemitism, and Germans of Jewish Descent, 117-118.   
90 Quoted in Beck, “German Views of Negro Life,” 27. 
46 
 
“‘white Negroes’” (those who were “technically” black but could pass for white) in the 
US.  These individuals, wrote Beck, represented to the German observers an “absence of 
real physical repulsion between the races.”  Though this would have been a good point 
for Beck to discuss the controversy about the Black African troops stationed in the 
Rhineland and the resulting mixed-race children, he oddly does not, only noting that the 
attraction between blacks and whites was a common topic of discussion for the German 
visitors.91  Given the debates raging at home, the reflection or belief that mixed-race 
children represented the “absence of real physical repulsion between the races” in the US 
might suggest that this observation was not necessarily meant to be a positive one.   
 Much as we will see in regards to East Germany, Beck’s German travelers “noted 
with interest and approval the growing tendency of Negroes to develop a social 
awareness of their own significance and worth.”  Yet, in praising African Americans for 
their awareness, one again finds undertones of a superficial understanding of the Black 
American that Beck seemed to miss (in addition to a dose of condescension).  One 
observer remarked that African Americans were beginning to embrace their “African 
individuality,” and the knowledge that their greatest contribution to American life would 
be not “the absorption into their own nature of what belongs to America, but the 
preservation of their African nature and its impression on the American mind.”  Further, 
said the observer, African Americans wanted to “establish their Ethiopian culture in the 
heart of America, borrowing nothing from America but her technical forms.”  This 
racially-stereotyped notion that African Americans had a true African nature tied in to the 
belief that Black Americans embodied a more “genuine creative culture” than did white 
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Americans, who for the most part lacked any culture.92  This (superficial) understanding 
of African Americans and their cultural forms would find expression in the GDR, both 
through the average East German and members of the SED. 
Under the Weimar Republic, the relationship between white Germans and blacks 
was largely shaded by what many Germans understood as their nation’s defeat in WWI.  
When France used black colonial troops to occupy the Rhineland, Germans first found 
the presence of the black troops insulting, initially focusing their ire on the French for 
their use of the black troops to drive home the consequences and reality of the German 
wartime defeat.  However, once the black troops engaged in romantic and sexual 
relationships with white German women, fathering a population of mixed-race Germans, 
the German indignation was turned toward the black men.  Not only had France placed 
these black men into a position of authority over white Germans, they had also assumed a 
sexual parity with German men that was considered absolutely unacceptable.  The 
resulting mixed-race children, like their fathers, were also viewed as perpetual reminders 
of Germany’s physical, racial, and sexual defeat in WWI.  In their case, even more 
worryingly, the children were German citizens and technically a part of the German 
nation, further placing the fate of German identity in danger.   
Yet, for all of the anger over the black occupation of the Rhineland and the birth 
of the so-called “Rhineland Bastards,” African Americans appeared to have been viewed 
separately.  This comparatively sympathetic, though racialized, approach to the African 
American situation owed to the fact that such sympathy was a means of emphasizing one 
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seemed), the less European they were, maintaining a racial hierarchy that placed white Europeans at the top 
and sustaining the traditional perception of German identity.  
48 
 
of America’s greatest problems, in a period that focused on Germany’s wartime defeat.  
This tactic would find similar use in the GDR, employed in propaganda demanding East 
German legitimacy.  As interwar Germans sought to right the hierarchical upset at home, 
they built upon previous discussions about preserving the German nation, a defense of the 
German “race” that would find easy expression under Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. 
 
Nazi Germany and Blacks, 1933-1945 
Though race was most famously tied to Jewishness under the Nazis, Hitler and the 
Nazis expressed anti-black beliefs as well.  While African Americans and Black Africans 
in a civilian capacity were often not explicit targets of Nazi racism, they were 
nevertheless victims of racism at the hands of the Nazis.  Meanwhile, Allied blacks in the 
military were subjected to a governmental violence infused with racism that had often 
been cultivated through anti-black propaganda, though certain policy considerations had 
the ability to better or worsen treatment.  The Nazis’ primary worry regarding blacks, 
however, was the existence of Germans of African descent; for a government that fought 
to create and maintain racial purity, Black Germans most certainly had no future within 
the “Thousand Year Reich” that Hitler envisioned.  Though the fates of Black Germans 
and foreign blacks under the Nazis may have varied, it was not because of a series of 
incoherent views towards blacks.  Instead, Black Germans bore the brunt of Nazi 
attention because of their literal position within the German nation; foreign black 
civilians were deemed less dangerous because they could easily be removed from the 
nation if necessary, while the treatment of military blacks was often affected by German 
war policy considerations.   
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Black Germans 
One of the concerns when the Nazis came to power was how to deal with the 
problems presented by the mixed-race children that had been born along the Rhine.93  
These children, according to Hitler’s own racist worldview, hierarchically existed on a 
medium level between both parents.  Mixed-race children could never reach the level of 
racial superiority afforded to their white parent, and in fact, if “race-mixing” were to 
continue on in further generations, these resulting individuals would lead to the 
destruction of the German “race,” a destruction from which the nation would never be 
able to rebound.  This owed to the belief that once wholly “polluted,” the superior race 
could not be “cleaned;” the pollution could not be reversed.94  Therefore, whatever 
solution was reached, it needed to ensure that there would be no further generations of 
Black Germans.   
While searching for a solution, the Nazi government conducted research that 
“confirmed” just how dangerous the children were to the future of the Third Reich.  In 
1933, Herman Göring, then the Minister of the Interior, ordered an investigation into the 
exact number of mixed-race individuals living in Germany.  As a part of this 
investigation, Dr. Wolfgang Abel, of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Anthropologie, 
traveled to Wiesbaden where he examined a group of mixed-race children and took 
photos and measurements of their lips, eyes, and heads.  From this “research,” Abel 
found the children to be uneducated, disorderly, and violent.  Abel reported the results of 
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his examinations in Neues Volk, a monthly publication released by the Nazi Office on 
Race Politics, referring to his research subjects as those “poor deplorable children, who 
through the racial peculiarity of their fathers are themselves living emblems of one of the 
most sorrowful betrayals of the white race….”95   
Abel went on: “Today there are about 600 bastards; we in the Rhineland know 
that tomorrow there will be more.  They experience suffering, which will multiply 
through their children—a suffering that will never cease.”  He warned that it was 
necessary to “open the eyes of those in whose hands it lies to prevent the proliferation of 
the suffering.”96  While repeating Weimar-era beliefs that the children not only 
represented defeat, but importantly, also a betrayal of the white race, Abel painted the 
sterilization of the Rhineland children not as something that would benefit the white 
German nation, but rather, would protect mixed-race Germans from “suffering.”97  
Sterilization, a method the Nazis often turned to in order to maintain the purity of the 
Aryan German race (and plans were still in place as late as 1942 to sterilize the so-called 
Mischlinge, Germans of Jewish ancestry), was considered an excellent solution for these 
children, especially since it was inexpensive.98  There was, however, a major obstacle for 
officials who advocated sterilizing the Rhineland children: the problem of obtaining 
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approval from the children’s mothers.99   
About a year later, in March 1935, a group of race specialists were called to 
Berlin by the new Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm Frick, to discuss the future of the 
Rhineland children.  The first suggestion made by this group was to create a law which 
would extend sterilization to these individuals (therefore avoiding the need to acquire the 
mothers’ approval), though fears about foreign reactions were strong enough to prevent 
the proposal from moving beyond the suggestion stage.100  A second recommendation 
suggested that the children be sent to countries with sizable black populations, where they 
would be brought up with the help of missionaries.  Each child, under this plan, would be 
given 10,000 German marks upon leaving the country.  For rather obvious reasons, this 
option was abandoned as too costly and impractical.101  Finally, the committee reached a 
decision: the children would be sterilized illegally by medical doctors who were either 
members or friends of the Nazi party.  This would be a top-secret operation in order to 
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avoid any possible domestic and foreign backlash.102  Even with the decision made to 
illegally conduct the sterilizations, the mothers remained the biggest obstacle authorities 
faced.103 
For all of the discussion about what to do with the Rhineland children, the first 
sterilization of a mixed-race individual was not carried out until 1937.  Reiner Pommerin 
has ascertained that, ultimately, 90% of the mothers created no difficulties, “voluntarily” 
appreciating the need for the operation.  Their acquiescence, however, was not at all 
voluntary, as it was often understood that the children would be sent for “re-education in 
a concentration camp,” should the mothers refuse the sterilization order.104  In June and 
July of 1937, a Commission was created at the Gestapo headquarters at Prinz-Albrecht-
Straβe in Berlin, followed by three sub-commissions in Wiesbaden, Ludwigshafen, and 
Koblenz.  A government representative and two doctors examined the Rhineland children 
and made official recommendations that they be sterilized.105  In the case of a Black 
German only identified in records as A.A., the recommendation for his sterilization reads 
as follows: 
A.A., of German nationality, born March 14, 1920, living in Duisburg, is a 
descendant of a member of the former Allied occupation forces, in this 
case a negro from Madagascar, and shows corresponding typical 
anthropological characteristics, for which reason he shall be sterilized.106 
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In this report, A.A. was acknowledged as being German, even though at this point non-
Aryans in Nazi Germany had lost their right to German citizenship.107  Yet, the change in 
citizenship status did little to fix the fact that Afro-Germans were still present within the 
nation and remained a part of the German bloodline. The only way to preclude the birth 
of additional non-white Germans was to prevent the mixed-race population from ever 
procreating.108  As the recommendation reads, AA was sterilized on the grounds that he 
exhibited “negro” anthropological characteristics; he would no longer be able to have 
children quite clearly for the reason than he was German and of African descent—two 
things that should have been impossible according to the generally-accepted definition of 
German. 
 
Foreign Blacks  
While mixed-race Germans were the physical manifestation of Germany’s various 
ideological, racial, sexual, and military defeats, non-German blacks in this period did not 
carry with them those reminders or stigmas.  In fact, some of these non-German blacks 
found employment under the Nazis, working as entertainers.  Placed alongside the Nazis’ 
years-long preoccupation with sterilizing the Rhineland children, this relative freedom of 
foreign blacks seems contradictory.109  Attempting to understand this deep division in the 
way the Nazis treated blacks, Elisa von Joeden-Forgey has examined the Deutsche Afrika 
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Schau (DAS), which grew out of the tradition of the Völkerschauen that were popular 
prior to WWI.  In her work, she has questioned how the show lasted for so long under the 
Nazis, only closing in 1940, when it was an institution that employed and placed 
“inferior” peoples on display at a time when the Nazis sought to remove most non-
Aryans from society.   
According to Joeden-Forgey, the Nazis understood the DAS as a way to provide 
unemployed foreign blacks with jobs.  Joeden-Forgey has written that in the early years 
of the show, the Nazi government was involved in production only insofar as it officially 
supported the show’s existence, though it later became a part of the Nazi propaganda 
machine.110  Despite some initial opposition from those who believed that the DAS drew 
attention to Germany’s past racial corruption, Joeden-Forgey has argued that the show 
nevertheless survived because the Nazis viewed the black actors as Vollblutneger (“full-
blooded Negroes”).111   The Nazi preoccupation with “full-blooded” blacks was tied to 
the memory of Germany’s colonial experience in Africa.  These blacks functioned in the 
Nazi mind as a constant reminder of Aryan racial domination, as people who had once 
been conquered by Imperial Germany and would again be conquered, this time by the 
Nazis.112  Important was the plan to establish, at some point, colonies in Africa, at which 
point the Black Africans could be sent “back home,” and could perhaps even operate as 
ambassadors of sorts.  As long as the foreign blacks remained segregated from the rest of 
German society, the Nazis could, at the very least, tolerate this particular group of blacks 
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for the moment.113  Ultimately, when the DAS was eventually canceled, it was in part due 
to questions about possible sexual relationships between members of the show and white 
Germans.114 
Also writing on the Deutsche Afrika Schau, Gerwin Strobl has depicted the show 
not as an indirect means of protection for foreign blacks, but rather an attempt to restrict 
their movement.  Strobl argues that “the difficulties the migrants encountered in finding 
employment amid escalating racism furnished the excuse for depriving them of their 
liberty.”115  Therefore, the show came about when the “Foreign Office, the 
Kolonialpolitische section of the Nazi party and the Propaganda Ministry jointly agreed 
to set up a theatrical venture, ostensibly to provide the ‘colonials’ with employment.”116    
This decision to restrict the movement of foreign blacks stemmed from the Nazis’ fears 
about Black Africans freely roaming Germany and engaging in sexual relations with 
white German women, with officials understanding that the same sterilization methods 
used on Black Germans could not be used on Black Africans, Strobl has argued.  The 
foreign fall-out that would likely result would become problematic in the face of German 
plans for “renewed colonial expansion” in Africa.  “Thus was born the Deutsche Afrika 
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Schau: a mixture of theatre, colonial exhibition and travelling circus….”117  The DAS 
closed suddenly in 1940, however, the same year that blacks were banned from 
performing on stage in Nazi Germany.  Strobl has argued that by 1940, “Nazi racism had 
reached such a pitch that the mere sight of ‘negroes’ provoked open hostility from 
sections of the party and public alike.”118  Strobl, however, fails to see the longer arc of 
German anti-black racism, as by 1940 it was neither new nor merely “created” by the 
Nazis.  Instead, it was something that was exacerbated and given further encouragement 
for expression by Nazi race ideology.    
Though Joeden-Forgey and Strobl’s arguments differ markedly—one 
characterizes the DAS as essentially protecting blacks while the other emphasizes the 
DAS as a means of restricting black movement—black sexuality is a common 
denominator in both Strobl’s and Joeden-Forgey’s accounts of the Deutsche Afrika 
Schau.  Strobl writes of a “bloody postscript” to the DAS, wherein an informer claimed 
that one of the actors, who had fought for the Germans during WWI and had even 
attempted to enlist in the German army in 1939, had had sexual relations with a white 
German woman.  The actor was sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where he 
died.  The example of the Deutsche Afrika Schau details both the Nazis’ fear of black 
sexuality, as well as an acceptance of foreign blacks (as it were), however temporary and 
opportunistic, so long as their (sexual) segregation from German society was maintained. 
Though the examination of the Deutsche Afrika Schau provides some insight into 
Nazi German attitudes towards foreign blacks, it is also necessary to look beyond 
Germany-proper to acquire a more complete picture of Nazi sentiments.  The Nazis not 
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only contended with a black population in Germany, but were also confronted with 
peoples of African descent outside of the country as they moved across Europe, most 
notably in France.  During the interwar period, a number of African Americans had 
moved to Paris, establishing an expatriate community in France.  In October 1939, just a 
month after war had broken out in Europe, the U.S. Embassy requested that all 
Americans leave France, and most heeded the warning.  Some, however, stayed behind, 
including performers Arthur Briggs, Charlie Lewis, Edgar Wiggins, and Josephine Baker, 
all of whom, Clarence Lusane has noted, “viewed themselves as more French than 
African American.”119  Hitler was, not surprisingly, not keen on the African American 
community that had settled in Paris, believing that “the black presence in interwar Paris 
symbolized everything decadent and despicable about French culture, something they 
[the Nazis] would not tolerate while they remained in control.”120   
Despite the idealism that may have encouraged them to stay on in France, these 
African Americans were by no means exempt from the effects of the Nazi occupation.  
For some, the consequences of their decision to remain in France were severe, including 
imprisonment in German internment camps.  Pianist Arthur Briggs hesitated to leave 
Paris, and was arrested and sent to an internment camp in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis 
on 17 October 1940.  Briggs was imprisoned for nearly four years, and is said to have 
maintained his sense of optimism by forming a musical trio as well as a twenty-five piece 
classical orchestra in the camp.  The orchestra garnered attention from the camp’s 
commandant, who even attended the orchestra’s rehearsals, in addition to its concerts.  
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Briggs later told a reporter that he was not discriminated against because of his color, and 
in fact, he had been well-respected—by everyone.121   
To be sure, Briggs’ experience was not the norm for those imprisoned in 
internment camps, and there were other black prisoners whose assessment of life in a 
German camp was far worse.122  It is unclear why Briggs’ experience was far less 
negative than one would have expected, but it is likely that Briggs’ musical talents and 
favorably-minded guards ensured his relatively positive experience.  Certainly the fact 
that he fulfilled a stereotype of the black entertainer (as did the blacks in the Deutsche 
Afrika Schau) worked in his favor.  He was what white Germans had come to expect of 
blacks—a form of entertainment, though one that was best kept at a distance.   
Germans under the Nazis not only came face to face with civilian blacks, 
however.  With the eruption of war, German men were confronted by black soldiers, 
often colonial troops fighting on behalf of France, and in later years, African American 
troops.  Nazi propaganda reminded Germans of the “horrors” allegedly committed along 
the Rhine by black French colonial troops in the 1920s, revitalizing the image of the 
Black African as a savage and brutal man who attacked innocent Germans.  The black 
soldier remained a convenient reservoir and symbol for all of the perceived injustices of 
the German defeat in WWI and the Treaty of Versailles, with propaganda suggesting that 
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given another chance, these men would terrorize Germans mercilessly in the event of an 
Allied victory.123   
Therefore, as Raffael Scheck’s research suggests, it was not surprising that the 
average member of the Wehrmacht (Nazi Germany’s armed forces) had little respect for 
their black enemy on the battlefield.124  Scheck has argued that when this preconceived 
notion of black savagery and inferiority was combined with the Nazis’ anti-black 
propaganda, the Wehrmacht was inspired to commit heinous crimes against their black 
French colonial prisoners of war (POWs), many times killing black prisoners at rates that 
outpaced other prisoners.125  Yet, despite the impact that Nazi propaganda had upon the 
execution of savage racist violence, in many cases practical considerations were just as 
important in determining black treatment by the German military.126   
According to Scheck, this owed in part to the fact that the colonial POWs were a 
cheap source of agricultural and industrial labor for the Wehrmacht.  Blacks were usually 
assigned to Arbeitskommandos (work commandos), often employed in areas as far as 100 
kilometers (a little more than 62 miles) away from the camps to which they were 
assigned.127  Wehrmacht officials were unconcerned about the temptations this distance 
could encourage, because it was known that black POWs were far less likely to escape 
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than other prisoners, for two reasons.  First, their skin color meant that they could not 
“pass” for a typical French citizen and blend in to the surrounding communities (in the 
way that some North African, and certainly, white POWs, could).  Second, their home 
countries were so far away that once they had escaped, easily reaching home was simply 
not an option.128  As one former POW said: “‘We didn’t know France.  We had black 
skin.  The French could save themselves by changing into civilian clothes.  They could 
escape…We had no contacts, so we were always there.’”129 
This example underlines something that was important to the Nazi German 
understanding of blacks versus Jews and others considered racially undesirable but 
phenotypically white: the visual appearance of blacks and many of those of mixed-race 
immediately set them apart from white Germans.  As “dangerous” as blacks could be 
when they crossed the boundaries separating them from the German race, their presence 
was easy for Germans to spot.  Though Afro-Germans represented both defeat and some 
of white Germany’s most deep-seated fears about identity and the future of the German 
nation, they too were easily visible, with the exception of anyone who was light-skinned 
enough to pass for white.  What made Jews so “dangerous” to Germans in this period was 
precisely the fact that it was so easy for them to pass as a member of the so-called 
German race.  Anti-black racists stood on much more secure ground when it came to 
identifying the enemy; blacks certainly had the ability to destroy the German nation, but 
not from the inside-out as Jews could. 
Yet another important factor in determining the official German attitude toward 
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the black POWs was Hitler’s desire for holdings in Africa.130  Some white soldiers who 
were present in the camps, such as Hans Habe, noted a marked change in the German 
treatment of the black POWs, which he believed owed to Hitler’s colonial ambitions.131   
In a book and an article, both published in 1941, Habe wrote of a massacre that occurred 
at a camp in which he had been imprisoned.  After being captured by German soldiers, 
Habe overheard several of them complaining about the snipers who had shot at them as 
they entered the town.  As a punishment, the German soldiers decided that they would 
shoot the snipers; the only problem, however, was that they did not know which snipers 
had shot at them.  They believed that the snipers had been black (whether they knew this 
for a fact or had merely convinced themselves of the case is not clear), and since they all 
looked alike to the German soldiers, the men decided to kill every one of the black 
prisoners.132  Habe claimed to have been unsettled by the fact that the Germans so easily 
perceived of the black men “not as soldiers but as ‘ordinary murderers.’”133 
Some weeks later, Habe was moved to another camp, where he became a 
translator for the guards in that camp.  One night, one of the black prisoners committed 
suicide by throwing himself off of a building.  The next day at an assembly, the prisoners 
were told of the suicide and were advised that “only black subhumans could run away 
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from life’s duties so ignominiously.”  Yet, somewhat paradoxically, the next day, the 
men were then told that “the white prisoners had driven the poor Negro to his death,” and 
as a punishment, they were to be deprived of their lunch rations, which would be given to 
the black prisoner’s friends instead.134  The camp’s guards, however, had yet to unveil 
the most bewildering response to the prisoner’s death.  Habe was informed that he would 
be needed to serve as a translator, and was asked to “appoint twenty black comrades” to 
help escort the dead prisoner to a cemetery, where a guard of honor would assist in the 
burial ceremony.135  
Translating for the dead prisoner’s “friends,” Habe bore witness to an awkward 
ceremony, in which the camp’s lieutenant spoke, proclaiming that as a soldier, he could 
not deny the prisoner his due honor.  Contradicting the belief that had earlier driven 
German soldiers to massacre a group of Black African soldiers, the lieutenant declared 
that though the prisoner may have fought against the Germans, he had done what he had 
been taught to do as a soldier, and the Germans respected that.  As if that were not 
perplexing enough, when Habe returned to the camp, he learned that “the camp 
commandant had set aside twenty portions of ersatz cheese and ten loaves of army bread 
for the twenty friends of the dead man.”136  Unable to control his curiosity any longer, 
Habe questioned a sergeant about the abrupt and total turnabout in the German treatment 
of the camp’s blacks, and was told that: “‘Germany wants no dissatisfied slaves.  
Germany wants slaves who love their masters.  Yesterday an order came through from 
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the High Command: Germany is developing a colonial policy.’”137   
Even if Habe’s story has been embellished, it still conveys a theme that was in 
fact a reality—Hitler was planning ahead for life after a German victory, and Africa 
figured in to his post-war plans, thus affecting how the Nazis treated captured soldiers.  
Through this example we see the complex nature of the Nazis’ anti-black racism (though 
it was one that many across Europe also subscribed to): at both the same time, blacks 
were considered savage beasts unable to practice any restraint and who needed to be dealt 
with most violently, yet they were also noble in their savagery.  This perception of 
nobility, however, ebbed and flowed, depending on the task at hand. 
By the time African American soldiers came into contact with German soldiers 
near the end of the war, some of the policy considerations that had once saved black 
soldiers gave way to fears about the savagery of blacks in the event of an Allied victory.  
Many of the African American soldiers who were victims of Nazi violence were those 
who were captured following D-Day, while others were members of the Air Force that 
had been shot down while flying over Germany and other parts of central Europe.138  The 
late Robert Kesting, an archivist at the National Archives, compiled a series of reports of 
executions that, in his mind, pointed to racist motivations on behalf of the German 
soldiers.  What follows are several of his examples. 
On 1 September 1944, records reveal that two former SS guards near Merzig, 
Germany, saw two African American soldiers being executed, and acknowledged that as 
members of the SS they had been issued the order that no blacks were to be taken 
prisoner.  Because the investigators could not find the named suspects, the case was 
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ultimately closed.139  Several months later, on 17 December 1944, the disfigured bodies 
of eleven African American soldiers of the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion were discovered 
near Wereth, Belgium, in a cattle ditch.  Autopsies were apparently performed some four 
months later, and statements were collected from townspeople who reported that “‘an 
unknown SS unit committed the heinous crimes.’”  Though investigators discovered later 
that the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions had indeed operated in that area, the case was 
closed because the investigators were unable to ascertain who precisely had been 
involved.140  A day after the bodies were discovered in December, records show that 
another African American soldier, while being marched to Stalag IV-B, in Muehlberg, 
Germany, was selected by an SS guard “for no apparent reason,” and killed.  This case 
too was closed, “pending receipt of additional evidence.”141  While the motivations are 
not entirely clear, it appears possible that the violence African American soldiers faced 
was encouraged by a mixture of racism and the Germans’ own desperate savagery in the 
face of a defeat inching closer.  
 From 1933 to 1945, the Nazis embarked upon what many have viewed as a series 
of contradictory policies towards blacks, policies that were in reality grounded in the 
Nazis’ way of race thinking.  Mixed-race blacks, those of African and German descent, 
were deemed most dangerous to the survival of the Nazis’ Aryan race.  As such a critical 
threat, they were subjected to sterilizations.  “Full-blooded blacks,” those without any 
German heritage, were still considered racially inferior, but were not deemed dangerous 
unless they entered into, or gave the appearance of entering into, sexual relationships 
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with Germans.  As such, they largely escaped any concrete action on behalf of the Nazis, 
though some were sent to camps if they appeared to ignore directives from the state.  
Militarily, black soldiers who were captured by the Nazis were generally victimized.  
However, at times foreign policy considerations created situations in which the Nazis 
pulled back on the poor treatment they were meting out to black soldiers, if it meant that 
Germany could acquire some sort of diplomatic advantage in return.  Nazi propaganda 
painting the black soldier as a savage beast also played a role in German treatment of 
black POWs, both in the years before colonial policy considerations came to the fore and 
at the end of the war when it became clear that defeat was rapidly becoming a reality. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Across the various periods of German history, the Imperial, Weimar, and Nazi 
eras had in common fears about the future of the German nation (and race) and the role 
that blacks would play in it.  The position occupied by blacks within German society or 
within the German mind—as either an insider or an outsider to the nation, whether 
physically or figuratively—often influenced German sentiments towards blacks.  In the 
case of Imperial Germany, blacks became a significant part of the discussion in the 
metropole once German men in the colonies began fathering mixed-race children, passing 
on to them their German citizenship and thereby making them a part of the German 
nation.  While blacks from the Völkerschauen were welcomed in Germany within their 
capacity as actors, once officials believed that German women had taken too much of an 
interest in the black men, their presence became restricted.  As far as Imperial Germans 
were concerned, blacks were suitable as forms of entertainment and as a counterpoint for 
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identifying oneself in a position of authority—as long as these blacks maintained a literal 
and figurative distance from Germany and Germans.   
Though sexual relationships between blacks and white Germans had roots in the 
colonial period, the relationships took on a more sinister character when they 
predominantly came to exist between black men and white German women.  During the 
Weimar period, these sexual relationships were not only seen as aberrations of nature—
the only way to understand the idea of sex between a black man and white woman was 
either as rape or the decision of a woman lacking morals—but they were also closely tied 
to the German defeat in WWI.  With the French occupation of the Rhineland the racial 
hierarchy, both in terms of power and sexuality, was turned upside down in Germany.  
The sight of black men with white women, and the children these relationships 
sometimes produced, was a constant reminder of a defeat many Germans did not believe 
was deserved.   
Foreign policy considerations also had the ability to influence the official German 
stance toward blacks, best seen in Hitler’s apparent about-face in his policy regarding 
Black Africans during wartime.  When (re)claiming colonies in Africa looked like a 
possibility, Hitler decided that, while still inferior, Black Africans served a purpose that 
made a kinder policy regarding their treatment worthwhile.  By improving Nazi behavior 
toward Black Africans, the goal was to create a population of Africans friendly to 
Germany to act as ambassadors for Hitler.  Yet again, there is an application of insider 
versus outsider status; an assumed part of this plan regarding Black Africans was that 
these same blacks who were being placated in Europe would return to Africa, never to be 
a German problem in the way that Black Germans were and would be.   
67 
 
Taken all together, Germany’s experience with Black Africans, African 
Americans, and Black Germans prior to 1945 highlights several characteristics of 
German racism and conceptions of race.  German views on blacks had the potential to 
vary greatly, depending on the political climate, one’s country of origin, policy 
considerations, the perception of sexual transgressions, and one’s status as an insider or 
an outsider.  It was from these views that East German anti-black racism developed and 
evolved—just as was the case in West Germany.  As East Germany embarked upon a 
relationship with Black America, the previous years of German interactions with blacks, 
perceptions of blackness, and the concepts of and motivations for racism were important 
factors in defining this relationship.   
As the coming chapters will show, though there were key factors particular to the 
East German situation that helped to define East German conceptions of race, racism, and 
blackness, these earlier periods of German history played an undeniable and considerable 
role as well.  Though the SED denied any connection to the history laid out in this 
chapter and instead claimed that this legacy of racism belonged solely to the West 
Germans, the Party was influenced by this history.  A denunciation of such views formed 
much of the SED’s official stance towards the world’s blacks, and despite the claim of a 
rupture in race-thinking, there was continuity between German conceptions of blackness 
prior to 1945 and East German conceptions of blackness after 1945.  Though the SED 
would never have admitted it, these earlier views on blacks informed many East 
Germans’ own opinions on peoples of African descent, views that were evident in action 
if not always in word. 
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Chapter Three: On Parallel Tracks 
Genesis of a Friendship between Black America and East Germany, 1949-1959 
 
 
 In the aftermath of Germany’s defeat in WWII, the Allied Powers once again 
found themselves contemplating the future of the German people.  The four powers 
divided the country amongst themselves, with the US, Britain, and France each 
occupying a region in western Germany, while the Soviet Union occupied a zone in the 
east.  In 1945, there were few who envisioned that this division was anything but 
temporary, but four years later any hopes that the German regions would soon reunite 
were dashed with the creation, just months apart, of two new German states: the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.142  The iron curtain that 
former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had spoken of in 1946—the division of 
Europe, and the world, by the power struggles of the Cold War—became an everyday 
reality for Germans in both the East and West. 
 From the very beginning and until its collapse in 1989, the East German state 
struggled to prove its diplomatic worth and relevancy as a loyal member of the Soviet 
coalition contributing to the international community.  Meanwhile, West Germany, 
comparatively, was easily accepted by most in the international community, quickly 
acquiring the legitimacy that East Germany long coveted.143  Despite a range of efforts, it 
was East Germany’s very association with the Soviet Union that made its own 
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international acceptance difficult to obtain.  Nevertheless, the SED utilized a variety of 
approaches and tactics in order to gain the legitimacy it craved, one of which was to style 
the GDR as anti-fascist and the FRG as the sole inheritor of the Nazi legacy. 
 At a time when accusations and allegations of fascism had the ability to erode 
one’s reputation, the SED claimed to have succeeded where West Germany had not. 
According to the SED, the anti-fascist GDR was populated by communists who had 
opposed Hitler and the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis from the very start.  
Encompassed in the GDR’s anti-fascism was anti-racism, which became important to the 
SED’s understanding of itself and the GDR vis-à-vis the world’s people of color.  It was 
this anti-racist rhetoric that provided East Germans with the very grounds for a 
relationship with Black America and other international black freedom movements.   
From the GDR’s earliest years, a potential link between the African American 
struggle against race discrimination and the socialist state’s commitment to defeating the 
evils of capitalism—of which racism was one—were acknowledged by East German 
officials.   However, much of this discussion about shared aims took place amongst East 
German elites—namely, intellectuals, academics, individuals pursuing advanced degrees, 
the political elite, as well as those who circulated socially amongst these groups.  Though 
the average East German citizen was exposed to news of the civil rights movement (a 
review of East German newspapers reveals that articles were published on a fairly regular 
basis detailing stories of American racism), the bulk of the conversation about African 
Americans took place among the elite.  The impact of this limited group of East Germans 
should not be underestimated, though, as it was this group that would later mold for East 
German consumption the image of the ideal African American.   
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The chapter that follows will focus on the 1950s, examining East German views 
on Black America, as well as African Americans who visited or settled in the GDR in this 
period.  At this point, a general African American interest in East Germany was rather 
scarce, as most Black Americans—and Americans in general—knew very little about the 
“other” Germany.  Though there were several African Americans who settled in or 
passed through East Germany, none of them provided the spark necessary to engage the 
GDR and Black America in a series of meaningful exchanges.  More than a black 
presence in East Germany was necessary for the relationship that the GDR elite had 
theorized about to become concrete.  In that same vein, simply being in East Germany 
was not enough to spark a sense of solidarity for the African American travelers.  
As this work argues, Paul Robeson’s 1960 visit to East Germany was a turning 
point for the relationship.  In order to understand why this visit, and Robeson in general, 
was so influential to the development of the relationship between Black America and 
East Germany, it is necessary to consider the African Americans who were involved with 
the GDR prior to Paul Robeson, and why they failed to be the spark that would light a 
fire under this relationship.  This chapter will examine the experiences of six African 
American military deserters in East Germany during the 1950s, as well as the arrival of 
musician and asylum seeker Aubrey Pankey in 1955, going on to examine W.E.B. Du 
Bois’ 1958 visit to East Germany, revealing how each failed to resonate with both the 
SED and the East German people, something that was vital to formally establishing a 
relationship between Black America and the GDR.  One finds that the African American 
deserters and Aubrey Pankey were often too close to GDR society, experiencing isolation 
and racism in ways that later, visiting African Americans would not.  Though Du Bois 
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had a set of devoted followers in the GDR, his appeal was largely limited to East German 
intellectuals.  These factors would make the deserters, Pankey, and Du Bois less than 
ideal vehicles through which to create a tangible relationship between Black America and 
East Germany.   
  
African American Discourse in East Germany after World War II 
In the GDR, the notion of an affinity between Black America and East Germany 
was one generally confined to the SED and other members of the East German elite, and 
it was among this stratum of society that the movement would first become and long 
remain popular.  For much of the 1950s, the East German elite developed a theoretical 
discourse about East Germany’s connection to African Americans and the civil rights 
movement, one that would determine just exactly what type of African American East 
Germans should support.  Though there is evidence that some members of the elite were 
fairly genuine in their exhortations about the connection between Black America and East 
Germany, others viewed the link between the two purely as a tool in the SED’s 
legitimation campaign.   
Intellectually—and politically—the connection between the GDR and Black 
America rested on the GDR’s stated struggle against racism.  That racism was forbidden 
by the East German constitution and punishable by law conveys how important it was to 
officials that East Germany gave the appearance of a commitment to anti-racism.  
Ideologically, this opposition to racism followed from the belief that racism “perpetuated 
social hierarchies in addition to those of economic class and prevented the ‘oppressed’ 
from uniting and rising up against their ‘oppressors.’”  Racism was, therefore, directly 
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incompatible with communism.  Though this formulation was nothing new for 
communism, it carried a heavy weight in East Germany, as the SED sought to throw off 
the shackles of a Hitlerian legacy.  Therefore, East German support for the civil rights 
movement in the US, in addition to black freedom movements worldwide, was 
understood as a valuable tool in expressing a commitment to eradicating racism, not just 
in the GDR but elsewhere as well.144 
Among the world’s black freedom movements, the African American civil rights 
movement acquired a special place in the minds of the East German elite because of 
“America’s elevated role in the Cold War and the global reach of its political and military 
power….”145  While support for anticolonial movements in Africa was also a tool for 
expressing East German anti-racism, members of the GDR’s elite focused their support 
and interest on the American civil rights movement in part because of its very location in 
the US.  Officials sought to use the evidence of their solidarity with Black America “in 
domestic and foreign policy matters to discredit the Western system of democracy and 
capitalism,” thereby making a pointed statement about the diplomatic legitimacy officials 
believed East Germany had earned.146     
 For some members of the elite, their knowledge of the civil rights movement 
stemmed from previously developed relationships with activists that were formed while 
they were in exile during the Nazi years.  Yet, the majority of the East Germans who 
discussed the American race problem learned about it primarily through African 
American literature and other academic works, instead of direct contact with African 
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Americans.  In this period, literature was the greatest means of African American 
influence.  In the years between 1949 and 1961, at least 100 texts were published in the 
GDR discussing Black America in some manner (and by the early 1970s that number had 
blossomed to 250147), including works by African American writers like Langston 
Hughes and Alain Locke in their original English or translated into German.  East 
German writers also penned books on African American history, the “Negro Question,” 
and key figures in the African American community.148  Among East German literary 
critics, African American poetry was circulated and discussed, with critics framing the 
poetic works “as part of a larger narrative of suffering, one which could be connected to 
the GDR’s own Marxist struggles for legitimacy and statehood.”149  Despite their 
popularity with East German elites, it was unlikely that such writings appealed to East 
Germans on a large scale, as they were generally viewed as academic works and 
therefore had a relatively small audience.   
Though written works were the primary means of East German engagement with 
Black America at this time, there were some African Americans who came to the 
socialist Germany to speak, putting a face to the experiences written about so extensively.  
At this point, however, these visits were more about sharing information with a 
sympathetic ear, rather than a demonstration of kinship.  One example of this is William 
Patterson’s January 1952 visit to the GDR.  Patterson, who was in leadership in both the 
CPUSA and the Civil Rights Congress, came to East Germany to speak on the subject of 
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“The Other America.”150   Just the previous month, in December 1951, Patterson had 
assisted in presenting a document entitled “We Charge Genocide” to the United Nations 
which, utilizing the UN’s Genocide Convention, accused the American government of 
genocide for its passive acceptance of the lynching of African Americans.151  Not long 
after, the petition was translated into German and published in East Berlin.  Referring to 
the petition, the SED, “following communist dogma, blamed the continued existence of 
Jim Crow laws on ‘U.S. monopolies,’ which, it claimed, maintained racial discrimination 
‘as a means of dividing and weakening the working class,’ including the use of African 
Americans as ‘wage depressers and strike breakers.’”152  
 As the response to the “We Charge Genocide” document shows, despite the fact 
that race and racism were often at the forefront of East German discussions about black 
freedom movements, elites nevertheless viewed the black liberation struggle as one that 
was primarily about class, as their ideology dictated.  To that end, East German officials 
“actively championed what they considered the ‘other America’ of black civil rights 
activists,” narrowing their focus to those who accepted or shared “Marxist and socialist 
convictions or were engaged in international peace activities….”153  Ending racial 
domination by white Americans would come with the defeat of capitalism, these elites 
reasoned, and those who placed more emphasis on racial discrimination and domination 
missed the true point of the civil rights movement and its broader international 
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applications.154      
 In a very practical sense, therefore, African Americans who prioritized race over 
class were a danger to East Germany’s propaganda and rhetoric inspired by the civil 
rights movement, because downplaying capitalism’s destructive capabilities also 
downplayed communism’s raison d’être.  Therefore, for East German elites, one’s 
blackness alone was not enough to elicit support.  In fact, being black only mattered to 
the extent that it made one potentially a victim of racism in the US, and therefore, a 
potential ally against the capitalist West.  Absent a commitment to communist ideology, 
these elites viewed American blacks as they viewed other Americans whom they 
criticized on a regular basis.  One finds, however, that racism often made these attacks 
even worse than ones aimed at white Americans.  Writes Sara Lennox: 
…African-Americans who denied communism were generally subjected 
to a German racial discourse that had originated in the Enlightenment; in 
these accounts, they were portrayed either as hapless victims not yet able 
to seize control of their own lives or as primitive and barbarous savages 
who, for purely racial reasons, lacked the resources to do so.155 
 
Important to note here is that even though this brand of racism was thoroughly infused 
with socialist and communist ideology, it was rooted in earlier racial discourses, the very 
same discourses informing West German views on blacks as well.  While justifications 
for the articulated racism differed, the views and basic language of expression were 
drawn from a common set of experiences.    
 The differentiating East German views on American blacks also extended to 
African American culture.  Though elites regarded some aspects of African American 
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culture, rather condescendingly, as impressive achievements, much of what the SED 
attacked in American culture was actually rooted in the African American sub-culture.  
This made for tensions between the East German elite’s intellectual acceptance of 
African Americans and the rejection of many of their cultural products.  A prime example 
of this was the SED’s staunch opposition to jazz in East Germany.156  During the 1950s, 
East German officials discouraged the importation of jazz recordings, just as they 
discouraged the enjoyment of other Western imports.  Proponents of the music argued 
that there were two types of jazz, one that was authentic and traditional, and another that 
had succumbed to the commercialization of capitalist industry. 157     
Surely, they argued, the authentic form of jazz could—and ideologically, 
should—be embraced by the GDR.158  This was because, the proponents argued, this 
form of jazz was actually a means of African American protest and should be celebrated 
as such in East Germany.  In fact, the argument continued, jazz could play a role in the 
development of a new East German dance music that could be deemed “clean.”  In 1956, 
even the state’s youth group, the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend—FDJ) 
supported and endorsed this argument publicly.159  Ultimately, officials were willing to 
allow East Germans to listen to what it considered traditional forms of jazz, “such as 
blues, Dixieland, and swing.”160      
There was, however, African American music that East German officials 
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approved of, celebrating and supporting African American folk music whole-
heartedly.161  The SED judged African American folk music as “the truest and most 
‘authentic’ expressions” of oppression, and treated those who performed this music 
“almost like folk heroes.”162   The best example of African American folk music that the 
SED could hold up to its people was Paul Robeson’s work.  Thomas Fuchs has described 
Robeson’s music as exemplifying “the musical tradition with which East German 
leadership had been familiar: traditional songs of international workers, the communist 
movement, and traditional folklore.”163  It was the music of an oppressed group, resisting 
its capitalist oppressors.  Again, one finds that GDR elites were very specific about whom 
and what from the African American community they were willing to accept into their 
largely theoretical friendship.   
The East German African American discourse in the 1950s was generally an elite 
one, confined to those in the SED as well as individuals who socialized in intellectual or 
academic circles.  What was clear to East German elites in the 1950s was that support for 
the African American struggle in the US could become part of the arsenal of East 
Germany’s efforts to become relevant.  As commentary proclaimed, African Americans 
had yet to succumb to the “grip of modern materialism,” making them suitable allies 
                                                 
161 In a press conference with Paul Robeson in 1960, he was quoted as saying that jazz had originally grown 
out of African American music protesting oppression and slavery, i.e. folk music, and in that form was 
acceptable.  However, the “commercialized” jazz of the period had apparently shed those origins and was 
now of a “destructive character.”  “Paul Robeson hat Wort gehalten: Pressekonferenz mit dem groβen 
Künstler und Kämpfer in Berlin,” Berliner Zeitung, 20 June 1960, clipping located in the Akademie der 
Künst, Berlin, Paul-Robeson-Archiv (hereafter PRA), 9.5/3.112 mi 4 c. 
162 Höhn and Klimke, A Breath of Freedom, 129. 
163 Thomas Fuchs, “Rock ‘n’ Roll in the German Democratic Republic, 1949-1961,” in Here, There, and 
Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture, eds. Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine 
Tyler May (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), 194. 
78 
 
despite (and in many ways, because of) their location in the West.164  This was an image 
that would change little over the remainder of the GDR’s lifetime, with the elite 
projecting onto this “ideal” black individual the values considered most important to the 
SED at a particular moment in time.   
 
African Americans in East Germany  
Likely the first African Americans to arrive in East Germany were deserters from 
the US military stationed in West Germany.  Before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, 
approximately 45 American soldiers deserted and fled to the GDR from West Germany.  
Six of these men were African American, and like the other deserters, had come to East 
Germany for a variety of reasons, none of the men ranking ideology very highly among 
these motivations.165  Upon their arrival, these men were sent to Bautzen, near East 
Germany’s border with Czechoslovakia, a village that would later become synonymous 
with a prison housing the SED’s political opponents.  The government placed the 
deserters in what was called the House of International Solidarity (hereafter HIS), where 
they were taught German, learned trades, and received political instruction.  The men 
became part of an East German experiment that ultimately ended in 1963 when the HIS 
was permanently closed.166   
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Among the deserters who sought asylum, the first African American to arrive in 
Bautzen was a man named Charles Lucas, from Ohio.  According to Lucas, he was 
drafted by the US Navy in 1943, and after spending time in the Pacific theater he returned 
home.  In the late 1940s he was again called to serve, this time as part of the occupation 
forces in Europe, though he soon learned that he was to be sent to Korea after a short 
furlough in the US.  Not wanting to fight in Korea, he deserted the US military and came 
to East Germany with a young West German woman to whom he was engaged.  He 
reached East Germany on 29 August 1951, and arrived in Bautzen on 12 September 
1951.  To the Stasi, he stated that he had come east because he “didn’t want to fight 
anymore wars.  Because I don’t see what we are fighting for…”167  An attraction to 
communism appears not to have played a role in his considerations.    
Upon arriving in Bautzen, Lucas was employed in a bakery.  In his spare time, he 
joined a boxing group and became known regionally as a boxing star.168  As a foreigner 
from the West living in East Germany, Lucas was monitored by the Stasi, who collected 
status reports from his employer on his work performance and work ethic.  Stasi officials 
noted that Lucas was a hard-worker who perhaps enjoyed the company of women a bit 
too much, but nonetheless pulled his weight at work.  In fact, he and his boss apparently 
got along so well that they even socialized together.  Lucas also joined the FDJ and the 
Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union Federation, FDGB)—
though many East German workers belonged to these groups and membership did not 
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necessarily signify a devotion to the state and what it represented.169   
Lucas eventually married and by all appearances made for an attractive asylum 
seeker.  The only real negative was that Lucas’ German was very poor, which made it 
difficult for him to interact with his co-workers and most East Germans in general.170  A 
difficulty with speaking German would become a theme among the other deserters as 
well.  Generally, when the deserters arrived at the HIS, they were given the opportunity 
to enroll in a three-month program in which they would study German and learn about 
socialism, as well as methods they could use to change conditions in their native 
countries, to which they were eventually expected to return.  In 1956, SED officials 
finally realized that three months was not enough time to successfully master German, 
and sought to expand the program.171  Sadly, though Lucas seemed to have adjusted to 
his new life in the GDR as well as he possibly could have given his language difficulties, 
on 12 June 1956 Lucas was discovered dead in the apartment he shared with his wife, the 
result of what was ruled a suicide.172   
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Though Lucas’ time in East Germany came to an unfortunate end, the other 
African American deserters lived to see the end of the East German state.173  Several 
years after Lucas arrived in East Germany, Arthur Boyd, who was born in South Carolina 
but raised on Long Island, New York, deserted to the East in 1953 or 1954.174  According 
to a newspaper article, it appears that Boyd defected to the East after meeting an East 
German woman named Ingeborg, while stationed in West Berlin.  The two married and 
had six children, the first a girl named Karin who would go on to become an actress in 
both the GDR and the FRG.175  Eventually, Ingeborg and Arthur divorced, though it is 
not clear exactly when.176  After the divorce, Boyd remained in East Germany, never to 
return to the US.  It appears that Boyd was more successful than some of the other 
deserters at learning German, as his daughter later stated in an interview that her English 
was poor because her father had always spoken German at home.177 
Another deserter, Raymond Hutto, a Georgia native, arrived in East Germany in 
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1954.  According to Jet, Hutto had been in West Berlin awaiting a court martial when he 
escaped from his guard and crossed the border into East Germany; there, he requested 
political asylum.  Per American military officials, Hutto was being court martialed on a 
larceny charge.178  Upon his arrival in East Berlin, Hutto was transported to Bautzen 
where he studied a trade, and he later went on to earn his master’s papers at the Schwarze 
Pumpe coal and gas complex, located not far from Dresden.179  There is little known 
about Hutto, except that he married an East German woman named Sieglinde.180  Hutto 
was one of several deserters or asylum seekers to flee to East Germany on the heels of 
criminal charges.  In a 1956 report from the Ministry of Interior discussing the absence of 
political convictions among many of the asylum seekers at the HIS, officials noted that 
indeed some of the applicants were looking to avoid criminal charges in West Germany, 
thinking that the best way to evade the police was to head eastward.181   
Another deserter, James Pulley, was probably the most publicly successful in 
building a life for himself in East Germany.  As he later told the story, he had been 
stationed in Augsburg, West Germany when in July 1955 he and his girlfriend traveled to 
her hometown of Saxony-Anhalt, in East Germany.  Apparently, he simply crossed the 
border on foot, wearing his uniform, and later checked in at a police station.  Said Pulley, 
“‘Frankly, I didn’t have a clue about East or West and suddenly I was in the East…I 
wanted the girl-friend and didn’t bother worrying about other matters.’”182  Much like the 
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other deserters, Pulley’s motivations for coming to East Germany had nothing to do with 
a knowledge of or sympathy for the East German side of the German Question.  
 In East Germany, Pulley—unlike Lucas, Boyd, and Hutto—did not learn a trade.  
Instead, Pulley ultimately became a singer who performed with the Black and White 
Dance Orchestra.  It is perhaps telling that the most “successful” deserter was one who 
pursued a career in entertainment, conforming to long-held German expectations for 
blacks as performers.  According to Pulley, one evening in 1957 he and his wife attended 
a dance and sat themselves next to the stage where the band was performing.  Keeping 
beat to the music with his hands, Pulley drew the attention of the pianist, who beckoned 
him over during a break.  The pianist asked Pulley if he could sing; upon hearing that he 
could, he invited Pulley onto the stage where he performed songs that were “sort of Rock 
‘n’ Roll.”  According to Pulley, he was immediately hired to join the band right then and 
there.183  The pianist’s question, however, seems an odd one to ask of someone who was 
simply keeping beat to the music, suggesting that racial stereotypes about blacks and their 
affinity for rhythm and music prompted the pianist to ask Pulley that particular question.   
In 1956, a year after Pulley defected to East Germany, Willie Avent arrived.  He 
was a former sergeant in the US military who would go on to win the (East German) 
Silver Pin of the National Front, and belonged to the Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship.184  In a 1995 interview with Der Spiegel Avent’s German wife Erika spoke 
on behalf of her husband, who had passed away the previous year, telling of his affinity 
for the East German state, maintaining that Willie “was more of a GDR citizen than he 
was an American.”  Though Erika claimed that her husband had been a “distinguished 
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member” of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship,185 this was in effect a society to 
which most East Germans were required to belong.  It is difficult to know how Avent 
actually felt, as his wife’s proof comes down to an association with a group practically 
required of all workers in East Germany.   
Lastly, the sixth African American to arrive in East Germany, about who very 
little is known, was a man named John Sykes.  Though there are scant sources available, 
he is briefly mentioned in East German files.  Sykes was born on 9 March 1925 and 
arrived in East Germany on 29 June 1957.  As of November 1957 he had been employed 
in Leipzig as a machine operator.186  The fact that so little information is available 
suggests that he did not arrive in East Germany for any ideological reasons, as the 
sources would likely have noted such a fact.  He may have left the GDR not long after 
arriving, also possibly explaining why there are so few mentions of him in the archives. 
Though the SED may have believed that they could use the deserters—black and 
white—for propaganda purposes, nothing materialized.  In theory, these simple soldiers 
could have been very useful propaganda tools, at a time when East Germans were fleeing 
the country in worrying numbers.  The notion of these men turning their backs on their 
military, country, and the West’s ideological worldview to request asylum in East 
Germany had the potential to not only reflect negatively on the US, but also to distract 
observers from the population drain in the GDR.  Yet, it eventually became clear to both 
the SED and the Stasi that few of the deserters and asylum seekers had arrived in East 
Germany out of an affinity for the state or its political ideology.   
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In fact, a 1956 report from the Ministry of the Interior’s Department of Internal 
Affairs admitted that not only was this the case, but that many of the men had arrived 
knowing little about the state, most simply hoping to receive some sort of financial 
assistance.187  Throughout much of this experiment at the HIS, East German reports 
painted a picture of the deserters and asylum seekers as people who were not fully 
engaged with the state when they arrived and who continued to maintain a distance from 
the East German socialist worldview.  Certainly, a lack of commitment to the GDR’s 
state ideology is only one of many reasons why the black asylum seekers (like other non-
black deserters), failed to provide any useful propaganda for the SED.  One of the most 
glaring reasons, however, owed to a general distrust directed at many of the deserters and 
asylum seekers by East German officials, suspicions that were proven true when in 1958 
an asylum seeker was discovered to be a spy.188   
However, even if the black deserters had arrived in the GDR for ideological 
reasons, the hypocrisy of the SED’s anti-racist rhetoric likely would have been a cause 
for concern.  The men were often confronted by racism and an exoticization that served 
to single them out and underline their differences.  According to a brief 1951 report in 
Lucas’ Stasi file, he related to officials some of the “difficulties” he had had with citizens 
of Bautzen who referred to him using the word “Neger,” which Lucas explained was an 
offensive term.189   Though the word Neger can express the English word “negro,” it is 
also sometimes used to express the word “nigger,” likely the usage with which Lucas 
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took offense.  The citizens of Bautzen were not the only ones who referred to Lucas using 
the word Neger; in a report from 1953 written by Stasi officials, Lucas’ biographical 
information listed his previous citizenship as American and his nationality as “Neger.”190  
By 1953, when the report was written, the negative connotation of the word Neger had 
long been established—in fact, “[b]y the 1920s, the pejorative or abusive sense of the 
[term] had become sufficiently well-established” in Germany191—such that the SED’s 
continued use of a highly racialized term is indicative of an institutionalized racism that 
found expression in the most bureaucratic of ways. 
A year later, a 1954 Soviet report about the HIS detailed a number of weaknesses 
in the program that led the deserters and asylum seekers to leave the country.  The Soviet 
observers paid attention to the conditions for the asylum seekers in the community 
surrounding the HIS, noting that the locals often expressed racist sentiments towards the 
“Blacks and Moroccans.”  According to the report, life in Bautzen was extremely hostile 
and lonely for the men who sought asylum in East Germany.192  Yet, despite this Soviet 
report’s frank discussion about East German racism, there was no further East German 
discussion about the racial discrimination that confronted the black asylum seekers in 
Bautzen.  Even had the men taken honest oaths of loyalty, their experiences with East 
German racism would have made them unlikely spokesmen for and supporters of East 
Germany’s anti-racist rhetoric.   
 Altogether, the experiences of these African American deserters in East Germany 
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signify why their arrival in the state failed to provide East German elites with the 
opportunity to take what was largely a theoretical relationship and turn it into a concrete 
and tangible one.  The deserters provided the SED with little propaganda value, and in 
fact, they served to highlight the socialist Germany’s legitimacy problems and holes in its 
rhetoric.  Despite the fact that, on the face of it, a group of African Americans choosing 
to live in East Germany and remaining there until the Berlin Wall fell would suggest that 
perhaps there was some truth to East Germany’s anti-racist rhetoric, this simply was not 
true.  The anti-racist propaganda did nothing to attract the men, and in fact, nothing about 
the state’s political ideology had been a magnet for these deserters.  They arrived in East 
Germany because of their personal circumstances, often uneducated about the state, its 
politics, and its ideology.  Though they remained, it is quite likely that it was because of 
the families that they had started, fears about the punishments they would face in the US 
for deserting the military, and an apprehension about the social stigma they would 
encounter for having defected to the Eastern Bloc.  They may simply have perceived it as 
much easier to remain where they were.   
Two asylum seekers who differed markedly from those housed in Bautzen were 
Aubrey Pankey and his wife Kay.  Aubrey was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1905 
and was orphaned by the age of fifteen.  Determined to learn a trade in order to support 
himself, he entered the Hampton Institute where he focused on auto mechanics until it 
was discovered that he could sing, and quite well.  He joined the Hampton choir, and 
upon graduation continued his studies at the Oberlin Conservatory of Music, Boston 
University, and the Hubbard Studios in Boston.  Gaining recognition from performances 
in Boston and New York, he was described as “a singer with musical intelligence and 
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imagination.”193  In May 1930 he left for Europe, where he trained in Paris and Vienna, 
and he eventually appeared in more than two hundred performances in twenty-four 
countries.194  During World War II he returned to the US but left soon thereafter and 
settled in France.  After divorcing his French wife of nine years, he married a white 
woman from the American south named Kathryn Weatherly.195  The new Mrs. Pankey, 
who went by Kay, was noted by the African American magazine Jet for living “quietly in 
her fashionable Harlem apartment, socializ[ing] at cocktail parties, NAACP and Urban 
League functions,” and for being very active in Harlem society.196   
 In early 1955, the Pankeys requested political asylum from East Germany.  
According to some Western news reports, Pankey and his wife took up permanent 
residence in East Germany after they were expelled from France for supporting Ethel and 
Julius Rosenberg, who had been convicted of a conspiracy to commit wartime espionage 
in the United States.197  East German records suggest that Kay’s refusal to submit to 
demands from her employer, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization), for a declaration of capitalist and Western loyalty played a role in 
their request for asylum.198  Whatever may have driven the application, the SED took the 
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Pankeys’ asylum request under consideration.  In a letter from Karl Tümmler, of the 
Ministry of Culture, to another functionary, he cautioned that the issue be attended to 
with the utmost confidentiality.  Aubrey was currently on tour in Europe, while Kay was 
still officially working in Paris at UNESCO.  As her situation there had not yet been fully 
resolved, should news of their request leak before the details had been worked out it 
could create untold problems and worsen those that already existed for the couple.  There 
were some questions, though, about the advisability of offering asylum to the couple, but 
not for political or ideological reasons.199  Tümmler observed that Pankey was a gifted 
musician, but wondered how he would support himself in East Germany: would Pankey 
be able to make a living through his concerts, and if not, was he was capable of teaching 
at a music school?200   
About a week after Tümmler sent his letter, he received a message informing him 
that the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs had devised a way for the Pankeys to 
receive asylum with little international fanfare.  The Pankeys were encouraged to enter 
East Germany on a normal, limited visa, which would later be converted into a permanent 
one.  In order to help facilitate and speed up the process, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
would write a statement supporting the asylum request.201  While this statement or any 
document officially granting the Pankeys asylum was not found in the archives, later 
documents make reference to the Pankeys having received asylum, and it appears that by 
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April 1956 the Pankeys were official members of the East German state.202   
By all accounts, the Pankeys settled in to East German society fairly well.  As a 
singer of black spirituals and German Lieder, Pankey became popular in East Germany, 
and took a teaching job in East Berlin.203  Kay became an editor at Seven Seas Publishers 
in East Berlin, a job which included publishing texts written by African Americans.  
What is striking about the Pankeys’ asylum request is the fact that little was made of it, 
not only while the request was processing, but afterward as well.  The Pankeys’ 
disavowal of the West was not used for the creation of any significant international 
propaganda, though Pankey was tapped to speak domestically on the issue of democracy.   
In the late 1950s, Pankey participated in several local election events in which he 
discussed his perception of democracy, comparing that which he had experienced in the 
US with what allegedly existed in East Germany.   
Before one election, Pankey wrote a piece for the Freien Presse in Zwickau, and 
told readers that it was false to assume that a state had to have multiple parties in order to 
be democratic.  He used his native country as an example, arguing that both the 
Republicans and the Democrats served the interests of Wall Street and not the people, 
making the multi-party system moot as a means of ensuring democracy.  To Pankey, true 
democracy was exemplified by a state where the people controlled the government, and a 
“struggle for peace and humanity” was the “prerequisite” for the success of the political 
system.  The mere fact of an election did not ensure democracy, wrote Pankey, but rather 
democracy was found where the people had full and steady control over political 
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workings.204   
That Pankey spoke publicly to East Germans about democracy and elections 
coincided with the SED’s efforts to prove that the US was decidedly un-democratic and 
should not be used as the benchmark of a successful democratic state (and by extension, 
neither should the FRG, the US’ own democracy “project”).  However, Pankey was just 
as outspoken, if not more so, on the issue of racism.  Given the SED’s stated commitment 
to anti-racism, why did they not ask Pankey to speak on the topic, either domestically or 
internationally?  The answer lies in the fact that Pankey was outspoken against all forms 
of racism, not just American racism.   
In fact, he did not hesitate to speak out about his own experiences with East 
German racism.  One complaint was filed in 1959, when Pankey was invited to 
participate in a program of American music to be conducted by the famed American 
director Earl Robinson at the State Opera in East Berlin.  Being the only American singer 
in East Germany at the time, Pankey felt obliged to participate in the program, and in 
fact, was honored to have the opportunity to work with Robinson.  However, he was 
sorely offended when he was offered the role of “Negro preacher.”  In a letter to Gerhart 
Eisler, the chief of East German radio, Pankey wrote: 
I would have been happy to share in this evening of American music.  
What has made it impossible for me is the fact that, as it turns out, the 
invitation was extended to me not because I am a singer, or an American, 
but strictly because I am a Negro…. I can only regard this as an 
unfortunate instance of Jim Crow.205 
 
It is not difficult to imagine that Pankey knew that tacking on his comment about “Jim 
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Crow” would be provocative, serving as an unfriendly comparison between East 
Germany and the US.  Pankey closed his letter by noting his regret about not taking part 
in the American musical revue; what he regretted most, however, was that the 
“circumstances which force this refusal should have occurred here, in the Berlin which is 
my home.”206   
 Eisler forwarded the letter on to Albert Norden, a member of the SED’s Politburo 
who ran East Germany’s agitation department from 1955 until 1967.207  Norden in turn 
shared the letter with Alfred Kurella, who led a Politburo committee investigating 
questions concerning culture in East Germany.  In a memo to Kurella, Norden noted that 
this would be a good opportunity to address the “situation” in East Germany in order to 
review the experiences of “people like Pankey.”  As an aside, he commented that he 
seemed to remember an earlier discrimination complaint from Pankey.208  In response, 
Kurella remarked that this letter from Pankey finally gave them a chance to take a stand 
against those in East Germany who loudly proclaimed their support on behalf of the 
world’s blacks, only to retreat behind their racism.209  Kurella opted to respond to Pankey 
personally, and shared with him his disgust for those who expressed what he called 
“pseudosympathies” for blacks as a cover for their true racist beliefs and attitudes. 210   
While Kurella was not sure how the matter would be resolved in the public 
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sphere, he did ask Pankey if he could use his letter to facilitate discussion.211  Pankey 
acquiesced, and offered to participate in any such discussion if Kurella deemed it 
appropriate.212  However, there is no evidence that Kurella or anyone else publicly dealt 
with the discrimination of “people like Pankey,” stemming from Pankey’s complaint.  It 
is possible that Kurella intended to, but was unable to do so—it is unlikely that Kurella 
would have received approval from the SED to instigate a conversation about East 
German racism, given that racism did not officially exist in the GDR.  It is also possible, 
though, that Kurella’s promise was nothing more than lip-service, an attempt to placate 
Pankey. 
The mere existence of this particular discussion, though, suggests that Kurella 
may have had at least some genuine desire to address East German racism, as he did 
admit to the existence of racism in the GDR in a letter to another functionary, when the 
standard procedure would have been to deny that it existed at all.  Certainly, Kurella and 
Norden, the first a critic of Walter Ulbricht (the First Secretary of the SED from 1950-
1971) and the latter the son of a rabbi (in a state whose anti-fascism did not include anti-
anti-Semitism213), were perhaps better positioned than others to appreciate Pankey’s 
complaint and the strains of racism that ran through his experience with the musical 
revue.  Though the two would ultimately end up defending the party line by their 
inaction, this is an example of the variety of perspectives on the GDR’s problem with 
racism. 
In February 1961, Pankey wrote yet another letter of complaint, this time directly 
                                                 
211 Alfred Kurella to Aubrey Pankey, 2 May 1959, BArch-SAPMO DY 30/IV 2/2.026/105, 125, SAPMO. 
212 Aubrey Pankey to Alfred Kurella, 12 May 1959, BArch-SAPMO DY 30/IV 2/2.026/105, 124, SAPMO. 
213 For more on anti-anti-Semitism and anti-fascism in the SED, see Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The 
Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
94 
 
contacting Norden.  In his complaint he included an article from the Norddeutsche 
Zeitung that critiqued a concert Pankey had given in Rostock, as well as the response he 
had sent to the newspaper.  Pankey hoped that once Norden read the article, Norden 
would agree with him that the newspaper should publish a correction of the critique.214  
In the offending article, the author criticized Pankey for undervaluing the music of his 
“people,” and claimed that the small number of concert attendees owed to the fact that 
Pankey’s repertoire simply did not align with what Germans had come to expect a Black 
American to perform.  Instead, of the twenty-four songs Pankey sang, ten were 
German Kunstlieder, five were labeled by the author as “international,” and three were 
Baroque songs, including one by German-born Händel.  This was contrasted with the fact 
that Pankey had sung “only” six Negro spirituals.  The author warned that Pankey would 
only find success if he remembered that his primary concern as a black performer should 
be to sing the music of his “people.”215  
Pankey, who had trained internationally and in many well-known musical centers, 
was outraged by this critique.  In his letter to the newspaper, he argued that had the 
review been confined to “my voice, my interpretation and technique, there would be no 
reason for this letter.”  Instead, he argued, the reviewer had chosen to write a political 
critique of his performance, in which he assigned Pankey a series of cultural and political 
responsibilities that were, frankly, racist.  “I believe that it is a grave political error for 
music critics in the DDR to blow the horn of white chauvinists,” he went on.  Though the 
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reporter may not have meant to write a critique with racist overtones, Pankey allowed, 
that was nevertheless the effect.  Because the newspaper had a large distribution, Pankey 
believed it was vital that a correction be issued.216  Unfortunately the archives do not 
show any response from either Norden or the newspaper’s editor.    
 Just as with the deserters, Pankey’s experience in East Germany reveals why his 
appeal for asylum did little to further a relationship between Black America and East 
Germany, while pointing to the precarious edge on which East Germany’s struggle for 
legitimacy rested.  Though Pankey had left the West in favor of East Germany, he was far 
too vocal against (East German) racism, making him a dangerous figure to use in anti-
racist rhetoric, and one that the SED could not safely utilize as a propaganda vehicle for 
an international audience.  To admit that racism existed in East Germany would, officials 
believed, create a tie to the Nazis, as well as contradict and lessen the effect of any East 
German propaganda condemning the “racist” Western powers, hampering the SED’s 
efforts at obtaining legitimacy.  It was simply easier instead to use Pankey to speak 
domestically about democracy in the GDR and the US.   
 The next noted African American to come to East Germany was the activist and 
academic W.E.B. Du Bois.  By the time Du Bois traveled to East Germany in 1958, his 
long-held appreciation for Imperial Germany, as well as his inclination toward East 
Germany, was well-known.  Du Bois, born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts in 1868, 
had moved to Germany in 1892 to attend university.  Enrolled at the Kaiser Friedrich 
Wilhelm University of Berlin in the Philosophy department, Du Bois completed a 
doctoral dissertation, but was unable to defend his work due to university requirements 
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and a lack of funding.217  After returning to the US, Du Bois spoke and wrote often of his 
time in Germany, expressing an appreciation for the freedom he had experienced as a 
black man while traveling throughout the then-young German state.218 
Throughout the 1950s Du Bois kept himself apprised of the situation in the GDR, 
and even spoke out in favor of the state at a speech given on 8 October 1954 honoring 
East Germany’s fifth anniversary.  Du Bois spoke of his great regard for the state, 
maintaining that the true greatness of German civilization was centered in East Germany, 
as most of Germany’s great thinkers had either been born in eastern Germany, had been 
educated there, or had carried out their activities in the region.219  Du Bois went on to 
extol East Germany’s virtues, applauding its efforts to unite East and West Germany, and 
doing so “through peace and not by war or preparation for war,” making reference to 
West German remilitarization.220  Elaborating, he said: 
…if a new Germany like Western Germany today is going to follow in the 
footsteps of Great Britain, France and the United States of America, and 
try to subdue the world so that the starved, the ignorant, and the sick 
majority of human beings are going to spend their lives working for a few 
leading countries, then there is no hope. […]  But we have a right today to 
have renewed faith in the emergence of Eastern Germany…into a new 
world which shall develop without war and exploitation and with peace 
and respect for humanity.  It is the curse of our day that so many honest 
human beings have allowed themselves to be persuaded that salvation for 
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civilization lies in war and in endless preparation for war.221 
 
He implored world leaders to realize the value of diplomatically recognizing East 
Germany, as the international community needed a state that would advocate for peace, 
industry, and workers at the expense of exploitative capitalists, rather than the other way 
around.222  This theme of decolonization and anti-imperialism would become a popular 
overlap for both African Americans and the SED, a point of discussion among both 
groups later on.223  At the time, though, little was made of this speech in East Germany, 
only to be briefly mentioned during a visit Du Bois made to the GDR in 1958.224 
 Though the background leading up to Du Bois’ 1958 visit is somewhat 
convoluted, it appears that the notion of creating ties with the aging African American 
leader was first considered by East German officials in late 1957, with some outside 
urging.  In December of that year, William Patterson had written a letter to the Academy 
of Sciences in East Berlin, in which he pointed out that Du Bois would be turning ninety 
the following year.  Because he believed that this landmark birthday would go 
uncelebrated in the US, Patterson suggested that the Academy make Du Bois a 
corresponding member, and widely publicize the fact that they had bestowed upon him 
this honor.  The Academy agreed with Patterson, praising the fact that, despite the 
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discrimination and persecution Du Bois had suffered throughout his nearly-ninety years, 
he had managed to hold on to his humanistic principles.225  In February 1958, the 
Academy of Sciences officially invited Du Bois to become a corresponding member.226   
 Du Bois’ return to (East) Germany that same year, despite how the SED would 
later spin it, was initially greeted with little fanfare among those who knew he was 
coming.  Documents suggest that Du Bois was in originally in East Germany to give a 
speech on pan-Africanism at Humboldt University, scheduled for 28 October 1958.227  
Three days before the talk, the head of Humboldt University sent out a memo in which 
the faculty was asked to announce to its students that Du Bois would be giving a speech, 
noting that Du Bois had not long ago celebrated his ninetieth birthday, that after having 
his passport revoked he had recently been allowed to again travel outside of the US, and 
that he had studied at their university from 1892 to 1894.228   
Then, on 28 October, the same day that Du Bois was scheduled to give his speech, 
Professor Heinz Mohrmann wrote to the State Secretary for Universities and Technical 
Schools, asking whether it would be possible to bestow upon Du Bois an honorary 
doctorate from Humboldt University.  The school had formerly been known as the 
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University of Berlin, the same school that Du Bois had attended sixty-six years earlier.  
In justifying the honorary degree, Mohrmann discussed Du Bois’ “life’s work,” which 
included “the liberation of the peoples of Africa,” followed by a discussion of Du Bois’ 
life history and a sampling of his published works.  Mohrmann closed by writing that 
Humboldt University was very different from the University of Berlin that had not 
allowed Du Bois to defend his PhD dissertation more than half a century earlier.  As 
members of a socialist and progressive university, the Humboldt faculty was proud to 
forever be associated with Du Bois, wrote the professor, by extending to him the degree 
that the University of Berlin did not give him.229  The request was approved the next day 
and Mohrmann immediately issued a memo announcing that Du Bois would receive his 
degree from the Economics Department on 3 November.230   
 The same day that he received his honorary degree, Du Bois was also awarded the 
German Peace Medal.  In his speech honoring Du Bois, the president of the [East] 
German Peace Council, Professor Walter Friedrich, explained that the values held dear by 
Du Bois were the same ones supported and advanced by the socialist Germany.  Friedrich 
proclaimed that Du Bois was a fighter for peace and freedom, principles which East 
Germany enthusiastically defended.  Friedrich also noted that Du Bois’ struggle against 
the world’s wrongs had included a protest against the remilitarization of West Germany, 
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showing that Du Bois had long sided with the “right” Germany.  In everything that Du 
Bois had done and stood for, said Friedrich, the African American activist had sought 
peaceful solutions, exemplifying the spirit of the peace movement to which the German 
Peace Council was devoted.231   
 Du Bois’ wife, Shirley Graham Du Bois, wrote of their trip to East Germany, 
though she made no mention of the speech that originally brought them to the socialist 
state.  After landing at the airport in East Berlin, she recalled, their East German handlers 
were pleasantly surprised to see that Du Bois needed no translators and was able to 
converse with them in a “pure and concise ‘Berlinese’ German.”232  When the couple 
reached their hotel, Du Bois stood at the window and remarked how new everything in 
the city looked, as well as how few people there were on the streets.  Shirley wrote that, 
as they later learned, the quiet streets owed to the fact that “at this time of day all the 
people of East Berlin were at work—we were probably the only idle visitors in the 
vicinity.”233  In a trend that would be repeated by other visiting African Americans, 
Shirley presented to her readers an East Germany that was new and exciting, but also 
hard-working; in short, an example of the successes of communism. 
 After touring some of East Berlin, Du Bois announced to their entourage that he 
wanted to visit West Berlin, to take in some of the sights he had known in his earlier 
years in Imperial Germany.  He was met with protestations from his hosts, who gently 
told him that many of the people he had known while attending university were no longer 
living, and the younger Germans he had met would have been “caught up in the wars.”  
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When that tactic did not work, they warned him that, due to his contentious relationship 
with the American government, should he cross into West Berlin he risked losing his 
passport and being deported.  Finally, one of his hosts asked him whether he would like 
to be the cause for World War III, after another had stated that they would not allow the 
American government to harm Du Bois in any way, “‘even if it meant calling on Russian 
tanks!’”  Shirley found this exchange amusing and laughed, seemingly breaking the 
tension in the room, and Du Bois stood down, claiming that he was a man of peace, never 
mentioning again the desire to travel to West Berlin.234   
 Despite the respect that members of the East German elite had for Du Bois, the 
majority of those who held the African American intellectual in high regard were 
intellectuals or academics themselves.  Ideologically, Du Bois’ own views differed from 
the orthodox Marxist-Leninist worldview to which East Germany officially subscribed.  
This ideological distance is best seen in efforts to have Du Bois’ speech published in the 
GDR. Shortly after Du Bois’ visit was complete and he and his wife had left for the 
Soviet Union, his speech on pan-Africanism at Humboldt University was translated into 
German, and Mohrmann explored the possibility of having the speech published.  While 
the journal Deutsche Aussenpolitik at first expressed some interest in the project, 
ultimately it was turned down because Du Bois strayed from East Germany’s orthodox 
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Marxism-Leninism.235   Furthermore, Du Bois had praised in his speech black liberation 
movements that had already been deemed unacceptable by East German officials.236  
Eventually the speech was published in the Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-
Universität, and though it was a respected journal, it did not have the circulation that 
Deutsche Aussenpolitik did.237   
Hamilton Beck has argued that because of Deutsche Aussenpolitik’s refusal to 
publish the speech, Du Bois’ lecture at Humboldt University on pan-Africanism, the 
actual reason why he had come to East Berlin, was relegated to obscurity.  Elaborating, 
Beck has written that the speech  
was overlooked even by the GDR’s own bibliographers.  And this 
occurred because, in the eyes of the GDR’s guardians of orthodoxy, Du 
Bois had expressed views that, to put it euphemistically, would cause 
“confusion” in the mind of the reader; in fact, the rejection occurred 
because Du Bois did not toe the SED’s line on a number of key issues: the 
interpretation of Marcus Garvey, the relationship between socialism and 
communism, and the relationship between Pan-Africanism and 
movements of national liberation.238 
While it was the case that Du Bois and the SED differed on various points ideologically, 
the idea of Du Bois being censored, as Beck has argued, falls flat when one considers that 
the very people who would have read the article were academics and intellectuals—not 
the average member of the East German public.   
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The archives clearly show East German academics’ avid interest in Du Bois and 
his writings.  In a letter dated 19 December 1958, a professor from Halle, Arno Lehmann, 
wrote to Du Bois, congratulating him on his honorary degree and relaying his praise for 
the African American’s well-known book, The Souls of Black Folk.  Lehmann, however, 
was not the only one in the family who enjoyed Du Bois’ work; his son was completing 
his PhD thesis on the topics covered in the book, and the two were anxiously awaiting the 
publication of his next work, The Dark Flame.239  Two years later in 1960, Humboldt 
University invited Du Bois to attend the university’s 150th anniversary celebration.  
Unfortunately, Du Bois responded that he would be unable to attend, “on account of my 
age and on account of the attitude of my government.”240   
 Also in 1960, Seven Seas Publishers was under contract to publish the Du Bois 
Reader, which would include extracts personally chosen by Du Bois from Crisis, the 
official magazine of the NAACP that he had cofounded in 1910.241  A year later, in 
March 1961, Du Bois was asked to contribute to a university conference, this time at Karl 
Marx University in Leipzig, on the topic of the “Problems of Neo-Colonialism.”  In a 
letter to Du Bois the rector of the university, Dr. Georg Mayer, wrote that “Support for 
this struggle is regarded by Karl Marx University as one of its foremost duties.  Because 
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356 1960H.  Du Bois made a typo in his letter and addressed the letter to “Berlin, West Germany,” which 
resulted in a response from Humboldt University informing him that the school was situated in East 
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thought the school was in West Germany.  Du Bois curtly replied: “Of course I know the fundamental 
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error.”  Both letters between Professor Dr. Nathan and Du Bois, 11 April 1960 and 12 May 1960, 
respectively, W.E.B. Du Bois Papers, Reel 74, Frame 357 1960H.  It is not clear exactly what Du Bois 
meant by the “attitude of my government,” especially since he made several other trips elsewhere in 1960.  
This comment may have been simply a polite way of declining the invitation. 
241 Du Bois to Mrs. Gertrude Heym, 15 January 1960, W.E.B. Du Bois Papers, Reel 74, Frame 781 1960S. 
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of the international character of the conference and of the importance of what is to be 
discussed there, I should be glad if you would care to send your comments….”242  The 
University was clearly attempting to position itself politically and ideologically through 
supporting anticolonialism, and Du Bois was an obvious contact with which the school 
sought to link itself.  This type of linkage would also be used by the SED in later years 
with other African Americans who more adequately subscribed to similar political 
ideologies.   
As these examples show, Du Bois appealed to an enthusiastic stratum of East 
German intellectual society, as well as one that was quite aware of the value of working 
together with the aging activist, even if only to use his name and his words.  It is quite 
evident from the letters sent to Du Bois that these intellectuals were certainly hungry for 
his work, but this likely owed less to his position as an African American activist than to 
his status as an internationally respected intellectual.  East German academics and 
intellectuals were generally isolated from emerging scholarship in the West; through Du 
Bois’ work (and that of other left-leaning Westerners) East German intellectuals were 
able to consume Western work without incurring the wrath of the SED.  An expression of 
familiarity with Du Bois’ work also extended to these scholars a legitimacy of sorts 
internationally, by referencing the work of a major Western thinker.   
These individuals, certainly, would have read the German translation of Du Bois’ 
speech at Humboldt University, and likely would have read it no matter what journal it 
appeared in, meaning that the so-called censorship of Du Bois really had little impact.  It 
is also important to note that Du Bois was not censored completely, but rather that his 
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speech was published in a journal with a smaller readership, one that likely would have 
had the ability to understand the nuances in his arguments and what deviated from 
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.  The effort seems to have been focused more on keeping his 
statements from reaching a broader spectrum of the East German public, rather than 
striking them from the record entirely, though this effort was unnecessary on a logistical 
level.  This does, though, explain the SED’s delayed efforts to bring Du Bois into East 
Germany’s pro-African American rhetoric: he became a part of the SED’s African 
American discourse in later years, especially after his death, when the SED could mold 
an image of him that would not be contradicted by new statements from the African 
American intellectual.     
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 Throughout much of the 1950s, the notion of a connection between East Germany 
and the African American civil rights movement was one that largely existed within the 
minds of the East German elite.  Indeed, the average East German was exposed to 
information about the movement.  However, most of the interactions between East 
Germans and African Americans during the 1950s lacked the spark needed to extend the 
relationship beyond the theorization of the East German elite.  Though the six African 
American military deserters may have remained in East Germany, they were quite 
isolated from the rest of East German society, largely because of their skin color but also 
because of difficulties with the German language and SED fears that the men might be 
spies.  Although Aubrey Pankey came to East Germany as an asylum seeker and spoke 
approvingly of East German democracy, his vocal stand against racism—including East 
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German racism—ran the risk of “outing” the existence of something that was expressly 
forbidden in the state, going against rhetoric that comprised an important piece of East 
Germany’s foundational blocks. 
 While W.E.B. Du Bois and his affection for East Germany, built upon a nearly-
lifelong appreciation of Germany and German culture, had the potential to make real an 
East German relationship with Black America, he failed to be the necessary spark.  His 
take on socialist and communist ideology was at odds with the orthodox East German 
ideology, creating concerns among East German officials about spreading his words and 
offering an unapproved interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.  While the figure of Du 
Bois would certainly be used in East German propaganda in later years, for the time-
being, officials preferred to limit the spread of his particular stance on socialism.  Yet, Du 
Bois remained a darling of the East German intellectual and academic community, 
largely maintaining a relationship with East Germany through those who devoured his 
works and begged for access to his words.  As we will see in the next chapter, a Supreme 
Court ruling in the US would create a situation in which an alliance that had been worked 
out theoretically would finally become a reality.   
107 
 
Chapter Four: Bridge over the Ocean 
The Growth of the African American-East German Friendship,  
1960-1975 
 
“[Paul Robeson] may indeed be the spark that moved hundreds of thousands of East Germans to 
send letters and greetings to Angela Davis and countless petitions and cards demanding freedom 
for political prisoners…” 
--The Afro-American, 22 May 1971 
 
For much of the 1950s, an alliance between East Germany and Black America 
largely remained abstract, though the dam began to break in 1960 with a visit by Paul 
Robeson.  It is not clear whether East German officials fully realized the implications of 
crafting a relationship with Robeson, beyond the immediate gains propaganda would 
bring.  Yet, in retrospect, Robeson’s visit in 1960 was a turning point for the alliance.  
What had largely existed in the minds of the East German elite was finally acted out, and 
blacks in the US began to show an interest in the GDR.  By the 1970s, the SED 
understood exactly what it stood to gain as East Germans carried out the “Free Angela 
Davis” solidarity movement, in the aftermath of her arrest for her alleged role in a 
courthouse shooting.  Where Robeson’s visit made the relationship real, Davis’ solidarity 
movement confirmed for Black Americans the GDR’s commitment to the freedom 
struggle, while legitimating for the SED its own strength. 
The chapter that follows will trace the path to this first Robeson visit and reflect 
on the new friendship that formed between Black America and East Germany, examining 
who was involved in this relationship, and the ways in which both sides expressed their 
participation.  With the Angela Davis solidarity movement in the early 1970s, the 
relationship between Black America and East Germany reached its peak, and this chapter 
will explore the development and significance of the solidarity demonstrations.  The 
example of Oliver Harrington, which closes out the chapter, illustrates that despite the 
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growth of the relationship, little had actually changed since the 1950s for African 
Americans who resided in the GDR. 
 
Paul Robeson in the GDR 
Robeson’s role in giving this friendship a breath of life relied on the fact that he 
possessed several attributes that the other African Americans discussed in the previous 
chapter did not.  First, Robeson was a world-recognized singer and actor, and had been 
quite active performing in Europe prior to World War II.  When news of a Robeson visit 
spread, his non-political popularity undoubtedly played a role in drawing East Germans 
out into the streets and to the various events he headlined.  Second, Robeson’s politics 
made him a key contender for “friend” of the GDR from the SED’s point of view.  Third, 
his views were easily accessible through speeches and performances, rather than 
academic works and lectures.  Fourth, the fact that Robeson had a relatively strong 
popular and leftist international following meant that East German propaganda featuring 
the African American had the potential to travel far. 
Important too was the fact that there were members of the elite who already knew 
Robeson, having become friends with the American while in exile during the Hitler 
years.  These friends would ultimately be a driving reason behind convincing Robeson to 
visit the state, leading to a relationship that would last the remainder of the African 
American activist’s life.  As the remainder of this section will show, the SED did not 
hesitate to exploit the public’s interest in Robeson with the hopes of transferring his 
popularity onto the Party.  Robeson would not only benefit the SED at home, officials 
believed, but also internationally, as spinning a Robeson visit just right could contribute 
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to the GDR’s drive for legitimacy abroad.243  These are key points, because at the same 
time that the SED was in the midst of arranging Robeson’s visit, East Germans were 
fleeing the country in amazing numbers.244  The government desperately needed a way to 
appeal to its citizens, while also painting an image of a jubilant East German citizenry to 
trump reports of the GDR population drain.245 
To understand the friendship that developed between East Germany and Robeson, 
it is necessary to briefly return to the early 1950s.  In 1950, Robeson attempted to renew 
his passport, a necessity in order for him to travel abroad and fulfill performance 
contracts.  Upon receiving his application, the US State Department demanded that 
Robeson, in an affidavit, declare that his loyalty lay with the US government and not the 
Communist Party, of which he was a reputed member.246  Robeson refused to do so, and 
was accordingly denied his passport.  He filed a lawsuit in federal court, but at that time 
the court agreed with the State Department and upheld its decision.  Though Robeson 
may have been one of the more famous victims of such a policy, his experience was by 
                                                 
243 Jiri Valenta and Shannon Butler, “East German Security Policies in Africa,” in Eastern Europe and the 
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no means a rarity.  In earlier years, this method had occasionally been used against 
dissenting Americans, but in the 1950s, it was increasingly used to deny presumed 
communists the ability to travel.247  When news of Robeson’s struggle to reacquire his 
passport broke, East Germany proudly offered Robeson support through its international 
solidarity efforts.248   
 East Germans acknowledged what many viewed as Robeson’s effective 
imprisonment within the borders of the US through letters written to the entertainer.249  In 
1955, during the Fifth World Festival of Youth and Students for Freedom and Friendship 
in Warsaw, Prague, the East German delegation composed a letter to Robeson, referring 
to the State Department’s “incomprehensible position,” that had provoked in them 
“displeasure…anger…and…protest.”250  East German newspapers kept their readers 
apprised of Robeson’s legal situation in the US, and informed them of various protest 
efforts that took place internationally.  In December 1956, the Berliner Zeitung published 
an article entitled “Freedom for Paul Robeson” that informed its readers of a conference 
being held by the English Paul Robeson Committee to demonstrate against Robeson’s 
imprisonment and the negative effect that this had had on the performance of his art and 
his work against anti-black racism.  The paper informed readers that a letter had been sent 
to the conference, written jointly by a number of East German cultural institutions that 
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expressed their support for Robeson and spoke of what an honor it would be to greet him 
in Berlin someday.251   
In another show of solidarity, in 1958 Deutscher Fernsehfunk ([East] German 
Television Broadcasting) commissioned a film by Robeson, with writer G.F. Alexan 
driving the project from East Berlin.252  The film was a recording of a performance by 
Robeson, which allowed him to perform “internationally” despite his travel restrictions.  
The request for this film came just a year after Robeson had famously performed a 
concert for listeners at London’s St. Pancras Town Hall over a telephone connection from 
New York City, organized by the English Paul Robeson Committee.  Robeson and 
director Earl Robinson created the film, which was called “Bridge Over the Ocean,” 
(Brücke über den Ozean), and in this forty minute film Robeson and Robinson addressed 
East Germans directly and Robeson performed songs.253   
As Robeson’s wife Eslanda later explained in a letter to friends, Robeson and 
Robinson received “money by cable, to cover the cost of a film to be made 
immediately…and to be sent at once for use on television in East Germany.”  The film 
was completed within one week, and Eslanda was quite impressed with the quality of the 
work in the film.  She believed that “Paul has never looked better, nor sung better, and 
the widescreen stuff is just made for him.  Earl is awfully good, too, and together they are 
excellent….It is beautiful technically, too, and was a labor of love by the best technicians 
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in the field.”254  The intention was to present the film in East Germany on 9 April 1958, 
during the state’s celebrations of Robeson’s sixtieth birthday.  The film was shown not 
only in the GDR, but copies were also lent to peace committees in Austria, Britain, 
Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ghana, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and 
Switzerland.255 
Accompanying the film and the birthday celebration, East Germans sent letters 
and greetings to Robeson wishing him a happy birthday and declaring their enjoyment of 
his music.  Some of the letters came from students (one telling Robeson that, “I am 
amazed that you, at sixty years old, can sing so well”256), and appear to have been part of 
a class assignment, while other letters came from private citizens seemingly of their own 
initiative.257  In the American media, this celebration of Robeson was, unsurprisingly, 
interpreted negatively for the performer and activist.  In Variety, one reporter wrote: “At 
a time when his American manager is trying to reestablish Paul Robeson as a U.S. 
boxoffice [sic] attraction, the kind of attention he is receiving around the world from 
Communist ‘befrienders’ may not help his professional comeback.  The Communists are 
perhaps, in terms of their own propaganda advantage, being quite clever.  That the word 
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was out of Robeson’s recent 60th birthday to use the incident to embarrass the Yanks 
appears clear.”258  It would seem that this propaganda effort was indeed successful, if this 
reporter’s words were representative of other Westerner’s views. 
Meanwhile in the US, in a judgment that would benefit Robeson, the Supreme 
Court handed down decisions in June 1958 on cases brought forward by Rockwell Kent 
and Walter Briehl, Americans who had also had their passports revoked.  The Court 
stated that the Secretary of State had no ability to deny a citizen his or her passport 
simply because of their political beliefs. The decision went on to state that the Passport 
Division could not demand of applicants that they sign oaths of loyalty to the American 
government in exchange for their traveling document.259  Thus, with this ruling, 
Robeson’s passport was returned and he was again allowed to travel internationally.  In 
East Germany, officials painted a self-satisfied picture in which their solidarity actions 
played an important role in obtaining Robeson’s passport.  “Paul Robeson’s courageous 
stand as well as world-wide pressure of democratic opinion to ‘let Paul Robeson sing’… 
[have] had its telling effects….Indeed a great victory for the arts and international 
friendship… [has] been won.”260  Not long after Robeson received his passport, East 
Germany began in earnest its efforts to arrange for Robeson to visit the country.  
Foremost among these efforts was G.F. Alexan, who was intent on Robeson attending a 
festival to be held in July 1958. 
 Alexan reached out to anyone and everyone who was in some way associated 
with the Robesons, who were by then residing in London.  He wrote a series of letters to 
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the Robesons’ acquaintances, which highlight not only the less-than-altruistic nature of 
East Germany’s international solidarity, but also the desperation evident in securing a 
visit from the American entertainer.  In Alexan’s letter to John Williamson, of the 
English Paul Robeson Committee, he wrote that: 
I am confident that you could convince him that he should not say no to 
the hundreds of thousands of people in Berlin.  They would be extremely 
happy to see and hear him in person and to show him how they love and 
admire him.  They have really actively participated in our great campaign 
on his behalf and I think Paul owes it to them.261 
 
Here, Alexan presents an appearance by Robeson in East Berlin as something owed to the 
people of East Germany, for their continued support throughout the 1950s.  While the 
GDR’s international solidarity was painted as simply the provision of assistance to those 
who needed it, clearly something was expected in return.   
In a letter to Peggy Middleton, another member of the English Paul Robeson 
Committee, Alexan took on a slightly more aggressive tone, writing: “I am confident that 
you will this time again do your best to help us in convincing Paul that he really should 
not disappoint our people, who belong certainly to the good people whom he might wish 
as a public.”262  Here, Alexan makes a reference to the creation of a public for Robeson; 
given the troubles Robeson had had with his passport, his career had taken a steep dive as 
he was unable to perform as he once had.  Upon receiving his passport, it was clear that 
Robeson would need to rebuild a fan base that had perhaps forgotten about him and/or 
gotten older over the course of nearly a decade.  As Alexan suggested, the East German 
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people could become a part of this public.263  Not only was something expected in return 
for the solidarity that had been offered in the past, but it was also implied that any future 
demonstrations of solidarity could also be held back unless Robeson complied.    
In a letter to Robeson himself, Alexan returned to his previous approach—
Robeson’s presence was something owed to the East German people for their solidarity—
writing: 
It is certainly no exaggeration to say that our whole population has taken 
part actively in the campaign of our committee on your behalf.  It goes 
without saying that the whole population of Berlin would be extremely 
happy to have the opportunity to see and hear you and to show you how 
they love and admire you.  So please, dear Paul Robeson, don’t say no to 
these many hundreds of thousands of people.  They are good folks and 
they really deserve your favor.264 
 
In an example of East Germany’s sense of importance and contribution to the black 
freedom struggle, Alexan suggests that Robeson really had East Germans to thank for his 
freedom, even though it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court took into consideration 
what people in East Germany had to say regarding Robeson’s passport.  Regardless, this 
guilt-trip was ultimately unsuccessful in convincing Robeson to visit.265  However, in a 
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personal conversation between Robeson and an East German friend, Franz Loeser, 
Robeson revealed that he would be interested in visiting the GDR in late August or early 
September, staying for four to six days.266  In this case, it appears that it was Loeser’s 
close friendship with Robeson, rather than a sense of obligation, that influenced 
Robeson’s decision to visit the socialist state. 
 In the meantime, word of a possible visit spread, and various East German youth 
and work groups jockeyed for an opportunity to meet the African American legend.  The 
Kinderradio DDR (Children’s Radio of the GDR) contacted the Ministry of Culture and 
declared that if they could have Robeson say a few words about the “better America” or 
even sing some children’s songs over the radio, it would be incredibly valuable in the 
state’s efforts to teach children the value of international solidarity.267  Meanwhile, the 
Klubhaus der Gewerkschaften Halle (Halle Union Clubhouse) of the FDGB contacted 
Alexan, maintaining that if they were given the chance to see Robeson perform, the 
workers would surely respond with enthusiasm, as so many of them wished to attend a 
meeting or event headlined by the celebrity.268  In these and other letters, the writers 
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expressed their desire to meet Robeson or attend an event of his, while cloaking their 
interest in key buzzwords to which the SED was sure to respond.  These letters become 
even more significant when one considers how they played off of the state’s obvious 
efforts to acquire legitimacy, by promising further involvement in the state’s solidarity 
campaigns.  Ultimately, though, Robeson’s potential trip to East Berlin was canceled 
when officials received news that Robeson had fallen ill during a trip to Moscow.269 
 After the cancellation of Robeson’s impending visit, the SED continued to pursue 
the entertainer, despite difficulties with scheduling.  During a trip Robeson’s wife 
Eslanda (Essie) made to East Germany in 1959, she and Deputy Minister of Culture Hans 
Pischner discussed the possibility of the couple attending a celebration, the Berliner 
Festtage, in October 1960.  According to an East German report, Eslanda stated that she 
was unable to foresee any difficulties in fitting the visit into her husband’s schedule.  
However, she cautioned, Paul was in poor health, something that needed to be taken into 
consideration when planning their visit.270  Surely to the delight of the SED, however, 
Robeson traveled to East Germany prior to the Berliner Festtage in order to participate in 
the Neues Deutschland Press Festival, in June 1960.271  His son later characterized this 
visit as a “defiant political statement,” noting that the timing was “especially provocative, 
since Berlin was arguably the most sensitive European flashpoint in East-West 
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relations.”272   
Throughout the rest of the summer, the SED worked on Robeson’s itinerary for 
his October visit, carefully accounting for nearly every moment Robeson would spend in 
the GDR.  When October finally came, Robeson was a propagandist’s dream, saying and 
doing all of the “right” things, creating numerous publicity opportunities for the SED.273  
During a speech given at Humboldt University, Robeson thanked the audience for 
making it possible for him to travel to their country, acknowledging the East Germans’ 
solidarity during the eight years that he had struggled to obtain his passport.  Speaking of 
the freedom struggles in which the world’s blacks were engaged, Robeson proclaimed 
that without the support of the East Germans and other socialist states, blacks would be 
unable to carry on their fight for freedom.  Then, looking out over the audience, he 
remarked how proud he was to see his African “brothers” sitting in the crowd, and 
thanked East Germany for “giving them the opportunity to study,” and to return to their 
native countries and build a life there.274  He also spoke out against imperialism, warning 
that the “gentlemen in Wall Street [the US], the gentlemen in various lands of 
imperialism, including those just across the way [West Germany], might as well 
realize…. [that] Africa will not be theirs to cut up and to divide.”275  He later promised to 
tell others of what he had experienced in East Germany—a warm-hearted and humanist 
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Germany, where “[a]ll men were brothers.”276   
While in East Berlin, following in the footsteps of W.E.B. Du Bois, Robeson was 
given an honorary degree from Humboldt University, as well as the German Peace Medal 
from the Peace Council.  In another ceremony, Robeson received the Great Star of 
People’s Friendship (Groβer Stern der Völkerfreundschaft), which noted his commitment 
to anti-imperialism: 
“In honouring you, dear Paul Robeson, we reaffirm our solidarity with 
those who suffered under colonial oppression in the past and those who 
are still compelled to live in colonial bondage today.  Like you, we shall 
not rest until freedom and human dignity are guaranteed to all peoples.”277 
 
In addition, Robeson formally became a corresponding member of the German Academy 
of Arts, an honor that had originally been extended in 1956 while he was still 
“imprisoned” in the US.  The FDJ also invited the entertainer to a performance of folk 
music and dances presented in his honor, with an audience that included Walter Ulbricht 
and Otto Grotewohl, both men leading members of the SED.278   
A review of East German newspapers during and after Robeson’s stay reveals 
numerous articles dedicated to intricately detailing Robeson’s entire visit, providing 
“evidence” of East Germany’s tolerant, open, and understanding nature, which was 
posited to be in stark contrast to their western neighbor.  As Mark Landsman has noted, 
Neues Deutschland, “cited the appearance of…the American singer Paul Robeson…as 
‘the most obvious symbol of the world-openness of our capital.’  Another observer might 
have looked elsewhere for openness, perhaps to the as yet unsealed border over which 
more and more East Germans were crossing with no intention of returning, at least not 
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anytime soon.”279   Yet, it was precisely for this reason that Robeson’s visit was 
presented in such a manner; at the very least, the SED could present the visit 
internationally as a unifying moment for East Germans, rallying around their “shared” 
values of racial tolerance and international solidarity.  It surely presented a much more 
palatable image than reports of East Germans leaving for the West in droves.   
Robeson vowed many times throughout his trip to share with the world this image 
of racial tolerance, and it is little surprise that the SED responded with excitement to 
those promises.  Robeson stated that he was keen to discuss East Germany in the African 
American press, leading an East German report to note the potential for these articles to 
clarify for the African American community the role East Germany (claimed that it) 
played in the struggle for their freedom.  There was a clear belief among the SED that if 
African Americans believed that East Germany wanted to help them and could be an ally 
in the black freedom movement, then perhaps when black artists, journalists, and the like 
were traveling in Western Europe, they would consider making a trip to the GDR as well.  
The report also expressed the hope that the articles in the black press could eventually 
lead to a situation wherein African American “ambassadors” of sorts would be directly 
invited to East Germany.280  The notion of an entrée into the African American 
community through the black press should not be underestimated.  Though it would 
ultimately do little to convert the unconvinced, the belief that the SED finally had a 
means of reaching the African American public went a long way in turning what had long 
been thought of as a theoretical and abstract alliance into a relationship whose 
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propagation was firmly within the SED’s reach. 
Robeson’s desire to share his news of his visit with the world was not the only 
way this newly established friendship supported the SED.  Sara Lennox has argued that 
because Robeson “embraced and disseminated the beliefs that the GDR avowed,” he 
confirmed “their own self-understanding….”281  For example, during a press conference 
in East Germany, Robeson was asked whether he had come across any racial 
discrimination during his travels throughout East Germany and other socialist states.  
Robeson responded that he had been lucky to visit many socialist states, and “everywhere 
I have never found any kind or form of race discrimination.”  He also went on to state 
that he knew that “the very basis of your society could not lead under any circumstances 
to such phenomena.”  He did, however, go on to praise the “brave fighters in West 
Germany” who stood against racial discrimination.  While he praised these West 
Germans, he did note that they were standing up to racism “despite the greatest 
difficulties,” implying that these “brave fighters” faced an uphill battle in their struggle 
against race discrimination.282  Placed next to his formulation of an East German society 
in which fighting racism was natural, not something one must struggle to do, the praise 
for the West German fighters nicely “confirmed” East Germany’s own view of itself as 
anti-racist, thereby legitimating an element of the SED’s justifying myth. 
Robeson’s 1960 visit certainly sparked a fire under the relationship with Black 
America that East German elites had only ever discussed in theory.  While his celebrity 
appeal was important, it was more than this attraction that contributed to pushing the 
friendship forward.  Though East Germans had long been involved in international 
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solidarity efforts more generally—as the next section will show, this involvement was 
often compulsory—the mental image of East Germans at desks writing protest letters 
lacks much of the dynamism conveyed by actual photos of throngs of East Germans 
packed into an auditorium listening to a “brother” or “sister” in solidarity speak.  
Therefore, while Robeson’s celebrity may have made attending these solidarity rallies 
that much more exciting, it was his physical presence that allowed the SED figuratively 
and literally to create an image of mass East German support for the civil rights 
movement in a way it had until then been unable to do.  This illustration of solidarity and 
support, coupled with Robeson’s own portrayal of the East German state, made some 
African Americans think twice about the communist Germany, as the remainder of the 
chapter will show.   
 
The “Who” of the Relationship  
Once the relationship began to gather some steam, just who was involved in it?  
As the last chapter has shown, East Germany’s socialist ideology dictated that only 
African Americans who accepted a socialist, specifically Marxist-Leninist, worldview 
were deemed acceptable by East German officials.  Without these ideological beliefs—or 
at least a worldview that did not stand in competition with the SED’s own understanding 
of the world—there was little chance of being invited or permitted entry to the state.283  
Even without that “requirement,” given the importance of ideology during the Cold War, 
it is not surprising that the majority of the African Americans interested in a relationship 
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with East Germany were communists, socialists, or adherents of the political far-left.284   
Though many African American visitors did return home to speak of their 
positive experience in the GDR, their audience was quite often other like-minded Black 
Americans.  Therefore, it was quite common to see a cycle in which an African American 
would visit, enjoy East Germany, return home to speak/write about their thoughts on the 
trip, only to convince other leftists to visit or support the state.  While more East German 
admirers were always welcome, these were not people with any great deal of influence 
outside of their leftist circles.  Meanwhile, African Americans—and of course, 
Americans in general—without communist inclinations often knew very little about the 
GDR aside from its relationship with the Soviet Union and its Nazi past, the latter a fact 
of which East German officials were painfully aware.  This same group was unlikely to 
be swayed by anything Black Americans returning from East Germany would have to 
say, making for a message that never would travel very far.   
While African American involvement in the alliance with East Germany was 
obviously voluntary, the same cannot be said for East German citizens.  Even though all 
East Germans in theory participated in the friendship, there were different levels of 
participation.  East German involvement can be divided into four groupings: intellectuals 
and elites, dutiful attendees, celebrity fans, and willing anti-racists.  As the last chapter 
showed, intellectuals and elites within East Germany had long been interested in a 
relationship with Black America.  They were responsible for coordinating the majority of 
the solidarity actions, while the dutiful attendees, celebrity fans, and willing anti-racists 
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generally made up the “face” of solidarity.  As the “face” of solidarity, these East 
Germans did things like attend events, sign petitions, and send letters of support to 
activists and letters of protest to the American government, which the Party transformed 
into propaganda for international use, depicting these fans as devotees of East Germany’s 
socialist ideology.   
The celebrity fans comprised a portion of those who willfully attended the events 
planned by the SED.285  One finds that people like Robeson, who was to many people 
around the world not just an activist but also a celebrity, garnered crowds far larger than 
those who lacked a similar popular appeal.  The largest group participating in the 
relationship, however, was the dutiful attendees, citizens who became involved because it 
was required of them.  Most were indifferent, contributing the bare minimum asked of 
them.  While some SED functionaries could be grouped among the elite in terms of their 
views on the relationship, others were indifferent at best and anti-black at worst.  Though 
these dutiful attendees were in the majority, it is important to acknowledge that there 
were also people who actually subscribed to anti-racist beliefs (even when the state itself 
did not) and unequivocally advocated racial tolerance and equality, though their anti-
racist contributions were often complicated by paternalism.  As the dutiful attendees 
characterized much of East German society and the willful anti-racists have often been 
overlooked, these two groups will be the focus of the remainder of this section.   
Much of the East German public’s involvement in the relationship with Black 
America stemmed from its participation in a series of organizations to which most of 
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those employed in the GDR belonged.  The organizations were generally considered 
extensions of East German work life, and in most cases, participation was mandatory.  As 
members of these organizations, citizens were expected to partake in, among other things, 
solidarity actions, which were “placed within a political context that demanded a political 
response from participants.”286  Many times, citizens were indifferent to the causes they 
participated in, viewing their involvement as yet another act expected of them.  For 
example, every month, workers were required to contribute a few marks from their 
paychecks, which were supposed to go toward “solidarity.”  Despite the SED’s claims 
that East Germans were actively contributing to the state’s solidarity actions, many 
remained apathetic about their contributions because they knew very little about how the 
Party actually spent the money.  Many speculated that the SED used the money its 
workers had “donated” for political propaganda instead of solidarity.287    
Others were indifferent to the solidarity causes in which they participated because 
the peoples for whom they “struggled” were closely associated with an ideology and a 
state they did not support.  Regarding East German solidarity with socialist Cuban and 
Latin American “heroes,” Jennifer Ruth Hosek has argued that “paradoxically, precisely 
because orthodox socialist heroes embodied the establishment, they were ineffectual in 
reaching the disaffected; youth critical of the GDR accepted both their nation and their 
nation’s heroes half-heartedly.”288  This general attitude was not only directed at the 
“heroes” of the movement, but also toward many blacks (and other foreigners) living in 
                                                 
286 Dorothy Wierling, “Work, Workers, and Politics in the German Democratic Republic,” International 
Labor and Working-Class History, 50, Labor under Communist Regimes (Fall 1996), 57. 
287 Bernd Bröskamp, Gabriele Jaschok, and Andreas Noschak, eds., Schwarz-Weiβe Zeiten: AusländerInnen 
in Ostdeutschland vor und nach der Wende: Erfahrungen der Vertragsarbeiter aus Mosambik: 
Interviews—Berichte--Analysen, (Bremen: Informationszentrum Afrika, 1993), 75. 
288 Jennifer Ruth Hosek, Sun, Sex, and Socialism: Cuba in the German Imaginary (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2011), 147. 
126 
 
East Germany.  Because it was difficult to migrate across the “Iron Curtain,” East 
Germans perceived those who made it through “as an exception that had to be approved 
by the regime.”  It was assumed that the immigrants must have been loyal adherents to 
socialism or communism at home, otherwise the SED would not have approved of their 
entry to the GDR.  Therefore, there “remained largely…a culture of mutual distrust 
between regime, population and immigrants….”289  When one considers this attitude 
towards both “heroes” and resident blacks, it is not unreasonable to make the assumption 
that for some East Germans, African Americans could quickly be stripped of any appeal 
they might have had, especially since in many cases the close ties to the SED were 
explicitly laid out in the media.       
The one group that ran afoul of the SED, however, was the willing anti-racists, a 
group that the SED had long called for, but did not truly want.  Though that may seem 
paradoxical, the last thing the ruling party desired was for East German citizens to 
undertake any spontaneous action from “below,” and as such, the SED made it quite 
difficult for East Germans to embark upon any of their own solidarity initiatives.  Those 
who actually subscribed to the SED’s rhetoric of fighting for peace and ending fascism, 
imperialism, and racism came to the same conclusion as those who were generally 
indifferent—the SED’s proclamations of solidarity were little more than propaganda.   
In an oral history study completed after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a former-East 
German woman identified as “Cornelia” shared her own experience, which exemplifies 
that of the willful anti-racist.  One way that East German bureaucratic roadblocks made it 
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difficult for the average East German to undertake any solidarity actions was by requiring 
permits, which were expensive to obtain.  Raising money through other East Germans 
was near impossible, Cornelia related, as many people were quite hesitant to contribute 
any funds in light of the doubts they already had regarding the SED’s use of their 
monthly contributions.  Though Cornelia’s solidarity action was ultimately successful, 
when she and her fellow organizers requested an extension for their permit, they were 
denied.  She wisely believed it owed to the fact that they were a group of “private” people 
doing this work.290  Given the state’s disapproval of action planned by the people, anyone 
who sought to help the African American cause outside of state-sanctioned solidarity 
actions would have found themselves facing deterrent after deterrent. 
Over time it became patently obvious to Cornelia that the SED’s claims of 
solidarity were self-serving, and many of the so-called solidarity actions exploited the 
vulnerability of the people who were used to propagate images of solidarity and 
progressiveness.291  In one instance, a member of the South West Africa People’s 
Organization (SWAPO) had traveled to an East German university to accept a donation 
from the state.  When the program began, instead of immediately introducing the 
SWAPO delegate, officials introduced the university’s rector, the professors in 
attendance and the official visitors from the SED before they mentioned the African 
guest.  Cornelia detected no sincerity in the words of solidarity that the officials were 
relaying; it became quite obvious to her that the visitor had simply been used as a 
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backdrop against which the SED could display its allegedly progressive nature.292   
Such propagandistic presentations many times served to distance East Germans 
from the solidarity initiatives the SED claimed to undertake, and incidents of this sort 
proved to Cornelia and others that actual solidarity was a low priority.  This also helped 
to distance East Germans more generally from the Party itself, as each instance of 
hypocrisy chipped away at what little legitimacy the SED had among its people.  Much 
like the African guest in this example, most African American visitors were used in 
similar ways.  If East Germans believed that the state’s solidarity with Black America 
was a farce, what was there to encourage their real engagement with the group if it would 
only be met with roadblocks?  Interestingly, the very thing meant to draw East Germans 
closer to the state accomplished quite the opposite. 
 
East German Expressions of Solidarity and Friendship 
  As the Paul Robeson example at the start of this chapter showed, on the whole, 
the relationship between East Germany and Black America was the result of the GDR’s 
efforts to reach out to various figures in the African American community.  East German 
elites used a variety of tactics to engage these civil rights activists, ranging from simple 
invitations to visit the state, to the ego-boosting bestowal of awards and honors, naming 
schools and streets after African Americans.  Most popular, however, were ostentatious 
shows of solidarity and unity.  These approaches were presented as benefiting the African 
American recipient or recipients of the solidarity action, yet in each case, the benefit also 
fell squarely on the shoulders of the East German government. The section that follows 
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will examine the GDR’s efforts to acquire African American friendship in the years 
following Robeson’s “inaugural” visit.  These efforts resembled a series of tactics that the 
SED used to convey its solidarity with Black Africans in the wake of decolonization. 
As noted previously, this solidarity with Black Africa fulfilled an important 
function for the SED, as it was conceived of as a “fundamental part of the GDR’s self-
definition as the antifascist German state.”293  The SED hoped that the solidarity would 
result not only in official recognition from the emerging African states, but would 
suitably impress leaders in other countries, who would then offer their official 
recognition as well. Another important element of solidarity with Black Africa—which 
included proclamations of friendship with a decolonizing Black Africa and highly-
publicized meetings and awards ceremonies—was the fact that the SED attempted to 
insert East Germany into an international discussion by connecting its name to much-
discussed hotspots in Africa.294  Of course, East Germany was no stranger to 
international dialogue, but most of it was decidedly negative. By inserting itself into the 
“good” side of the debates surrounding decolonization and other discussions about 
Africa, the SED believed that it could improve its reputation and ensure that others would 
realize what the Party had long claimed—that East Germany was the moral and 
upstanding Germany.295 
The SED’s goals were much the same in its solidarity efforts with Black America 
and the civil rights movement, though the means by which they sought to accomplish 
these objectives were different, because of an important set of underlying distinctions.  In 
                                                 
293 Loren Kruger, “Seeing through Race: Athol Fugard, (East) Germany, and the Limits of Solidarity,” 
Modern Philology 100:4 (May 2003), 620. 
294 Kruger, “Seeing through Race,” 624. 
295 Lennox, “Reading Transnationally,” 113. 
130 
 
Africa, the SED often interacted with governments or groups seeking to create governing 
bodies; the African Americans the SED dealt with did not occupy any comparable 
positions of power within the American government.  East Germany offered financial and 
military assistance to its African “friends;” to Black America the GDR offered its moral 
support and voice.  This seeming financial and military disparity actually created no 
problems; African Americans would have had little use for the GDR’s financial 
assistance in the form of trade agreements, and they were not looking for military 
assistance either.  Rather, they were looking for moral support and statements and 
demonstrations of solidarity, which the SED was willing to give in heaps.  In turn, the 
SED was not looking for diplomatic recognition or legitimation from Black America in 
any direct sense.296   
A cornerstone of the relationship between African Americans and East Germany 
was the bestowal of honors and tributes, whether they were prestigious state awards, 
ceremonies conferring the activists’ names upon brigades, groups, schools, and streets, or 
rallies and meetings at which the activists’ legacies were celebrated.  These celebrations 
served a number of purposes, not only to honor the activists, but to generate publicity for 
the SED and to act as anti-Western propaganda by reaffirming East Germany’s 
proclaimed struggle against fascism and racism, both domestically and internationally. 
This was achieved by tying the GDR and what it stood for to the legacy, and thus the 
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reputation, of the activists, while also neatly underlining East German involvement in the 
solidarity movements supporting them.297  
 Before an activist could be honored, those nominating him or her had to provide 
officials with a justification for doing so. These justifications generally painted the 
recipient as a “good leftist” and tied their life’s work and principles to values held by the 
SED.  For instance, when Eslanda Robeson was nominated for the Clara Zetkin Medal in 
1961, her nominators argued that Robeson had long been a staunch advocate the world 
over for the preservation of peace.298  They noted that she had spent many years in the 
US fighting racial discrimination and was against nuclear war.  Robeson had also fought 
against fascism in the Spanish Civil War alongside her husband, driving an ambulance 
and bringing thousands of wounded soldiers to the hospital.299  When Claude Lightfoot 
was awarded an honorary degree from the University of Rostock in 1973, the honor was 
justified by his “scientific contributions to the struggle against racist ideology and for 
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showing why socialism is necessary for today’s world.”300  As with any of the accolades 
and solidarity offered by the GDR, the East German state also profited, often in the form 
of propaganda that tightly entwined the values of the East German state with the respect 
and esteem given to members of the African American civil rights movement.  
 Organizations within East Germany also used a practice of naming themselves 
after members of the civil rights movement as a means of conferring this same respect 
and esteem upon themselves, while seemingly honoring the activist and expressing their 
solidarity with both the individual and African Americans in general.  In 1961, the 
Robesons received a letter requesting permission for a Leipzig railway work brigade to 
use Paul’s name for their team.301  Though the Robesons did not respond immediately, 
plans were put into place for a celebration in December 1961, in the hopes that the couple 
would be in touch in the meantime.  According to the official plans, present at the 
celebration would be the brigade, of course, as well as “many Africans.”  A Paul Robeson 
film, detailing an earlier visit to East Germany, would also be shown at this naming 
ceremony.302   Officials do not elaborate as to why “many Africans” needed to be present 
at this ceremony, but it is fair to speculate that officials sought to make a not-so-subtle 
connection between solidarity with Robeson, African Americans, and Black Africa, as 
well as East Germany’s general drive against fascism, racism, and imperialism.  
In 1964, yet another East German organization bearing Robeson’s name was 
created—this time, the Paul Robeson Committee—with the goal of building the Paul 
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Robeson Archive in East Berlin.303  Most African American guests visited the Archive, 
which they often viewed as proof that Robeson was better understood and appreciated in 
East Germany than he was at home. One of those behind the creation of the Committee 
and archive was Franz Loeser, the Robesons’ old friend.  On 26 June 1964, the German 
Academy of Arts approved the request that it house the archive, and so began work on 
the project in earnest.304  The Committee appointed Victor Grossman (an American 
military deserter) as director, and set out to acquire any and every item that related to the 
Robesons.305  
In a long document written by the Committee detailing its plans for the archive, 
there were a number of reasons given for embarking on the project, one of which was 
driven by the acknowledgment that blacks in the US knew very little about the GDR.  
The Committee’s members noted that in their experiences and through their own 
research, it had become clear to them that people of color in the US knew just one thing 
about Germany: that six million people whom Germans had considered racially inferior 
had been brutally murdered there.  In fact, Eslanda Robeson—one of the archive’s very 
own subjects—had herself once been afraid to travel to the GDR because she held what 
the Committee referred to as a “prejudice” against Germans.306  Yet, when she visited 
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304 Karl Hossinger to Stellvertreter des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik Gen. Alexander Abusch, 20 August 1964, BArch DC 20/7693, BArch-Berlin. 
305 The search also extended to the Robesons themselves.  The committee asked that the couple send “in 
short, everything you wish us to preserve and register,” making it clear that the archive wanted material 
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German Academy of Arts in East Berlin. 
306 This likely owed to an experience her husband had in Nazi Germany on 23 December 1934.  On their 
way to Moscow, she and her husband were at a Berlin train station, having stopped in the city for a brief 
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East Germany, she learned about the state’s “true nature.”  Eventually, she and her 
husband would come to applaud the state’s “greatest achievement,” the “abolishment of 
racism, anti-Semitism and chauvinism.”307  The archive’s founders understood that East 
Germany desperately needed to duplicate such reversals in opinion if it hoped to form a 
friendship with Black Americans that would accomplish anything significant.  Therefore, 
the archive would be a vehicle through which African Americans could learn more about 
East Germany, namely its allegedly anti-racist character. 
 Of course, the Committee recognized, one could (and likely would) question why 
East Germany, of all places, should house the Robesons’ work and other materials related 
to the couple. To this, the Committee pointed out that the GDR was actually specially 
qualified to do so because of personal ties to the family.  Importantly, it was also noted, 
the GDR had a very long experience with and connection to Paul Robeson’s struggles. 
Not surprisingly, the Committee tied the creation of the archive to East Germany’s 
competition with the West, arguing that it was necessary for the GDR to take the 
initiative of safe-guarding the Robesons’ material from the “reactionary powers in the 
imperialist countries.”308  The Committee also noted that the Robesons’ work belonged to 
all of humanity, rather than any one state or people. Lest this seem contradictory, the 
archive would be established with an “international character” in mind.309  Here, East 
                                                                                                                                                 
visit.  When Eslanda left to gather their bags, “two groups of brown-shirted Nazi storm troopers formed a 
semi-circle” around Robeson.  The Nazis began yelling slurs at Robeson, but when Eslanda returned they 
were able to safely board the train.  Robeson is said to have remarked that, “‘I never understood what 
fascism was before.  I’ll fight it wherever I find it from now on.’”  Scott Allen Nollen, Paul Robeson: Film 
Pioneer (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010), 52.  When the SED had engaged in efforts to bring Paul 
Robeson to the GDR in 1958, records made note of this fear, but claimed that it was in Dusseldorf in 1938 
that the bad experience (which is not elaborated upon) had occurred.  See footnote 265.  
307 “Konzeption,” BArch-SAPMO DY 30/IV A 2/2.028/124, 9, SAPMO. 
308 “Konzeption,” BArch-SAPMO DY 30/IV A 2/2.028/124, 3, SAPMO. 
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Germany’s position as guardian—as it commonly depicted itself in this relationship—
was a propaganda opportunity to yet again internationally paint the state in a positive 
light vis-à-vis the FRG and the US.  
 The archive, though, was not the Committee’s only efforts to connect the legacy 
and legend of Robeson to the East German state, in order to glean a propaganda 
advantage. The Committee also organized various meetings and celebrations honoring 
Robeson, and though these events were generally meant to coincide with or mark 
Robeson’s birthday, there was always the intent that they would signify much more than 
another passing year in Robeson’s life. For example, in 1967, the Committee initiated 
plans to celebrate Robeson’s 70th birthday the following year. Yet, according to 
organizers, the real significance of the event was to demonstrate solidarity with everyone 
who was “against imperialist reaction and aggression,” as well as those struggling for 
freedom, independence, and peace for all people.310  Additionally, the celebration’s 
coordinators wanted to paint a picture of Robeson that portrayed him as a fighter not only 
for his people, but for all “colonial” peoples, as well as a warrior for “peace and 
friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.”311  Not just another birthday 
celebration, these commemorations were meant to signal to foreign observers the high 
esteem with which the GDR held the black freedom movement, as well as to indicate to 
East Germans that support for Robeson and the black freedom movement was the 
equivalent of supporting the (deserved) ruin of the capitalist West.  
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African American Expressions of Solidarity and Friendship 
In comparison to the GDR, African American expressions of solidarity were far 
less ostentatious.  Often, these demonstrations of solidarity came in the form of praise for 
the state and its efforts to bring an end to racism everywhere.  For example, in 1963, the 
Robeson couple returned to the GDR for several months while Paul received medical 
treatment from East German doctors.  The Robesons’ stay in East Germany gave Eslanda 
a chance examine her connection to and relationship with the socialist Germany, 
experiences she would later write about.  Eslanda took advantage of opportunities to meet 
with East Germans and discuss the international black freedom movement, visiting the 
Herder Institute at Leipzig University in November 1963, speaking about the race 
problem in the US and her experiences in Africa, which was then followed by what she 
termed a “long, lively and very interesting question-and-answer discussion period.” 312   
In December she took part in a forum at Humboldt University in East Berlin, 
participating in a panel entitled “The Negro in the United States.”  That same month, she 
visited the Händel School in East Berlin, speaking with students and teachers about the 
race problem in the US, and about Africa and the United Nations. According to Eslanda, 
“A gratifying outcome of this evening…was the spontaneous request, enthusiastically 
and unanimously endorsed by students and faculty, to establish contact with an American 
Negro school through correspondence, and to exchange views and news, thus building up 
understanding and friendship.”313  All of these experiences were assembled in an article 
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Eslanda wrote for the New World Review after she returned to the US. In the article she 
noted that “[i]t is interesting and heart-warming to see how the German Democratic 
Republic is giving aid to the African people and others.  Nowadays we hear of millions 
and billions spent in foreign aid, often so badly administered that it is wasted, it is good 
to hear about such very direct and practical help.”314   
Certainly, returning to the US and writing about East Germany in such positive 
terms was understood as an expression of solidarity, a contribution to the East German 
recognition campaign, though, there was a very limited audience that this material 
reached (the New World Review was a pro-Soviet journal). What Eslanda’s article did do, 
in addition to her speaking engagements in East Germany, was contribute to the notion 
that the GDR was a logical place in which to hold such discussions about race, racism, 
and peoples of African descent.  Implied was that East Germany was qualified to host 
such symposia and meetings because the state and its people possessed the interest and 
knowledge necessary to participate in these events.  Importantly, however, the state was 
also a qualified host because of its commitment to supporting the African American civil 
rights movement and the freedom of the world’s blacks. 
An African American whose support from East Germany also prompted advocacy 
for East German recognition was Ralph Abernathy.315  Abernathy had once been Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s right-hand-man in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
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(SCLC), ultimately assuming King’s position upon his assassination.  In September 1971, 
Abernathy visited the GDR, where he was billed as a “close friend and comrade-in-arms” 
by Albert Norden, and honored by the German Peace Council for his “struggle against 
imperialism, racism, and war.”316  While in East Berlin, Abernathy gave a sermon at St. 
Mary’s Church, and during the sermon, thanked his hosts for their “warm hospitality far 
beyond words of expression,” a welcome that would send him back to the US “with a 
greater determination to fight for justice and equality.”317  The SED’s Central Committee 
noted that in the wake of such “rejuvenation,” Abernathy left the GDR promising to 
campaign for international recognition on the state’s behalf, so thankful was he.318   
As has been noted, many of East Germany’s African American friends were 
communist supporters or sympathizers.  There were, however, instances when blacks of 
more moderate politics expressed some level of support for the East German state, adding 
to the African American voices of solidarity.  In 1975, a delegation of Black American 
journalists and editors from the Black Press of America, also known as the National 
Newspaper Publishers Association (NNPA), traveled to East Germany.  Some members 
of the delegation were already convinced of East Germany’s allegedly positive attributes 
(like Claude Lightfoot, who will be discussed in more detail shortly), but there were more 
than a few holdouts.   
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While many of the holdouts were ultimately not convinced that the GDR had 
succeeded in removing all forms of racism, they were willing to admit that East Germany 
was at least making strides towards doing so.  Though he criticized a lack of freedom in 
East Germany, one journalist, Louis Martin,319 conceded that: “Today the officials of this 
part of Germany under a socialist government are trying to destroy the old racial myths 
and create what they believe is a more humane and civilized social order. I could not help 
but wish them luck.”  Further, he told his readers that if it really were possible to create a 
society free of racism, East Germany would “before long find out.”320   
 Meanwhile, for those who had witnessed the ravages of WWII on Berlin in the 
early days after the conflict ended, the reconstruction and rebuilding of East Berlin was 
considered astonishing.  As African Americans struggled for equal access to adequate 
housing, journalist delegate William O. Walker told his readers that what he had seen in 
East Berlin was “remarkable.”321   In fact, “reconstructed East Berlin is a modern, 
beautiful city with hundreds of newly built apartments….”  Furthermore, he wrote: “The 
German Democratic Republic…has done a phenomenal job of physical restoration and 
human rehabilitation….The number of modern apartments put to shame housing in most 
of our American cities.”322  If war-torn Berlin could rebuild and create housing for its 
people, then certainly American cities—which had not been ravaged in the same way 
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Berlin had—could do the same. The silent point was made that the American government 
had to take the initiative to do so.323  
In the examples above, Eslanda’s and Abernathy’s support for the GDR was a 
reaction to the solidarity they had received over the years from East Germans.  For the 
members of the newspaper delegation, their support for the GDR came from an 
educational tour (however distorted that education may have been) of East Germany—
something that East German officials longed to do with other African Americans as well.  
Yet, for some, their solidarity with the GDR was more directly a means of furthering 
their own agenda, an approach the SED had itself perfected.  In the early 1970s, black 
communist Claude Lightfoot began writing a book about East German anti-racism, which 
he would later entitle Racism and Human Survival: Lessons of Nazi Germany for Today’s 
World.   
Based on his travels through East and West Germany, Lightfoot supplemented his 
experiences by reading several hundred books on German history.  In a letter from May 
1971, Lightfoot informed an SED official that he was making great progress on his 
manuscript, and that in conducting his literary inquiry, he had “come away from the 
research with a firm conviction that the real story of what happened in the Third Reich 
and also a contrast of the DDR and Bonn Governments has yet to be told.”324  Through 
his praise for East German anti-racism, and condemnation of West German race thinking, 
Lightfoot made an argument in favor of American communism: if the US had any hope 
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of solving the problem of American racism, a change in ideology was essential.325  
A common theme throughout African American observations and discussions of 
GDR anti-racism was that the East German example provided proof that the eradication 
of racism in the US was in fact possible.  More broadly, the example of East Germany 
proved that with communism it was possible to make the necessary social and economic 
improvements to American society that would benefit America as a whole, but most 
especially African Americans. These African American observers often implied—or 
stated it directly—that if the GDR could make these improvements in the wake of 
Germany’s destruction in WWII and the racism of Hitler’s regime, then the US could 
certainly do the same.  Viewed in comparison to the allegedly racist and capitalist West 
Germany, it was clear to observers like Lightfoot that socialism and communism lay at 
the heart of these necessary changes.326  While in some cases the example of East 
Germany operated simply as inspiration (like that of Carter and Walker), in other cases it 
was used to make explicit arguments in favor of a socialist or communist approach to 
acquiring a host of rights for African Americans.  
In Racism and Human Survival, Lightfoot highlighted several elements of East 
German society as he made his argument for American communism.  He told his readers 
of the GDR’s eradication of racism, writing that it “came about and flourished in the 
                                                 
325 In Lightfoot’s autobiography, he also speaks highly of East Germany, recounting his first time in the 
state in 1969.  “When I went to the GDR I had not read or heard very much about developments there; so 
when I arrived, I was stunned by what I saw.  I saw a great program of reconstruction that I had not 
dreamed was possible in such a short period of time.  East Berlin was beginning to look like a paradise. 
[…]  Thus a new romance began in my life.  I spent the next ten years studying German history.”  Claude 
Lightfoot, edited by Timothy V. Johnson, Chicago Slums to World Politics: Autobiography of Claude 
Lightfoot (New York: New Outlook Publishers and Distributors, 1985), 174. 
326 Stefan Berger and Norman LaPorte make a similar argument regarding the British Left and East 
Germany, writing that, “Those who advocated socialist measures at home could, and did, investigate the 
GDR’s policy of ‘constructing socialism’ as a potential political model.”  Berger and LaPorte, Friendly 
Enemies: Britain and the GDR, 1949-1990 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 4. 
142 
 
context of changes in the entire social, economic and political environment of people.”327  
In fact, the new person created in the GDR was “in direct contrast to the kind of person 
bred by the insecurity of capitalism, a society which thrives on ‘dog-eat-dog,’ a system 
that supports everything selfish in man.”328  Though Lightfoot would have preferred to 
see the institution of a socialist or communist government in the US, he did allow that 
“even short of socialism, advanced progressive-minded people can make substantial 
progress against racist poison and imperialism.”329  Change of some sort, whatever it 
might be, was vitally necessary.  
The GDR, Lightfoot believed, provided undeniable proof that racism was the 
product of capitalism, something that became all the more evident when placed alongside 
a “racist” West Germany.330  Though Lightfoot had made a similar argument in other 
works—including Ghetto Rebellion to Black Liberation, based on trips to the USSR and 
Cuba—upon visiting the GDR he realized that the two Germanys provided him with a 
perfect case-study opportunity to make his point more strongly.331  Lightfoot was not the 
first to make this argument about East Germany, however.  In a 1968 interview with the 
American communist newspaper Daily World, Henry Winston (who was African 
American and Chairman of the CPUSA) addressed his view that East German 
communism had spurred a recovery from the evils of Hitler and the Nazis. He told the 
reporter: 
What impressed me most is that in such a brief period racism and anti-
semitism have been virtually wiped out. […] Many people throughout the 
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world still think that racist and anti-semitic attitudes are part of the 
‘German character.’ But human nature has changed for 17 million 
Germans, because its basis, capitalism, has been uprooted. There are 
people in our country who say that racism cannot be successfully wiped 
out. […] People must understand that such a change is possible, but only 
when, as in the GDR, its capitalist soil has been removed. Once people 
realize that racism and chauvinism in any form are class weapons, they 
can deal with them effectively.332 
 
What made the East German case so compelling, even though the Soviet Union had long 
asserted the relationship between capitalism and racism, was East Germany’s Nazi past.  
Having apparently eradicated a virulent form of racism through the establishment of a 
communist government was significant, and considered highly relevant to the American 
situation.333  As much as the SED tried to outrun the GDR’s Nazi past, in this instance it 
served to buoy the Party’s claims of anti-racism by acting as a sharp means of 
comparison. 
 As the relationship between East Germany and Black America flourished over the 
course of the 1960s and into the 1970s, both sides expressed their solidarity with each 
other.  East German examples of support for the civil rights movement and particular 
activists tended toward ostentatious and flashy, though that should not come as a surprise.  
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The SED’s main purpose for this relationship, in addition to garnering influential contacts 
in the US, was to publicize it.  The SED needed for the international community to be 
intimately aware of the GDR’s commitment to the struggle against oppression, if it had 
any hopes of earning diplomatic recognition.  African Americans, on the other hand, 
generally expressed support and praise for the GDR in response to East German 
solidarity, though some Black Americans used their endorsement of GDR society in 
order to further their own arguments about the need for political and ideological upheaval 
in the US.   
 
Angela Davis and East German Solidarity 
By the end of the 1960s, the SED had become more adept at carrying out pro-
African American solidarity movements and arranging visits from activists.  Perhaps the 
most extravagant and all-encompassing example of unity between East Germany and a 
Black American was the GDR’s solidarity campaign for the black communist Angela 
Davis, in the aftermath of the 1970 arrest for her alleged involvement in a courthouse 
shootout in California.  To better understand Davis’ arrest and the solidarity actions 
undertaken by East Germany, it is necessary to first examine the events that preceded her 
arrest.   
On 13 January 1970 at Soledad Prison in California, a fight broke out in the 
prison yard and three black prisoners were shot by a white guard.  The shooting was 
judged a justifiable homicide, infuriating the prison’s black population.  Three days later, 
when a white guard was killed, prison authorities believed it was an act of retaliation for 
the prison yard deaths.  Three black inmates—John Clutchette, Fleeta Drumgo, and 
George Jackson—were charged with the murder, and later became known as the Soledad 
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Brothers, though they were of no actual relation.  Protests on their behalf were quickly 
arranged, and Davis was one of many who worked in support of the so-called Brothers.334 
It was her support for the Soledad Brothers that brought Davis together with 
Jackson’s younger brother, Jonathan.  This friendship would take a tragic turn when, on 7 
August 1970, Jonathan entered a courtroom at the Marin County Courthouse, carrying a 
bag with several pistols and wearing a coat that hid a carbine.  The courtroom’s judge, 
Harold J. Haley, was then hearing the case of James D. McClain, a black inmate who had 
been charged with stabbing a San Quentin guard.  Several other black convicts from San 
Quentin, two of whom were William Christmas and Ruchell Magee, were also present as 
witnesses for McClain’s case.  According to the narrative in newspapers at the time, 
Jonathan jumped out of his seat brandishing his carbine and ordered the black prisoners 
freed.  McClain, Christmas, and Magee joined Jackson, and taking Haley, an assistant 
district attorney, and three jurors as hostages, Jackson and the inmates attempted to flee.  
According to one source, Jackson was alleged to have stated that “we want the Soledad 
brothers freed by 12:30!” before leaving the courtroom.  
Once outside, the men and their hostages climbed into a rented van and were 
leaving the area when gunfire broke out.  The judge, McClain, Christmas, and Jackson all 
died.  Meanwhile, Magee and the assistant district attorney were seriously injured. 
Though McClain’s case had nothing to do with the Soledad Brothers’, it was theorized by 
some that the younger Jackson had organized the armed getaway in an attempt to save his 
brother who had recently been transferred to San Quentin in Marin County, believing that 
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it was likely that George would receive the death penalty for the guard’s death.335  The 
narrative of 7 August as told by Bettina Aptheker (at one time a member of the CPUSA), 
in her book The Morning Breaks: The Trial of Angela Davis, is decidedly more 
sympathetic to Jackson.  Aptheker writes: 
Jonathan Jackson entered the courtroom quietly. He took a seat in the 
spectators section. A few minutes later he stood up, held a pistol firmly in 
his hands and said: “All right, gentlemen. This is it. I’m taking over now.” 
Jonathan died in a hail of bullets an hour later. […] Jonathan had never 
fired a shot. Neither had McClain, Christmas or Magee to whom Jonathan 
had given guns. Four San Quentin guards and the prosecutor had done all 
the shooting.336 
 
Aptheker also spoke to the claim that Jackson demanded that the Soledad Brothers be 
freed by 12:30, arguing that only one person—a news photographer—claimed to have 
heard it. Even though “initial reports of the event did not mention it,” Aptheker argued, 
public officials latched on to the notion that this was a plot to free Jackson’s brother and 
his fellow inmates.337  
 Shortly after, police publicly alleged that Davis had purchased the guns used in 
the breakout, and that she had been seen riding in the rented van prior to the shootings.  
Davis was charged with murder and kidnapping, and because she fled the jurisdiction, 
she was also charged with flight to avoid prosecution.338  Though Davis was not present 
at the courthouse shootout, under California law, anyone who “aid[ed] or abet[ted] in a 
major crime [wa]s equally guilty with the direct participants.”  Since police believed that 
Davis had purchased the guns used in the crime, under the law she too was responsible 
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for the attack.339  A national manhunt ensued, during which Davis was added to the FBI’s 
Ten Most Wanted Fugitive List, only the third woman to appear on the list.  She was 
eventually arrested on 13 October at a motel in New York City.340  She was taken to the 
Women’s House of Detention in New York City, where her lawyers claimed that she had 
been placed in solitary confinement and went on a hunger strike.341  Ultimately, Davis 
was extradited to California, where she faced charges of murder and kidnapping.342 
During her time in jail in California, hundreds of committees and organizations 
across the US and beyond, including groups in the GDR, spoke up in defense of Davis. 
As a black communist and the latest victim of the so-called reactionary American 
government, Davis became a symbol on the Left of all that was wrong with the US and 
the capitalist West.343  Almost immediately after Davis’ arrest, letters of protest against 
both the Californian and American governments poured in from East Germany.344  The 
notes were written by various groups and organizations, expressing outrage at Davis’ 
arrest. For example, the Textile-, Garment-, and Leatherworkers of the GDR sent a letter 
billing Davis’ accusers as “race fanatics” who had imprisoned her under “false pretenses” 
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in order to “illegally murder” the young black communist with the death penalty.  The 
letter went on to argue that the arrest was really just a means of quieting an extremely 
vocal Davis and others like her; significantly, the letter-writers noted, every day that 
Davis remained in jail was another day that humanity remained in danger.345  Protest also 
came from academic circles: in January 1971, Neues Deutschland published an article 
claiming that more than 4,500 faculty members, students, and staff at the Technical 
University of Dresden had demanded Davis’ release, attaching their signatures to a 
protest resolution.346  
Of course, there were many who questioned what the movement could possibly 
mean to those abroad and whether these international committees, as well as the 
American “Free Angela” committee, truly believed that the pressure they placed on the 
American government would actually result in Davis’ freedom.  In 1972, Time magazine 
sought an explanation, commenting that nowhere in the world was there a nation as 
consumed by “Angelamania” as East Germany.  “Why,” the article’s author questioned, 
“did the East Germans decide to champion her cause?”347  To the author, East Germans 
supported Angela Davis because it was their government’s way of keeping them 
preoccupied while waiting for a more important, and propaganda-worthy, crisis to 
develop:  
Until recently the East German regime concentrated its propaganda attacks 
on West Germany, whose free society and economic prosperity have for 
years exerted an almost irresistible magnetism on Germany’s poorer half.  
In the past year, however, as Moscow and Bonn have sought to establish 
better relations, East Germany has had no choice but to tone down its 
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attacks on the Federal Republic. […]  U.S. “racism” is hardly as 
threatening to East Germany as the visions that the propagandists once 
conjured up of a neo-Nazi invasion from the West.  But at least it keeps 
the indoctrinated minds of the East Germans occupied until a more 
pressing issue comes along.348  
 
This explanation is far too simple, but is indicative of the West’s dismissive view of the 
GDR’s campaign for Davis’ freedom.  The SED, for its part, painted its involvement in 
the Free Angela Davis movement as altruistic, a struggle against oppression in keeping 
with the GDR’s long-held commitment to defeating racism and supporting Black 
America.  East Germany’s approach—as it was laid out in propaganda—is best summed 
up by Davis’ lawyer, Howard Moore, who told a reporter that Davis “is in the clutches of 
the law….Given the deep-seated hatred and the political nature of the trial, the only way 
she can be freed is to bring enough pressure to insure that she has a fair trial. The outside 
pressure forces them to be more scrupulous. It is salutary.”349   
It was in this vein that East Germans communicated with the judge for Davis’ 
case, Richard Arnason.  In an effort to ensure that the judge knew that the eyes of the 
world were upon him, they warned that the GDR would sound the alarm at the slightest 
misstep that might harm Davis, and thereby the rights of all Black Americans.  In his 
letter to the judge, the East German attorney and professor Dr. Friedrich Karl Kaul350 
opened by stating that “the attention of the majority of the decent people of the world is 
focused on you. This will continue to be the case until the conclusion of this trial.”  
Further, he wrote that “[i]t is incumbent upon you as the judge in the case to guarantee 
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that this case…will be conducted strictly according to the law.”  Unfortunately, Kaul 
believed, “there is reason to doubt that this will be the case.”351   
Kaul likewise asserted that Davis was receiving an unfair trial, biased by the 
statement from the American president praising J. Edgar Hoover for having captured a 
“terrorist” and setting a warning for her compatriots.  No one, argued Kaul, could expect 
a fair trial with such “condemnation pronounced by the nation’s Chief Executive,” one 
which was then repeated continually by the American media.  Kaul ended his letter by 
declaring that: 
The President, public opinion, the prosecutor, the judge and the jury, are 
against Angela Davis, even before a verdict has been returned. The 
designation of the case “United States versus Angela Davis,” has thus 
taken on a different, a terrible meaning. It is the American ruling circles 
who have put Angela Davis on trial. If they have their way, they will make 
short work of her.352 
 
In another letter to Arnason in June 1972, the GDR Committee for Human Rights struck 
a similar chord.  The committee accused “certain political quarters” in America of trying 
to hurt the “whole of the American labor movement,” as well as everyone struggling for 
black rights, and anyone against “the war of aggression in Vietnam,” all by punishing 
Davis.  Just as Kaul warned Arnason, the Committee for Human Rights cautioned the 
judge that everyone around the world was watching the trial, and that “as the 
representative of the American judiciary,” it was his job to “ensure that justice is done to 
Angela Davis…as your conscience should demand.”353 
East Germans also protested Davis’ arrest and trial through demonstrations of 
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solidarity with the imprisoned black communist.  One of the most all-encompassing 
national solidarity actions embarked upon by the GDR on behalf of Davis was a 
campaign known as “1,000,000 Roses for Angela!”  The brainchild of FDJ member 
Angelika Löffler, this action was also coordinated to coincide with Davis’ 27th birthday. 
Youth were asked to send Davis postcards with roses on them, the ultimate goal being to 
send one million postcards—hence, the one million roses.  In Junge Welt, the FDJ’s 
newspaper, readers were told that these postcards were crucial to the solidarity effort 
because they, unlike Davis, could travel beyond prison walls, and would serve as a 
reminder that she was not alone in her struggle.354  
 In the grip of “Angelamania,” the Davis case quickly became a topic over which 
African American visitors and the SED bonded.  Most importantly, impressed by the 
exhaustive expression of solidarity with Davis, African Americans thanked and praised 
East Germans for their involvement.  For instance, when Ralph Abernathy visited East 
Germany in 1971, he participated in a rally at Humboldt University calling for Angela 
Davis’ release.  He later spoke at St. Mary’s Church, wherein he told the crowd gathered 
that: 
 You have convinced me that we are not alone in our struggle, for we have 
many friends here in Berlin.  I will go back knowing that in the German 
Democratic Republic we have countless numbers of friends, who will help 
us to free Angela Davis and to solve the problems of racism, poverty, and 
war in the world.355  
 
Abernathy keyed in on a crucial point: the GDR’s work to free Angela Davis was not 
merely about winning her release from jail.  It was meant to further underline the image 
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of East Germany’s broader support of the civil rights movement and its tireless work on 
behalf of victims of oppression all over the world.     
 When Davis’ case ultimately ended in an acquittal, organizations in East Germany 
were eager to congratulate the young black communist on her victory, most certainly 
because her triumph was one for them as well. The First Secretary of the SED, Erich 
Honecker, sent Davis a congratulatory letter, the text of which was published in East 
German newspapers.  The FDJ’s First Secretary, Günther Jahn, sent his “most heartfelt 
greetings” and expressed the happiness felt by the “progressive youth from all over the 
world” at her release.356  Time and again, East German officials declared that the 
acquittal was not only a victory for Davis herself, but also for all of the peace-loving and 
progressive peoples of the world, namely the socialist and communist states.357  It is in 
this assessment that one finds the incredible importance of Davis’ release from prison for 
the SED: the release symbolized the sheer power of the East German people—at the 
behest of the Party—in demanding that forces in the West back down.  In congratulating 
Davis, the SED was embracing the justification of its political ideology and the validation 
of East Germany’s existence. 
This self-proclaimed East German “victory” was certainly trotted out on many 
occasions, and a visit from Davis while on a victory tour provided the SED with yet 
another opportunity to remind East Germans and international observers of the alleged 
role played by the state in securing Davis’ release from jail.  In September 1972, Davis 
and two of her comrades, Kendra and Franklin Alexander, visited East Germany 
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following a trip to the Soviet Union.  On Davis’ behalf, this trip, like the one to the 
USSR, was intended to thank East Germany for its support during her trial.  Future 
African American visitors would do much the same as well, celebrating East Germany’s 
support for the activist.   Davis also added her voice in solidarity with the East German 
socialist experiment, reciprocating the backing and encouragement given to her by the 
GDR.  Davis proclaimed: “‘We find ourselves, indeed, in a new historical era, when we 
compare life in the socialist countries with that in the United States.  We see here what it 
means for the working class to wield the power.’”358   
The Party used this visit from Davis to further cement the state’s link to the 
activist by honoring her with the Great Star of People’s Friendship in Gold, making 
Davis an honorary citizen of Magdeburg, and bestowing upon her an honorary degree 
from Karl Marx University in Leipzig.359  As G.F. Alexan had encouraged Robeson in 
1958, Davis had come to the GDR to thank East Germans for their help, further 
cementing their linkage.  Davis made several more trips to East Germany in coming 
years, attending the Tenth World Youth Festival in 1973 and making an appearance at the 
World Congress for International Women’s Year held in East Berlin in 1975.  To this 
day, like Robeson, Davis’ name is one that has long been linked with the East German 
state.  
 
Oliver Harrington: The more things change, the more they stay the same   
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 Despite the image painted by examining the experiences of Paul Robeson and 
Angela Davis, the 1960s and 1970s in East Germany were not entirely friendly to all 
African Americans.  For someone like Oliver Harrington, the stories of East Germany as 
a model society were generally canceled out by his own, far different, experience as a 
resident of the GDR.  It is this status as resident that, just like the military deserters and 
Aubrey Pankey, influenced his perception of East Germany’s relationship to peoples of 
color.  Because Robeson, Davis, and other African American friends of the GDR were 
visitors, they rarely stayed in East Germany for any extended period of time.  Harrington, 
meanwhile, lived out much of his later years in the communist Germany (and later in a 
unified Germany), and saw first-hand the dismal reality of life in East Germany.  An 
examination of statements from Harrington and his wife Helma reveal a set of ambiguous 
feelings toward East Germany.   
These statements are admittedly somewhat complicated by the fact that many of 
them came after the Berlin Wall fell, and the state ideology that they had long lived under 
no longer existed, quite possibly influencing their statements about the GDR.  Documents 
in Harrington’s Stasi file, however, provide some insight into his feelings while living 
under the SED’s rule, suggesting that the distancing one finds in his post-GDR statements 
was not far off from his earlier views of East German society.360  Through Harrington 
one finds that, on the African American side, the relationship thrived as long as one 
maintained (willingly or not) a surface understanding of East German views on race. The 
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less one knew about everyday life, the better. 
When Harrington arrived in East Germany in 1961, he was already celebrated 
internationally as a cartoonist whose work focused on American racism.  His arrival in 
East Berlin, however, was many years in the making, with roots in a public debate that 
took place in 1946.  Harrington, then the director of the NAACP’s public relations 
department, had been invited to speak at a forum sponsored by the Herald Tribune, where 
he engaged in a debate with Attorney General Tom Clark, who accused Harrington of 
being a communist.  Harrington later argued that Clark had labeled him a communist in 
order to hurt the NAACP; the suggestion that an NAACP executive was a communist 
would certainly do the group no favors, regardless of the claim’s veracity.  Not 
surprisingly, in the years that followed this debate, Harrington came under increased 
scrutiny by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).  In an essay 
detailing his reasons for leaving the US, Harrington recounted in detail the night in 1951 
when he was told by a friend that he should leave the country.  Over drinks this friend, 
who belonged to Army Intelligence, told Harrington that he should take a trip to Europe 
for six months or so until things blew over.  Three weeks later Harrington sailed to 
Europe, settling in Paris only to return to the US once for a short visit before 1989.361  
Ten years after arriving in Paris, Harrington traveled to East Berlin to engage in 
talks with publishers about creating illustrations for American and English literary 
classics. According to Harrington, his actual settlement in East Berlin was dramatic and 
unplanned: 
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…while I was there, in August, I heard a very sinister sound in the streets. 
I looked out of my tiny hotel window and down below there was a stream 
of tanks going along. They were Soviet tanks. That gave me a bad feeling 
because I’d seen that before. I went down out of my room and walked in 
the direction the tanks were going for about a mile. On the edge of the 
place which has since become known as Checkpoint Charlie there was a 
line of US tanks. I knew I was right in the middle of World War III…I 
went back to my hotel, but found that I couldn’t leave there. I lost my 
French apartment, I lost everything. I had to stay there.362 
 
Harrington did admit, however, that this was not the worst possible outcome; he went on 
to start a line of political cartoons that were “entirely different from what [he]’d been 
doing.” Gradually his cartoons were published in the top satirical magazines in East 
Germany, as well as magazines and newspapers in the US and the Soviet Union. Though 
he was at times tempted to leave the country, he claimed to have stayed because he liked 
the work.363 
Aribert Schroeder, however, has questioned the validity of Harrington’s claim that 
he became “stuck” behind the Berlin Wall. He points to the fact that the tank crisis 
Harrington referred to occurred in October 1961, while the construction of the Wall 
began in August 1961, concluding that since Stasi records do not show Harrington 
arriving in the country until November 1961, these two events occurred before 
Harrington had even arrived in East Berlin. Schroeder goes on to note that, as an 
American citizen, Harrington could have easily left East Berlin via Checkpoint Charlie, 
further giving lie to the notion that Harrington was unable to leave the country.364  In fact, 
Harrington often traveled to West Berlin to deliver cartoons to be shipped to a newspaper 
in the US.  Harrington’s own wife, Helma, shoots down the notion that Oliver was stuck 
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in East Germany, suggesting that his past experiences in France and the US made staying 
in Berlin the best option, if not his originally preferred one.365 
Clearly Harrington’s explication about his arrival in East Germany has some 
logistical and factual problems, and was likely told that way in order to place his 
residency in East Germany in as positive a light as possible. His essay explaining his 
departure from the US, entitled “Why I Left America,” was published in 1993, after the 
collapse of communism, a time when it is quite possible that he would have sought 
alternative ways to explain why he had left the US and never returned, living for many 
years behind the Iron Curtain.  According to Harrington, nothing about his departure 
from the US was voluntary.  Owing to the communist witch hunt, he was forced to leave 
the US—lest one think otherwise, he was not abandoning his country, nor was he 
abandoning the civil rights movement, but rather leaving to ensure his safety and 
livelihood (the latter an argument that is plausible considering Paul Robeson’s later 
experience).  His later settlement in the communist Germany was also depicted as due to 
circumstances outside of his control, resulting in Harrington remaining there 
permanently. Though Harrington has clearly whitewashed his settlement in the GDR, 
what is true regardless is that the Cold War and its political consequences made him a 
resident of East Berlin.  
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 Whatever the real reasons for remaining in East Germany, Harrington’s cartoons 
were nevertheless quite popular in the GDR, and many were keen to employ his skills as 
a cartoonist.366  The majority of Harrington’s cartoons dealt with American policies 
towards Vietnam, South Africa, and Latin America, criticizing the racist and imperialist 
policies of the American government.  Harrington also, of course, condemned the 
government’s failings regarding Black Americans, providing East Germans with an 
“authentic” window into American society.  Many of his cartoons appeared in the 
satirical magazine Eulenspiegel and the general interest magazine Das Magazin, and 
quite a few of them were printed in color—something Harrington noted in a number of 
interviews—certainly a luxury for a cartoonist at this time.367  Harrington was often one 
of the few foreign cartoonists to contribute to these East German periodicals, and his 
cartoons occupied prime real estate in the magazines, a testimony to the value placed on 
Harrington’s work by East German editors and those to whom they answered.368  It is 
little surprise, though, that many white East German cartoonists were not fond of 
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Harrington, their Black American competitor.369 
  Even though Harrington’s settlement in East Germany may not have been as 
accidental as he claimed, he was not entirely enamored with his new country and its 
government. According to Helma, Harrington had “philosophically” 
always been a socialist, for the ideals of socialism. It comes also with his 
being partly black: men are created equal, social justice and so on. But, 
naturally, as a philosophy is then put into politics and practice, this is a 
completely different thing. In general, politics, as far as the G.D.R. was 
concerned, he was not so interested….370 
  
Since Harrington was a foreigner living in East Germany, the Stasi maintained a file on 
the cartoonist, which included reports submitted by agents and mail that the Stasi had 
intercepted and opened.  One report noted a conversation an informant had had with 
Harrington, during which the cartoonist had apparently remarked that the warm welcome 
he had received from the GDR upon his arrival had certainly cooled.371  This was perhaps 
in response to Harrington’s cool reception of the SED as a political party, but may also 
have been influenced by another factor.  Harrington was quoted in yet another report as 
stating that East Germany understated the black problem in the US, and that the situation 
for African Americans was much worse in reality.  Contrasting what African American 
visitors friendly to East Germany believed about East German people, Harrington went 
on to complain that a large portion of East Germans knew very little about the 
circumstances in the US, which was “terrifying” for him as an American citizen.372 
Though much of what Harrington said was true, speaking so frankly about East 
Germany’s failure to understand American racism certainly did little to raise officials’ 
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opinions of the American artist.  
 Harrington also criticized the GDR’s lack of services and organizations that 
served foreigners, pointing out that there was nowhere for him, and others, to take their 
problems.373  This perhaps contributed to the loneliness noted in a report almost a year 
later, which was attributed to Harrington not being able to return to the US and that he 
felt uncomfortable in the GDR.374  Still another report later noted that though Harrington 
clearly had very strong views about the African American civil rights movement, he had 
yet to become involved in any East German organizations—apparently an unspoken 
expectation the SED had held for Harrington.  This was put down to the likely 
development of a prejudice or bias against the GDR’s Kulturpolitik, a series of cultural 
policies that placed limits on what East German artists were allowed to create.375   
Helma seems to support this notion, later stating that: “…there were some ups and 
downs….We were friends of [G.D.R. writer]376 Stefan Heym.  He had trouble.  And so 
you had contact with difficult things.”377  For the Stasi, proof of this came down to the 
close relationships Harrington had formed with foreign artists, the fact that he had 
connections to “Zionist circles,” and subscribed to an ambiguous world view.378  
Harrington was also noted as associating with controversial East German dissidents like 
Ingeborg Hunzinger, Robert Havemann, and Wolf Biermann.379  Yet, for all of the 
criticisms of the GDR and the SED that Harrington expressed, he was careful and only 
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ever willing to discuss these views in private.380  He avoided expressing his true thoughts 
in public, his wife noting that while he never joined the SED, he never created a single 
cartoon that criticized the Party either.381     
Certainly, from Helma’s description of her husband’s politics it is clear that 
Harrington was not a perfect fit ideologically in East Germany. Harrington was likely 
understood as ambiguous by East German authorities because in addition to his continued 
foreign contacts, he held views that touched upon, but did not necessarily coincide with, 
those officially supported by the SED.  Though no one explicitly stated it, the conflict 
here arises from the fact that Harrington’s black radicalism strayed from the SED’s more 
orthodox approach to communism, which was similar to that expressed by Robeson and 
Davis during their visits.382   Yet, despite the ideological uncertainty he represented, 
Harrington was of value to the SED; not only through his cartoons but also his mere 
presence, as African American visitors often dropped in on Harrington, someone they 
either knew well or knew of quite well.383  This sense of familiarity often translated into a 
positive view of their time in East Germany.384 
                                                 
380 Though Harrington clearly misestimated those to whom he was speaking, as there was at least one of his 
confidantes who reported his statements to the Stasi. 
381 Brown, “‘Bootsie in Berlin,” 357. 
382 Davis’ expressions of orthodoxy while in the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union will be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter. 
383 Helma says that “we often had visitors from the States.  I remember Langston Hughes, John Killens.”  
Also, there were “a group of American Indians who were here for some kind of congress. […] And then 
also some wild women.  There was an international women’s congress and the Americans, they had several 
extreme feminists.”  Brown, “Bootsie in Berlin,” 369. 
384 See for example Elizabeth Murrell, who visited East Germany in 1975 for the World Congress for the 
International Women’s Year (the women’s congress referenced above by Helma).  She noted that 
Harrington helped one of the delegates cross from West to East Berlin when she arrived at Checkpoint 
Charlie without the appropriate paperwork.  He found housing for one reporter, and helped another reporter 
who had “arrived in East Berlin with nothing but her return ticket.”  Harrington also spent an evening 
speaking with the younger black delegates who knew little of the cartoonist and his work, sharing stories.  
Murrell, “Many Women—One Goal: World Congress For the International Women’s Year,” 
Freedomways, 15:4 (1975—Fourth Quarter), 256.  Jim Cleaver, part of the newspaper delegation that 
visited East Germany in 1975 wrote in the Los Angeles Sentinel: Ollie Harrington had been brought to the 
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 The example of Oliver Harrington is a good illustration of the limits that bound 
the friendship between Black America and East Germany.  It was at best a relationship 
that could thrive only so long as one did not look too closely at the SED and the GDR, 
and compare that with officials’ rhetoric about what supposedly bound Black America 
and East Germany. On the surface, Harrington’s existence in East Germany appears 
positive—he found a home where he could continue his work as a cartoonist, safe from 
the specters that chased him in the West.  His work occupied prime real estate in East 
German periodicals, and he was able to critique the American government in a place 
where he was free from the communist witch hunts plaguing the American political 
landscape.   
Yet, Harrington resided in a state which he, at best, felt ambiguous toward.  His 
artistic freedom was limited by Kulturpolitik, he never really embraced the politics of the 
SED, and he felt isolated among a group of people he believed did not truly understand 
the black freedom struggle.  Even though Harrington lived out his final years in the GDR, 
and later in a unified Germany, it is far more likely that he remained not because of a 
deep attachment to East Germany and the SED, but because of the life he had built for 
himself there.  With a wife and son, and quite possibly the notion that he could not return 
to the US, it would not be surprising to discover that Harrington found it easiest to remain 
where he was.  For the SED’s part, it seems likely that any of the “ideological 
disagreements” Harrington had with the SED were not apparent until after he had lived in 
the GDR for some time.  Harrington’s contributions as an African American cartoonist 
                                                                                                                                                 
East Berlin Press Club to partake of the evening’s festivities…. [Harrington] was the star of the 
evening….the essence of the evening was that Ollie Harrington was there and everybody remembered both 
him and Bootsie.”  Cleaver, “East Berlin: Journalists, Ham Hocks, Vodka Bottles,” Los Angeles Sentinel, 5 
June 1975. 
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seemed to make up for his provocative views, regardless. 
  
Concluding Thoughts 
After Paul Robeson visited East Germany in October 1960, the relationship that 
East German elites had long envisioned became a reality.  With Robeson, the SED finally 
felt comfortable presenting to its citizens an African American whom it believed 
represented the Black America elites had long conceived of as an ally.  In the coming 
years, Robeson would pave the way for other civil rights activists to visit East Germany, 
while members of the East German public began to express an interest in their so-called 
brothers and sisters in the struggle against capitalism, though not always for ideological 
reasons, and not always willingly.  The SED used Robeson’s visit in international 
propaganda as well as domestic, and the message was the same: the SED was legitimate.     
Perfecting its approach to the relationship, by the early 1970s the SED had 
become quite proficient at organizing solidarity campaigns on behalf of Black America 
and the civil rights movement.  When the “Free Angela Davis” solidarity movement 
“culminated” in Davis’ acquittal, the alliance found itself facing yet another defining 
moment.  For some African Americans, the movement had become concrete proof of the 
GDR’s commitment to supporting Black America’s struggle for rights.  For the SED, the 
acquittal was a self-justification of the Party’s reason for existing, confirming the SED’s 
own beliefs about itself and its abilities. 
Friends like Robeson and Davis helped to drive this relationship by quite simply 
reciprocating East German overtures and accepting offers of solidarity.  By visiting East 
Germany, African Americans lent a legitimacy to the relationship and claims of kinship 
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that would not have been there had it merely been a friendship marked on the African 
American side by statements of praise for the East German state, instead of action.  
Important, however, is that like Robeson, most of the GDR’s African American friends 
only visited East Germany; those who resided more or less permanently in the state often 
came away with opinions that were at odds with visiting Black Americans.  Because the 
majority of East Germany’s African American friends were visitors, this in itself helped 
to keep the relationship alive, as their positive opinion of the apparent changes that East 
Germany had undergone kept them engaged.    
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Chapter Five: Disintegration 
The Friendship in Decline, 1972-1989 
 
 
 Despite the shot of energy injected into the relationship between Black America 
and East Germany during the 1960s and into the 1970s, the very ties that had once bound 
the two groups began to fray.  With the relative decline of the civil rights movement in 
the US, visits to East Germany from African American friends for reasons of solidarity 
virtually came to halt.  Meanwhile, after years of struggling for legitimacy and diplomatic 
recognition, by the mid-1970s the SED had received both from a significant portion of 
the international community.  The combination of these two developments ushered in the 
decline of the Black American-East German friendship, as the two issues that had 
brought them together no longer provided the momentum necessary to keep both sides 
actively in contact.  By 1989, the relationship was a ghost of what it had once been. 
These developments had several consequences: though the majority of East 
Germany’s African American friends were leftists and subscribed to an internationalist 
worldview, as the civil rights movement began to decline, so too did their need to look 
internationally to states like the GDR for assistance in the struggle. Though the GDR 
would continue for the rest of its lifetime to engage in a struggle with the FRG for 
supremacy, contemporary Black America failed to provide the ammunition necessary for 
the SED’s struggles of the late 1970s and 1980s.  The chapter that follows will examine 
how, rather than engaging with contemporary African Americans, the SED sought to 
preserve and revive the legacies of two Black Americans whose connection to the GDR 
dated back to the 1960s—the heyday of its relationship with Black America.  This 
preservation highlights what was the ever-growing distance between the SED and its 
166 
 
citizens, as portions of East German society found themselves relating to Black America 
in ways the SED had not encouraged.  A relationship that had once been intended to 
bring East Germans together with the SED was now underlining the very differences that 
kept them apart.   Lastly, an examination of the mechanics behind the SED’s approach to 
cultivating a relationship with Black America will close out the chapter.  If we were to 
take the SED’s rhetoric at face value, the alliance between Black America and East 
Germany should have survived until, at least, the death of racism in the US.  Yet, this was 
not the case, and an analysis of the SED’s attempts to engage in solidarity with Black 
America underline why this was the case.385   
 
The SED and Black Power 
By the early-1970s, the civil rights movement had entered into a decline and the 
black power movement was on the rise.  With African American attention focused 
elsewhere, there were no longer visits and exchanges of solidarity on the same scale seen 
in previous years.  There was increasingly little for the SED to capitalize on within the 
black freedom struggle in the US, and increasingly less need for the SED to do so, as 
states began to recognize the GDR.  One finds that in this last stretch of the GDR’s 
existence, the few African Americans who did venture to the communist Germany or 
maintain some sort of contact with East German officials generally did so on the basis of 
ideology.  While issues plaguing the African American community were sometimes 
discussed, they were done so in the context of providing updates about the American 
                                                 
385 The period under consideration in this chapter overlaps with that of the previous chapter.  One finds the 
decline first began to take root in the early-1970s, even though the effects would not be seen until slightly 
later. 
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communist party.  For example, in 1980 the Chairman of the CPUSA, Henry Winston, 
visited East Germany to speak with First Secretary Erich Honecker.  Minutes of the 
meeting include a long discussion that touched on the black situation in the US, yet that 
was just a small part of the overall conversation, which largely focused on communism 
more broadly.386       
By the early 1970s, black power had come to dominate the American struggle for 
black freedoms.  Despite a few public discussions in East Germany about black power, 
there was little about this subsection of the black freedom struggle that appealed to the 
SED, regardless of certain black power groups’ interest in socialism.  Even if the 
advances made by East Germany in acquiring diplomatic recognition had not occurred, it 
is likely that this move toward black power in the US would have elicited some level of 
drawback from the SED.  That this would be the case is not surprising: for a movement 
that many identified with a strong black racial pride, it was not uncommon to see an 
alienation of white “friends,” whether in the US or elsewhere.  How correct these 
“friends” may have been in emphasizing the role played by racial pride is less important 
than the fact that these “friends” believed racial pride to be a stumbling block for their 
cooperation.   
For example, in 1982, two African American union officials visited East 
Germany, ostensibly to study the role of unions in the GDR.  There for two weeks, Eric 
Pace and James Johnson were first-time visitors to the socialist Germany.  East German 
records noted that Johnson was a member of the CPUSA, while Pace self-identified as a 
                                                 
386 “Vermerk über das Gespräch des Genossen Erich Honecker, Generalsekretär des Zentralkomitees der 
SED, mit Genossen Henry Winston, Nationaler Vorsitzender der Kommunistischen Partei der USA, am 
23.10.1980,“ BArch-SAPMO DY 30/13654, fol. 1-161, 93-4, SAPMO. 
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communist sympathizer.  After the trip, GDR officials commented that while Pace’s 
education would have enabled him to appreciate and understand the information they 
shared with the two men, his “racism” against everything “white”, combined with an 
American nationalist arrogance, meant that he did not take the trip very seriously, even 
missing several of the talks that had been arranged.  Johnson, on the other hand, though 
interested in the material, was deemed by officials as not intelligent enough to fully grasp 
the already “over-simplified” material they shared with the men.387  The disdain with 
which the officials spoke of Pace was in keeping with the Party’s stance on black power. 
In a “strictly confidential” report drawn up by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 
March 1971, an extensive report (by an unnamed author) laid out background 
information about the Black Panther Party (BPP), which was a largely negative depiction 
of the Black Panthers.  In this confidential report, the author expressed a thorough 
contempt for the BPP that centered on its demands and general organization.  For 
example, the author referred to the BPP’s ten point party program,388 and noted that only 
some of the mandates were “reasonable” in that they demanded “social and political 
liberation.”  Yet, these same reasonable demands were juxtaposed against ones that 
“might lead to black racism.”389  In particular, the report pointed to the demands 
decreeing “We want full employment for our people,” “We want all black men to be 
exempt from military service,” and “We want freedom for all black men held in federal, 
state, county and city prisons and jails,” as some of the most divisive.  These demands, 
                                                 
387 “Information über den DDR-Aufenthalt von zwei afroamerikanischen Gewerkschaftsfunktionären zum 
Studium der Rolle der Gewerkschaften in der DDR, 30.4-13.5.1982 (Deleg.-Nr. 2-02 Db),” 12 Juli 1982, 
Koblenz Endarchiv, BArch-SAPMO DY 13/3188, fol. 1, SAPMO. 
388 A copy of the program (both the 1966 and 1972 versions) can be found at: 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/blackpanthers/history.shtml, accessed on 21 August 2013. 
389 i.e., racism held by blacks against whites. 
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the report continued, completely denied the value of working with all oppressed peoples, 
as well as “the necessity of a joint class struggle against the imperialist system….”  
Furthermore, it was argued, the BPP very rarely worked with “white organizations with 
corresponding political objectives.”390  Clearly, a group perceived as placing a strong 
emphasis on race, and not class, would find few friends among the SED.391 
 Unmistakably unimpressed with the BPP, the report continued on to point out 
inconsistencies in its organization, noting that the comparative youth of the party, as well 
as their quick growth, had managed to create an incredibly heterogeneous group.  The 
report discerned three different strands within the BPP which often clashed, and more 
than once emphasized the negative impact of this lack of homogeneity.  Adding to the 
perceived problems of the group was the general lack of ideological maturity 
compounded by the leaders’ apparent absence of domestic and foreign political 
knowledge.  The report also remarked that while the BPP wanted a socialist state, it had 
no real idea how this should happen.  Furthermore, though the CPUSA supported the 
BPP, said the report, even the American Communist Party saw room for improvement 
within the group.392  Closing the report, its author remarked that the BPP was at a 
crossroads, in which it would have to decide whether it would become “an influential 
mass party of the black population,” or “an anarchist underground organization.”393  This 
confidential report makes it quite clear that if the Black Panthers, and any other black 
                                                 
390 “Über die Black Panther Party, Quelle: Abt. USA/Kanada/Japan, 17 March 1971,” BArch-SAPMO DY 
30/J IV 2/2J/3391, 1-2, SAPMO. 
391 Daisy Weβel has argued that the SED was against all forms of black extremism, since any group that 
was anti-white ignored the importance of class in the struggle against oppression.  Weβel, Bild und 
Gegenbild, 110.   
392 “Über die Black Panther Party, Quelle: Abt. USA/Kanada/Japan, 17 March 1971,” BArch-SAPMO DY 
30/J IV 2/2J/3391, 2-4, SAPMO. 
393 “Über die Black Panther Party, Quelle: Abt. USA/Kanada/Japan, 17 March 1971,” BArch-SAPMO DY 
30/J IV 2/2J/3391, 6, SAPMO. 
170 
 
power groups, were to be the future of the civil rights movement, East Germany would 
not be providing the kind of solidarity to Black America that it once had. 
 Yet, if the SED was not particularly fond of the BPP, how does one explain the 
GDR’s massive solidarity campaign and its friendliness with Angela Davis that would 
continue on into the 1980s?  The reason becomes clear with a comparison between the 
Angela Davis solidarity campaigns in both the FRG and the GDR.  In West Germany, 
Davis’ connection to the Black Panthers and the black power movement was well-
documented.  In the West German solidarity campaign, she “emerged as the undisputed 
icon of the black power struggle at the beginning of the 1970s,” write Höhn and 
Klimke.394  Davis’ supporters condemned the American dedication to upholding and 
preserving a power structure that subjugated people of color, which they feared would be 
used to “murder” Davis through the death penalty.  Höhn and Klimke regard this 
condemnation as evidence of the belief among her West German supporters that “Angela 
Davis’s case represented a concerted attempt by U.S. authorities to criminalize and 
silence the Black Power movement….”395 
 Meanwhile, in the GDR, the narrative was slightly, but importantly, different.  
Indeed, East Germans also spoke of what they understood as the American government’s 
attempts to murder Davis through the death penalty, and supporters spoke of the arrest 
and trial as the American government’s effort to crush the country’s black freedom 
movement.  However, in the East German narrative, Davis was simply a communist.  She 
was rarely depicted as a Black Panther or a particularly devoted member of the black 
power movement, though officials were willing to admit to her associations with the 
                                                 
394 Höhn and Klimke, A Breath of Freedom, 118. 
395 Höhn and Klimke, A Breath of Freedom, 120. 
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movement.  For example, in a pamphlet entitled Kämpft Angela Davis frei!, Davis’ 
development into a black radical is detailed, starting with her childhood in Birmingham, 
Alabama and culminating in her arrest and trial.  In the pamphlet it is acknowledged that 
Davis had worked on behalf of the BPP protesting various arrests, but her association 
with the BPP is never further defined.  Instead, she is continually referred to as a 
communist.396  
 Davis herself would further cement this identity as a communist during her 
victory tour through the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, leading observers in the West 
to question the extreme orthodoxy of the statements she had made during this trip.  A 
report from Radio Free Europe Research noted that during her trip to the GDR in 
September 1972, “some of her statements in the GDR exceeded even the anticipated 
degree of orthodoxy,” even going so far as to praise the Berlin Wall.  Regarding her trip 
to the Soviet Union, this same report remarked that “one Moscow dissident asked a New 
York Times reporter: ‘Is she a fool or is she dishonest?  It seems to me she is doing a 
disservice to her own countrymen by her statements here.’”  Further, the report noted that 
a Black Panther paper in the US had accused Davis of deserting America’s blacks in 
favor of the Communist Party.397  
In this comparison, one finds that while the West may have viewed Davis as 
embodying the black power movement, the same was not true behind the Iron Curtain.  
As an incredibly vocal communist fighting for black rights, and with a case that had 
                                                 
396 Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland, ed., Kämpft Angela Davis frei! (Suhl: 
Freies Wort, 1971), 24. 
397 Dorothy Miller, “Angela Davis in the GDR,” Radio Free Europe Research, 18 Sep. 1972, 3.  Many 
observers questioned Davis’ intent—why would she strike such an orthodox Marxist-Leninist stance, when 
she had long been identified with the New Left and black power?—and her silence on political prisoners in 
the Eastern Bloc despite promises to work on behalf of such prisoners after her acquittal. 
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enraptured much of the international community, there was little chance of the SED 
bypassing the opportunity for propaganda through proclamations of solidarity with Davis.  
This could explain why they originally downplayed Davis’ connection to black power.  
Yet, when Davis visited the GDR, she committed herself to an orthodoxy that pleased 
officials, confirming the picture East German officials had painted of her, further 
cementing herself as a friend of the GDR.  Rather than contradicting the opinions 
expressed in the report about the BPP, East Germany’s depiction of Davis underlined the 
SED’s wishes to distance itself from black power.  
 
A Fork in the Road 
With the conclusion of the “Free Angela Davis!” movement, there would be no 
other East German solidarity action on behalf of an African American that would come 
close to matching its scale and intensity.398  In the absence of such ostentatious 
expressions of solidarity, the SED’s biggest contribution to the relationship in this period 
was the preservation of the legacies of two figures—Paul Robeson and Martin Luther 
King, Jr.  In the case of Robeson, one finds that the tensions inherent in officials’ efforts 
to maintain an older version of Black America becomes all too apparent when compared 
to East Germans’ interest in more current elements of African American culture, like hip-
hop.  Though the SED’s celebration of King and his legacy was in step with other 
international efforts to do the same, the very essentials that had once made King 
appealing to the East German people were no longer present in the SED’s version of the 
African American by the 1980s.  In both cases, a very clear disconnect between the SED 
                                                 
398 There was a movement to free the Wilmington 10, though that solidarity action never reached the 
heights of the campaign for Davis’ freedom. 
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and the average East German is painfully obvious.  What had at one time given the 
appearance of a Party and its people in agreement very clearly proved the opposite.  A 
theme common to both the celebration of Robeson and King is the implication of a 
continued bond between the GDR and Black America, despite the fact that contacts 
between both groups were increasingly on the decline.  This examination, however, also 
reveals a solidarity with Black America that the SED had not counted on.       
 
Paul Robeson 
On 23 January 1976, Robeson died in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania of 
complications following a stroke.  Though the sometimes larger-than-life figure that had 
served as a bridge between Black America and East Germany had passed away, his 
legacy continued to find a home in East Germany.  One week after his passing, a group of 
students and teachers from the Paul Robeson High School in the Berlin borough of 
Köpenick honored Robeson, the students singing his songs and attendees listening to his 
recordings.  According to news reports in the GDR, there were approximately 890 
Pioneers and members of the FDJ, as well as 58 teachers, present at the mournful 
celebration.399  The Daily World reported on this East German celebration in April 1976, 
writing that while “formally the evening was held under the auspices of the World Peace 
Council, the Academy of Art and the Paul Robeson Committee of the GDR,” in reality, 
“the whole country was paying its respects” to Robeson.  The article, written by Bob 
Lumer,400 noted that it was “only fitting that this memorial was held in the GDR.”  The 
                                                 
399 “Robeson-Ehrung,” Der Morgen, 30 January 1976, clipping located at PRA 9.5_3.559. 
400 Bob Lumer, an American, was the son of communist writer Hy Lumer.  Bob was married to a German 
woman named Helga, and resided in the GDR. 
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message was that Robeson’s love for the GDR ran deep and was an affection that East 
Germany also felt.401    
Referencing Robeson’s decline in popularity in the US, Lumer praised East 
Germany, writing that the “GDR kept the memory of this great man alive while the 
American ruling class tried to blot it out of the public consciousness in the United 
States.”  In contrast, wrote Lumer, “the average GDR school child has known more about 
Paul Robeson than the average Black child in the U.S. ghetto.”  By preserving the 
memory of Robeson—as well as his image—and teaching East German children about 
Robeson’s legacy, the GDR was “also carrying on the struggle which Paul Robeson 
wages.  It is striking out against racism, war and exploitations.”402  Even in death, the 
GDR continued to exploit its connection to and support for Paul Robeson.   
 Two years after his death, the GDR celebrated what would have been Robeson’s 
eightieth birthday, naming an East Berlin street after him, as well as a school in Leipzig, 
which was unveiled in April 1978.403  Officials also introduced a commemorative medal 
in Robeson’s name, to be awarded to people who embodied the values and objectives for 
which the African American had fought.404  In justifying the large-scale celebration that 
marked Robeson’s eightieth birthday, Robeson’s image was once again used to 
demonstrate the GDR’s “humanist character” and to illustrate its role in the struggle 
                                                 
401 “GDR Honors beloved anti-fascist hero Paul Robeson,” Daily World, 28 April 1976, clipping located at 
PRA 9.5/1.392. 
402 “GDR Honors beloved anti-fascist hero Paul Robeson,” Daily World, 28 April 1976, clipping located at 
PRA 9.5/1.392. 
403 Two years later the Daily World would publish a photo of children walking down Paul Robeson Street, 
captioning the photo: “Kindergarten children in the German Democratic Republic are learning their way 
around Berlin by walking from their school on Paul Robeson Street.  Berlin has many streets named for 
world progressive figures.”  “Paul Robeson St. Berlin,” Daily World, 17 Apr. 1980, clipping located at 
PRA 9.5/1.496. 
404 “Ehrung für Robeson: Festveranstaltung zum 80. Geburtstag des Künstlers und Friedenskämpfers,” 
Berliner Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1978. 
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against racism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.405  The planned celebration also 
provided an opportunity for East Germany to “reiterate our support for the struggle of the 
peaceful and democratic forces in the USA….”406  Following the celebration of 
Robeson’s birthday, the Academy of Arts of the German Democratic Republic, through 
an effort spearheaded by Brigitte Boegelsack, published a book in both English and 
German comprised of speeches given by the speakers at the event.  These speakers 
included East Germans who had been well-acquainted with the activist and entertainer, as 
well as some friends from a variety of other countries.407  The creation of both an English 
and German version suggests that this bit of propaganda was intended for domestic and 
international audiences.   
In 1982, efforts to preserve Robeson’s legacy continued with the Paul Robeson 
Committee marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the famed Robeson concert that was 
broadcast from New York via telephone to an audience in London while his passport had 
been revoked.  On the agenda at this formal meeting marking the concert’s anniversary 
were plans to organize the celebration of Robeson’s eighty-fifth birthday the following 
year.408  As a part of this birthday celebration, a Paul Robeson exhibit opened in April 
1983, which was housed at the main public library in Berlin.409   That same year, East 
                                                 
405 “Vorlage an das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, Betr.: Würdigung des 80. Geburtstages von Paul Robeson, 
17 January 1978,” BArch-Berlin DZ 9/3858, BArch-Berlin. 
406 “Vorlage für das Sekretariat des ZK der SED, 20 February 1978,” BArch-SAPMO DY 30/J IV 
2/3A/3133, 17, SAPMO.  
407 Brigitte Boegelsack, ed., Paul Robeson, April 9, 1898-January 23, 1976: For His 80th Birthday (Berlin: 
Academy of Arts of the German Democratic Republic, 1978). 
408 Invitation from Franz Loeser to the Akademie der Künste der DDR, Paul-Robeson-Archiv, 31 March 
1982, BArch-SAPMO DY 17/3752, SAPMO. 
409 “GDR citizens meet Paul Robeson,” Daily World, 1 August 1984, clipping located at PRA 1/22. 
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Germany released a stamp with his image, inscribed with “‘For Peace Against Racism, 
Paul Robeson 1898-1976.’”410 
That Robeson was still significant to the East German elite some twenty-four 
years after his first visit to the state speaks to the place of honor he occupied among them.  
It also speaks to how “stale” things were intellectually in East Germany, as some of the 
same people who had sought to make Robeson a household name in the 1950s and 1960s 
were still behind efforts to keep him in the East German imagination in the 1970s and 
1980s.411  In highlighting the “contemporary significance of his struggle,” the library 
exhibit’s organizers were using a figure that embodied a much earlier time in the 
perspective of the East German youth.  Just as much of the GDR youth found SED 
rhetoric to miss the mark, their use of an older African American who had been popular 
in their parents’ youth adds to the ever-growing mountain of evidence highlighting the 
disconnect between a sclerotic SED elite and East German citizens, especially in the 
1980s. 
 
Hip-Hop in the GDR 
The effort to keep Robeson’s image alive can be contrasted with East Germans’ 
interest in hip-hop, and the SED’s efforts to limit and restrict the consumption of the 
African American musical art form, reminiscent of its struggles against jazz many years 
                                                 
410 Quoted in Höhn and Klimke, A Breath of Freedom, 132. 
411 It is certainly the case that some of those who “honored” Robeson did so because it seemed to be the 
right move, whether for political or personal gain.  It would be a mistake, however, to take the cynical 
stance that this affection for Robeson was entirely for show.  Robeson had a number of friends among the 
East German elite, while other East Germans admired him for his entertainment talents and/or political 
stance.   
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earlier.412  This was done by trying to create a “system to support and encourage the 
practice of hip-hop”413 under the SED’s auspices, attempting to “control its practice in 
order to make it conducive to their Socialist cause.”  The SED provided locations where 
“hip-hop heads” could train and practice breakdancing, all under the watchful eye of East 
German authorities.  This, in theory, gave officials the opportunity to watch and control 
the development of the art form.414  Not surprisingly, most East Germans with an interest 
in the musical craft looked elsewhere to satisfy their cravings, in a more authentic 
fashion.  The SED’s fears about and desires to contain hip-hop were apparently justified, 
however.  According to Leonard Schmieding, the “performance of GDR hip-hop culture 
functioned as a form of imaginary and temporary Republikflucht, or flight from the 
GDR.”415   
Whereas African American folk music, like that performed by Robeson, had been 
utilized by the SED as part of an effort to create a desire to remain in East Germany, 
African American-inspired East German hip-hop was instead being used to leave the 
GDR, even if only in their minds.  Schmieding has argued that such “escape” and 
“traveling” through hip-hop occurred with the use of musical samples from songs that 
were obtained from the West.  In addition to their western pedigrees, these samples were 
a representative form of protest because sampling undercut East German policies 
                                                 
412 Mike Dennis and Norman LaPorte write that culture, which includes music, “was part of the struggle 
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regulating the number of songs that could be played by Western entertainers on the radio, 
allowing DJs to create music that was defined as East German, even though it used 
samples from Western musicians.416   
Despite efforts by the SED to create in the minds of East Germans a connection 
between the African American oppression expressed in hip-hop and the evils of America, 
East German hip-hop fans rarely did so.  Some enjoyed the music much less for political 
and ideological reasons and more so simply as a means of entertainment.  Examining the 
East German reception of Beat Street, a 1984 film produced and with music by Harry 
Belafonte exploring the hip-hop scene in New York City,417 Schmieding has shown that 
despite the SED’s efforts to use the movie as a teachable moment about the US, many 
East Germans turned to the film because they enjoyed “its style rather than any political 
message in its story.”418  Much like the “fans” discussed in Chapter Four, these examples 
show that East German affection for African American visitors or their culture did not 
necessarily signal an acceptance of the SED’s ideological offerings.   
For those who did find that politics or ideology drove their interest in hip hop, in 
most cases these GDR citizens were identifying with African American oppression in a 
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way unintended by authorities.  Despite the fact that hip-hop had been created as an 
expression of resistance against oppression in America—and was the message the SED 
wanted its citizens to come away with—East German fans understood this resistance as 
reflecting positively upon the US.  Even though it was an African American cultural 
product that protested oppression in America, to East Germans this cultural product was 
American nonetheless.  “For countless youth, the ‘land of unlimited opportunities’ 
became a myth and a symbol; they worshipped cultural goods such as jeans, rock ‘n’ roll 
and Beatnik poetry ‘as bearers of emancipatory energies.’”  Of course, the more the SED 
protested, the more attractive such music became.419  Further, the fact that African 
Americans could freely engage in such art in protest of the American government, 
something East Germans themselves could not readily do, was important; even the state-
approved hip hop was, quite obviously, state mandated.  This did not preclude East 
German rappers from attempting to utilize its emancipatory symbolism, but doing so was 
made all the more difficult because of SED regulations on the art form.  
Michael Rauhut has made a similar argument in regards to blues, which had been 
popular years earlier: “African-American music projected the craving for ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘pure emotion,’ and young misfits considered the oppression of ‘the black’ as an 
ancestral example of historical suffering.  The blues became an escape, idealized as a 
counter-world to the GDR system of social tutelage.”420  It is through examples like this 
that we see the formation of a sense of solidarity with Black America for some East 
Germans, yet outside of the official boundaries set by the SED.   
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This sense of solidarity, for some East German rappers and rap fans, stemmed 
from their view that the African American experience was quite similar to their own in 
the GDR.  Timothy S. Brown writes that, “in contrast to many West German rappers, 
who (to their credit) recognized that as educated, middle-class Germans they enjoyed a 
position of privilege that gave them little in common with oppressed Blacks in the U.S., 
East German rap fans tended to see a real parallel between ghetto life and their 
oppression as citizens of a communist dictatorship.”421  He quotes Joy, a rapper from a 
group called Zoo Sound, as saying about Beat Street that, “We felt almost exactly like 
[the people portrayed in the movie].  Of course we had cash for a doctor, and here it 
didn’t rain [through the roof of] the apartment, and we didn’t have any gangsters on the 
street, but our life was just as dreary.”422   
Certainly, Joy’s formulation that life in East Germany was comparable to the 
oppression faced by Black Americans is debatable, and even Joy’s own quote seems to 
reveal a certain understanding, even if subconsciously, that the lives of East Germans and 
the African Americans in the movie were not all that similar.  What is clear here though 
is that, as Brown argues, “…the “Blackness” of hip hop is less important for its ethnic 
nationalist charge than for its ability to stand in for various types of oppression,” for 
many of the East German rappers and rap fans.423  Though they came at it from different 
perspectives, these East German rappers and fans of the art and the SED similarly 
appropriated elements of the black struggle for rights; blackness and the oppression that 
accompanied it in much of the world was never truly understood but rather utilized as a 
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means of expressing distaste for oppression in general, to various ends.  For this reason, 
both the SED and those seeking an escape from East German society were able to utilize 
blackness and the protest against oppression it often represented for different goals. 
In its efforts to harness hip-hop for its own use, Schmieding has argued that the 
SED’s “strategy of fighting the influences of American popular culture by actually (and 
paradoxically) embracing hiphop required quite some ideological twists.”  In support of 
this point Schmieding noted that, because officials viewed hip-hop through a Marxist-
Leninist frame that “ignores race as an analytic category,” they were often unsure of 
“how to respond to African-American cultural products.”424  What Schmieding has 
overlooked, however, is that the SED—as this work has shown—had long had a history 
of appropriating elements of African American culture to fight the influences of American 
culture.  In reality, such “ideological twists” as perceived by Schmieding actually 
required little effort for the SED of the 1980s.  While the SED may have considered the 
solution to racism to lie in class struggle, they were not blind to the propaganda 
opportunities that became available through discussions of the race struggle. 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
In examining the SED’s preservation of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s legacy, we find 
yet another example of the ways in which Black America’s oppression could mean two 
different things to the East German public and the SED.  In preserving the legacy of yet 
another African American figure, this period bore witness to the re-characterization of the 
relationship between East Germany and Martin Luther King, Jr.  Contrary to propaganda 
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of the 1980s, the SED did not welcome King with open arms when he visited East Berlin 
in September 1964.  What makes King’s integration into the SED’s propaganda and 
doctrine especially significant is that his 1964 visit to East Germany was virtually 
ignored by the East German elite both before and immediately after his visit.425 
Upon learning that King had been invited to West Berlin by the city’s then-mayor 
(and future chancellor of West Germany) Willy Brandt in September 1964, Gerald 
Götting, a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in East Germany and Vice-
President of the German-African Society, invited King to the GDR.426  At the time, 
letters show that King regretfully declined the invitation.427  At the same time that 
Götting was corresponding with King, Heinrich Grüber, the provost of St. Mary’s Church 
in East Berlin, also invited King to the city.428  Ultimately, it is not clear what made King 
change his mind and when, because he did, at some point, decide to travel to the GDR 
and give a sermon.   
After participating in several events in West Berlin, King and his colleagues 
arrived at Checkpoint Charlie on the evening of 13 September 1964, though King did not 
have his passport with him.429  According to Alcyone Scott, who accompanied King to 
the east as a translator, when the East German border guards discovered that King was 
missing his passport, they stated that he was not allowed to enter the country.430  Scott 
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claims that she then argued with one of the guards, telling him that refusing King entry 
would be a bad idea because of all of the people waiting to hear him speak.  Then, “he 
then turns around and we go back in [to the barracks] and after a while he fills out some 
papers or a paper and our passports and he hands it all to me.  I didn’t read the documents 
or even look at them I just held on to them.  He had given us permission to go in, and that 
was the way we got through the wall.”431   
Ebony magazine gave a simpler recounting of the story, writing that though King 
was initially denied entry to the state, one of the guards recognized him from television, 
and King was then admitted without his passport.  The article summed up the encounter 
at Checkpoint Charlie, writing that: “It was the first time on record since the erection of 
the wall that anyone other than a defector had been allowed to enter East Berlin without 
presenting an official document.”432  The Stasi’s reporting on the incident, not 
surprisingly, differs from that of both Scott and Ebony.  According to the official report, 
when King and his entourage reached Checkpoint Charlie, two of the people with him 
approached the guards, and without making explicit reference to King’s identity, declared 
that their guest had no passport with him.  The guards responded with the official line, 
which was that one could not enter “democratic Berlin” without a passport.  Eventually, 
another guard recognized King and asked him if he had any other form of identification, 
ultimately accepting one of King’s credit cards as a proof of identity.433   
Of course, the Stasi version paints the state in a positive light, asserting that the 
guards simply were unaware that King was the guest in question.  Once made aware of 
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this fact, the guards bent the rules to allow King into the country.  The real story is likely 
a mixture of the three versions presented above, but regardless, what is quite clear is that 
King was not officially “expected” by the SED.  This is a point that cannot be over-
stated; when one considers King’s international renown and his position vis-à-vis the 
American government, the fact that the SED passed up the opportunity to invite King to 
East Berlin was significant.  The reason why becomes clear when one considers what 
King meant to those clamoring to hear him speak.   
Though the SED was silent about King’s visit, East German citizens were well-
aware through word-of-mouth that the activist was to visit their capital, and many turned 
out to hear him speak at St. Mary’s Church, in East Berlin.  In fact, so many people 
turned out that organizers were unexpectedly forced to funnel extra attendees into a 
second church, where King gave the same sermon for a second time in East Germany 
(after giving it earlier that day in West Berlin).  Upon arriving at St. Mary’s Church, 
Scott recalled the scene as one befitting the arrival of a rock star: 
…I could not get out of the van because people were pressing against the 
van to get to King.  And you thought you were with the Beatles because 
the people mobbed him, they just mobbed him. […] I’d never been in that 
excited a situation, where people were clamoring to be near somebody.  
And, that made you very aware of the import of this visit for them.434 
 
After entering the church, Scott noted that it was packed to the rafters, filled with people 
who were anxiously awaiting King’s arrival.  Scott had also been present when King 
spoke to West Germans earlier in the day, and was able to compare their responses with 
those of the East Germans.  Unlike the West Germans, the crowd at St. Mary’s Church 
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did not “have any freedom to claim,” observed Scott, who believed that the East Germans 
absorbed King’s words about passive resistance and struggle quite hungrily.435 
 In his sermon, King remarked that the situation of East German citizens behind 
the Berlin Wall, and that of African Americans in the US, was quite different, though 
they did share some similarities.  “There is a common humanity,” King stated,” which 
makes us sensitive to the sufferings of one another.”  Indeed, the wall that divided 
Germans was a “symbol of the divisions of men on the face of the earth.”  Despite these 
similarities, King was hesitant to “attempt to bring you God’s word for your situation.  (I 
am not familiar with your plight.  I don’t know your politics.)”  Instead, he chose to speak 
about the African American situation, and the “way in which the spirit moves our midst 
in the freedom struggle in the southern United States.”436   
In offering a brief history of the black freedom movement in the US, as well as 
the modes of resistance the non-violent segment of the movement had supported, King 
noted that: 
It will not be easy, and one of the things we have learned is the necessity 
for a group action in the public sector of life. […] Group action, even mass 
action, in the public realms of politics and economics is the only way that 
we can get hope to confront the tremendous forces of our time.437 
 
Despite his insistence that their situations were different and that “you must discern that 
which is relevant to your place here in Germany,” East Germans’ response to his sermon 
was electrifying.  Scott observed that “Everybody in that church was totally wrapped up 
in someone whose story they knew and who represented the shame of America and its 
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oppression but who had the courage to resist, and ask others, in their situations, also to 
resist.”  She went on to state that for East Germans in that church, people who felt that 
they really had no future, such words were stirring and captivating.  “I don’t think,” said 
Scott, that, “I’ve ever been present where all of those things that one wants to believe in 
and desperately hope for are given expression with such resonance.”438 
 An examination of King’s sermon, and East German citizens’ reaction to it, 
provides some insight into the SED’s failure to invite King to the state and its decision to 
remain silent about the visit afterward.  Given the SED’s problematic relationship with its 
people, it is obvious that King’s rhetoric of resistance, even though non-violent, was not 
something the SED wanted to hand to its citizens on a platter.  For a ruling party that 
already had a tenuous hold on its public, officials were at pains not to encourage any 
other forms of resistance to which the people had not already resorted.439  Höhn and 
Klimke also suggest that perhaps East German officials’ silence at King’s arrival owed to 
the fact that they may have been “too surprised by the actual course of events,” though 
this would not explain why very little was said about the visit in its immediate 
aftermath.440   
Since the SED had seemingly chosen to distance itself from King, it was the 
churches, then, that ultimately brought King into the East German mainstream, argue 
Höhn and Klimke.441  In the immediate aftermath of King’s visit, he was heavily 
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discussed in religious circles, and Höhn and Klimke believe that King’s popularity 
among the East German religious was a signal to GDR publishing houses to publish his 
texts.  In doing so, however, they still needed to present King in a manner palatable to the 
SED.  Therefore religious figures and publishers made the argument that socialism’s 
humanist outlook was not at odds with Christianity, and claimed that King himself was a 
staunch humanist.  According to Höhn and Klimke, this helped to eventually integrate 
King into the state’s officially-accepted doctrine.442  Worth considering, too, is that 
King’s assassination in 1968 helped to cement his integration into the state’s doctrine, as 
one could now paint him as a victim of the imperialist West.443     
Though the SED may have, at the outset, issued radio silence in response to 
King’s September 1964 visit, by the end of the 1980s it had taken on the mantle of 
preserving his legacy by celebrating Martin Luther King Day.  King’s widow Coretta 
Scott King and the Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Center had worked for years to 
establish a federal holiday in the US honoring the fallen civil rights leader.444  On 20 
January 1986, Americans celebrated the first national King Holiday, though at that time, 
only seventeen states officially observed it.445  In September of that same year, Coretta, 
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on behalf of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal Holiday Commission, sent a letter to 
Willi Stoph, the Prime Minister of the GDR, as part of an effort to broaden international 
commemoration of the holiday the following year.  She noted that earlier in 1986, “more 
than one hundred countries” had participated in the celebration in their own ways, some 
co-hosting events with the American embassies in their countries, while “in others, local 
governmental authorities declared a holiday in honor of Martin and held official 
ceremonies.”446   
She went on to note that “in some instances, schools, religious organizations, and 
many private organizations concerned with peace and human rights held observances of 
their own.”  For the second observance of King’s holiday, his widow sought to involve 
more celebrants, “asking people all over the world to make Martin’s Day a day of peace, 
a day of amnesty and a day for reaching out to the most needy among us—the poor, the 
hungry, the homeless and the disenfranchised.”  King even requested of Stoph that the 
GDR “consider declaring the third Monday of each January a holiday in honor of Dr. 
King in your country.”447 
 Six days before the holiday was set to be observed in the US, Stoph responded to 
King, thanking her for her letter from the previous September.  He assured her that in the 
GDR, East Germans held the “unforgettable pioneer of the American Civil Rights- and 
Peace Movement” in the highest regard.  Since, wrote Stoph, East Germany was 
dedicated to disarmament and friendly coexistence and sought to avoid a nuclear 
holocaust, a King celebration in his country was an obvious next-step.  Stoph believed 
that the GDR was well-placed to fully embody King’s dream for “a world without war, 
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oppression, hunger, and poverty.”  He closed his letter by informing Coretta that the 
Peace Council had plans for a memorial honoring her husband’s life and work.448  This 
memorial, held on 22 January 1987, began at 10am and included performances by the 
Paul Robeson Choir singing “Swing Low Sweet Chariot” and “John Brown’s Body”, 
followed by speeches and the reading of a letter that the Peace Council had sent to King’s 
widow.  The Paul Robeson Choir closed out the service by singing “When the Saints Go 
Marching In” and “We Shall Overcome,” the latter a song popularly associated in East 
Germany with Black America, and Paul Robeson specifically.449   
In the wake of the celebration, a press release noted that the event’s speakers had, 
while fêting King, expressed the GDR’s support for the Soviet Union’s proposal for a 
reduction of nuclear arms by the year 2000.   East Germany also renounced the 
creation—on both sides—of any new weapons for use on earth and in space, referencing 
American president Ronald Reagan’s (thoroughly mocked) Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI, or “Star Wars”), a program that would use weapons systems based both on the 
ground and in space.  In essence, the message was that the GDR stood against all forms 
of war, just as the late African American civil rights activist had.450  This focus on 
nuclear war and its weapons was not a new one for the GDR, though it had not always 
been connected to civil rights activists by SED propaganda.  Arguments about nuclear 
war would continue to frame the SED’s discussion of King for the next two years.   
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 The following year, in April 1988, the Peace Council marked the twentieth 
anniversary of King’s death, in association with the League for People’s Friendship in the 
GDR (Liga für Völkerfreundschaft der DDR) and the Executive Board of the German 
Christian Democratic Union.  In the plans drawn up for the remembrance, it was noted 
that the organizations had several goals, one of which was to convey the ways in which 
King’s dreams for “peace, détente, disarmament, and peaceful coexistence” were being 
fulfilled in the GDR.  Scheduled to participate in the event were again members of the 
Paul Robeson Choir, as well as delegates from brigades and other organizations bearing 
both King’s and Paul Robeson’s names.451   
Götting, one of the men who had extended an invitation to King in 1964, spoke at 
the commemoration ceremony.  In his speech he declared that King was “alive in his 
legacy,” a legacy that was carried along as an example by everyone struggling for “peace 
and social justice,” i.e., East Germans.  Again drawing a link between King and nuclear 
war, Götting noted that King was often quoted not only at “peace conferences” and at 
“church services,” but also at “protest marches against racism and nuclear proliferation 
(Hochrüstung).”452  Following the completion of the commemoration service, Günther 
Drefahl, president of the GDR’s Peace Council, sent a telegram to Coretta Scott King 
informing her of the meeting.  He closed out the telegram by writing that “We are 
confident that the legacy” of Martin Luther King, Jr. had found “fulfillment in our 
common struggle for a peaceful and just world.”453 
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 In November 1988, the SED once again began planning their King celebration for 
the following year.  As in previous years, the SED sought to spotlight their proclaimed 
stance on world issues by commemorating King’s work and legacy.  In 1989, the 
ceremony was held at the Apollo Hall in the German State Opera.  That year, a 
polytechnic high school and a work collective were to be given the name “Martin Luther 
King.”454  There would also be special guests at the celebration: an American delegation 
that included Dr. Joseph Lowery and his wife Evelyn, as well as Acie Byrd.455  The 
American guests were in East Berlin for five days, from 6-11 January 1989.456 
 On 9 January, the name “Martin Luther King” was bestowed upon a polytechnic 
school in the Berlin borough of Marzahn.457  The American delegation attended this 
naming ceremony, at which Werner Rümpel, the First Vice President and Secretary 
General of the GDR’s Peace Council, spoke.  Rümpel used the occasion to remind his 
audience about the hardships America’s blacks had faced, transitioning into an oft-
repeated refrain, noting that “in our humanist, socialist society, racial hatred and racial 
discrimination” had forever been eradicated.  In its place, “equality, brotherhood, peace, 
friendship, and solidarity” were not only celebrated by the government, but the people as 
well, both young and old.  It was this, Rümpel continued, that “also impressed Martin 
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455 “Rede von Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Günther Drefahl, Präsident des Friedensrates der DDR, auf der festlichen 
Veranstaltung am 10. Januar 1989 aus Anlaβ des 60. Geburtstages von Dr. Martin Luther King jr.,” BArch 
DZ 9/2652, BArch-Berlin.  Dr. Lowery was the third president and co-founder of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC).  Like King and Ralph Abernathy before him, Lowery was also a minister 
and civil rights activist in the US.  Evelyn Lowery, the daughter of civil rights activists, was herself an 
activist and involved in the SCLC.  Byrd too was an activist, veteran, and political scientist, as well as a 
member of the SCLC.   
456 “Aktivitäten des Friedensrates der DDR aus Anlaβ des 60. Geburtstages von Rev. Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., am 15. Januar 1989,” BArch DZ 2652, fol. 1, BArch-Berlin. 
457 “Aktivitäten des Friedensrates der DDR aus Anlaβ des 60. Geburtstages von Rev. Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., am 15. Januar 1989,” BArch DZ 9/2652, BArch-Berlin. 
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Luther King,” during his trip to East Berlin in 1964.  “Here he saw his dreams become a 
reality,” an obvious reference to King’s “I Have a Dream” speech.458   
That Rümpel would argue that King “saw his dreams become a reality” in East 
Germany (and implicitly, not in the US) is in itself not surprising—he was certainly not 
the first East German official to stretch the truth in order to praise the East German 
socialist experiment.  Despite the image of the close friendship that Rümpel painted, 
though, King spent very little time in East Germany (several hours, as a matter of fact) 
and had said very little on the record about the state, even remarking in his 1964 sermons 
in East Berlin that he knew little about the Germans’ situation.  It is, however, indicative 
of an effort to retroactively write King into the SED’s version of East German history, 
and importantly, to write East Germany into King’s history as well.   
 The following day, on 10 January 1989, Doreen Müller, a teacher at the newly-
minted Martin Luther King High School (Martin-Luther-King-Oberschule), spoke at the 
ceremony at the German State Opera.459  The teachers and students of the high school, 
she announced, had prepared for the honor of the renaming by “familiarizing” themselves 
with King’s life.  Acknowledging King’s commitment to social justice and peace, Müller 
declared that an understanding of King’s struggle had fostered in them a drive to become 
active in solidarity movements.  As evidence of this drive, Müller referenced their 
                                                 
458 “Ansprache des 1. Vizepräsidenten und Generalsekretärs des Friedensrates der DDR, Werner Rümpel, 
anläβlich der Verleihung des Namens ‘Martin Luther King’ an die 16. POS in Berlin-Marzahn,” BArch DZ 
9/2652, BArch-Berlin. 
459 The naming of schools after individuals was an old German tradition.  According to the GDR’s version 
of this tradition, most schools were typically expected to bear the name of communist revolutionaries or 
anti-fascist resistance fighters, who could come from anywhere in the world as long as they lived up to East 
German ideological values.  Pragmatically, the names supplemented the GDR’s numerical naming system 
for the schools, but ideologically, the intent was to infuse the students with the political values of the 
school’s namesake, as the school officials dedicated time to teaching the students about the individual for 
which their school was named.  Catherine Plum, “Contested Namesakes: East Berlin School Names under 
Communism and in Reunified Germany,” History of Education Quarterly, 45:4 (Winter 2005), 626, 627. 
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involvement in pushing for a pardon of the Sharpeville Six through protest resolutions 
and petitions.460  She closed her speech by stating that the students and teachers of the 
school would give their all to make sure that they honored and lived up to the name and 
legacy bestowed upon their school.461   
When Günther Drefahl spoke at this same ceremony, he began by praising the late 
activist and explained why King’s legacy and his life’s goals were so compatible with 
East Germany’s.  In this explanation we see more clearly how officials created an image 
of King that fit into the SED’s worldview.462  Drefahl openly admitted that King’s 
humanism grew out of his Christian beliefs; obviously, for a man so clearly devoted to 
God and religion, the SED could not ignore this aspect of King’s background.  Yet, it was 
in scientific socialism, stated Drefahl, that King found many similarities to his Christian 
worldview (Weltanschauung).  Upon reading Marx and Lenin, King, according to 
Drefahl, was able to grasp why so many people had turned to communism.  Drefahl was 
sure to convey the image of King coming to this conclusion as a young man in his 
twenties, suggesting a long-held understanding of the appeal of the works of Marx and 
Lenin and their theories.463   
                                                 
460 The Sharpeville Six were six South Africans who had been arrested for the murder of Sharpeville’s 
Deputy Mayor Kuzwayo Jacob Dlamini in the wake of a violent protest march.  The Six were sentenced to 
death, a ruling that angered much of the international community. Ultimately, the sentences were 
commuted and instead the Six were to serve sentences of 18-25 years.  Between 1991 and 1992, the Six 
were released from prison early. 
461 “Rede von Doreen Müller—Gedenkveranstaltung Deutsche Staatsoper Berlin, 10.1.1989,” BArch DZ 
9/2652, BArch-Berlin. 
462 Though Drefahl was a member of the Peace Council, this organization, like many others, was so closely 
entwined with the SED that he would not have painted an image of King that stood at odds with that of the 
SED. 
463 “Rede von Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Günther Drefahl, Präsident des Friedensrates der DDR, auf der festlichen 
Veranstaltung am 10. Januar 1989 aus Anlaβ des 60. Geburtstages von Dr. Martin Luther King jr.,” BArch 
DZ 9/2652, BArch-Berlin.  In a speech given at a “peace meeting” (Friedensmeeting) at a children’s 
hospital in Berlin-Friedrichshain that same day, Deba Wieland, a journalist and vice president of the Peace 
Council, made this same point, almost word-for-word.  Deba Wieland, Vizepräsidentin des Friedensrates 
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In keeping with the GDR’s previous connection made between King and nuclear 
war, Drefahl also reiterated that East Germany and its citizens only wanted disarmament, 
a world safe from war, as well as international development.  Drefahl looked back on 
King’s 1964 visit to East Berlin, slightly altering the story to create the impression that 
East Germans had long stood behind King and offered “moral support” for his struggle, 
“offering…great sympathy,” to “King and his friends….”  This was evidenced by the 
“warm welcome” he had received in September 1964 from the East German people; 
Drefahl clearly glossed over the absence of the SED and the fact that some of that “warm 
welcome” may have owed to sentiments that pit the citizens against the SED instead of 
with it.464  
In the GDR’s efforts to preserve the legacies of Paul Robeson and Martin Luther 
King, Jr., the SED sought to maintain ties to two figures that had loomed large not only in 
the African American civil rights movement and internationally as well, but among the 
East German population.  While efforts to preserve Robeson’s legacy was at odds with 
younger East Germans’ desires to consume contemporary African American cultural 
products, the upholding of King’s legacy in the GDR was indeed keyed into a 
contemporary movement to do the same elsewhere.  Yet, the SED very neatly rewrote its 
history with the activist, using an enthusiastic public reaction to King’s visit as proof of 
the SED’s own long-standing support for the late activist.  The public’s excitement about 
King and his speech likely owed not to a sense of socialist solidarity, but rather a 
solidarity linked by a call for the resistance of government oppression.  Preserving the 
                                                                                                                                                 
der DDR, “Anprache auf dem Friedensmeeting in der Kinderklinik Berlin-Friedrichshain am 10. Januar 
1989,” BArch DZ 9/2652, BArch-Berlin. 
464 “Rede von Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Günther Drefahl, Präsident des Friedensrates der DDR, auf der festlichen 
Veranstaltung am 10. Januar 1989 aus Anlaβ des 60. Geburtstages von Dr. Martin Luther King jr.,” BArch 
DZ 9/2652, BArch-Berlin. 
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legacies of King and Robeson simply highlighted the ever-growing distance between the 
SED and its citizens.  
 
The SED’s Approach to the Friendship 
A major theme present throughout this work has been the SED’s proclamation of 
solidarity with Black America and other people of color struggling for rights.   The 
section that follows will delve further into this theme; though the existence of the civil 
rights movement and East Germany’s yearning for legitimacy drove this relationship, 
ultimately the SED’s approach to the relationship and its real views on blacks are both 
what made the alliance possible and part of the reason why it eventually fizzled out.  If 
we were to take the SED’s rhetoric at face-value—assertions of a commitment to anti-
racism and therefore a shared struggle with African Americans against the capitalist 
West—even with the loss of a highly-publicized African American civil rights movement 
and the GDR’s large-scale receipt of diplomatic legitimacy, the bonds that tied East 
Germans to African Americans should have remained.  Ultimately, the relationship 
weakened, but the capitalist West still existed and blacks remained oppressed.   
Looking beyond the patina of East German rhetoric and propaganda, one finds 
that contrary to the Party’s stated claims, the SED’s primary interest had not been in 
creating links with broad swathes of African Americans, but rather with an incredibly 
selective group of African Americans.  Philip Matthes has argued that this narrow focus 
owed to the fact that the Party’s main interest was in befriending those who could 
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influence opinion.465  A large part of the Party’s problem, however, was that they often 
overestimated the influence of their African American friends.  The very criteria that 
made these figures the perfect representatives of the evils of American (and by extension, 
Western) tyranny constituted the very reasons why they would be unable to influence 
anyone in a position of authority in any appreciable way.  It seems that the SED often 
equated popularity with influence, and to a certain extent, this popularity was useful 
domestically, as the example of Paul Robeson shows.  However, it was Robeson’s 
communist ties that had severely damaged his reputation in the US.  No matter how 
positively Robeson or his wife spoke of the GDR, no one in a position of power in the 
American government was going to change their stance on the legitimacy of the East 
German state because of what the couple had to say.   
 Significant too was the SED’s seeming-ignorance of the friction between many 
organizations in the civil rights movement and the CPUSA.466  The SED’s approach to 
creating sympathy among influential African Americans was largely done through the 
CPUSA and radical black leftists.  Yet, the SED failed to understand that the relationship 
between the CPUSA and many of the organizations that fell under the umbrella of the 
civil rights movement was quite poor, making the American Communist Party’s sphere 
of influence rather small.  What is more, the emphasis on class oppression rather than 
anti-black racism seriously undermined what for many African Americans was their 
reason for fighting.  The assumption that its own view, which subsumed race struggle 
                                                 
465 Philip Matthes, “David und Goliath: Der Anerkennungslobbyismus der DDR in den USA von 1964 bis 
1974,” in Umworbener Klassenfeind: Das Verhältnis der DDR zu den USA, eds. Uta A. Balbier and 
Christiane Rösch (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2006), 43. 
466 Matthes, “David und Goliath,” 46. 
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within class struggle, predominated, serves as yet another reminder that the SED failed to 
understand the nuances of the civil rights struggle.   
Additionally, this approach also overlooked the fact that the civil rights 
movement’s driving focus was on domestic issues.467  For a state that was allegedly so 
anti-racist as to seek out racism abroad and remove it everywhere it was present, an 
elementary understanding of the civil rights movement prevailed.  It is in this that we see 
both why the SED’s views on blacks made the relationship possible and why it fell apart: 
officials were able to utilize the message of the civil rights movement in order to 
accomplish their own goals because they too saw blacks as a commodity.  This way of 
thinking also ensured a superficial understanding of blacks and their freedom movements, 
failing to foster any real, lasting friendship.  Once the two factors that spawned the 
relationship, East Germany’s search for legitimacy and the American civil rights 
movement, began to decline in need and intensity so too did the friendship, because it 
was not based on any real “kinship” or “brotherhood,” but rather the urgency of the 
current situation. 
  A brief examination of Black America’s exchanges with the Soviet Union 
further brings into relief the SED’s own approach to the alliance with African American 
activists and makes the approach to the friendship clearer.  With the Russian Revolution 
in 1917 and the subsequent creation of the USSR, the Soviet Union’s intersection with 
Black America reached its zenith in the interwar period, though there were still Black 
Americans who traveled to or lived there in the years after WWII.  The Soviet Union 
determined that championing racial equality had the potential to operate as an “important 
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weapon in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism,” understanding that by 
supporting equal rights for blacks, it could carve for itself a path to international 
support.468  Though the USSR never attracted large numbers of African Americans and 
the CPUSA never counted among its members a particularly large constituent of blacks, 
this factor was not important.  What was, however, was that the value “of the Soviets’ 
emphasis on the race question lay not so much in recruiting blacks to their cause but in 
using racial injustice as a powerful critique of American society as a whole.”469   
Similarly, if we are to assess how East Germany profited from the relationship 
with Black America by how many blacks actually belonged to this relationship, then the 
results would be dismal.  However, if we consider the friendship in terms of the critique it 
enabled the GDR to make of the US and West Germany, then it was quite a profitable 
relationship.470  Furthermore, the SED’s ability to defend, campaign, and advocate for the 
world’s blacks while quietly supporting a racist worldview at home was far from 
contradictory because its real goal had never been to attain rights for blacks, nor had it 
been to provide blacks with a permanent place within the East German orbit.  These 
efforts had been about affecting a sea change in international opinion by positioning East 
Germany as the opposite of the allegedly corrupt, fascist, and racist West Germany, the 
objective being to provide the SED with the legitimacy it needed and carve out a place 
for the GDR as an important international actor and economic power.  In theory, at least.  
 Quite like the SED in the 1960s, the Soviet Union spent much of the 1930s 
“trying to convince black visitors to the Soviet Union and their compatriots at home that 
                                                 
468 Barbara Keys, “An African-American Worker in Stalin’s Soviet Union: Race and the Soviet Experiment 
in International Perspective,” The Historian, 71:1 (Spring 2009), 35. 
469 Keys, “An African-American Worker in Stalin’s Soviet Union,” 36. 
470 The benefits to both Black America and East Germany will be considered in more detail in the 
conclusion. 
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the Soviet Union represented not simply a ‘workers’ paradise’ but a paradise for all 
races.”471  When well-known or influential Black Americans visited the Soviet Union, 
just as was the case in East Germany, they were generally treated quite well by the 
Soviets.  It is not surprising that many left impressed by the Soviets’ “lack of 
institutionalized racism,” and feeling as if they actually had stepped foot in paradise.472  
In assessing the truth of these claims of Soviet anti-racism, Maxim Matusevich has 
argued for a correlation between the Soviet rhetoric and reality, at least during the first 
wave of what he refers to as “black travelers,” those who arrived prior to WWII.  Citing a 
study by Terry Martin, Matusevich maintained that “the Soviets practiced what they 
preached and even promulgated an affirmative action empire of sorts.  One testimony 
after another indicates that black travellers yearning for a place free of racism had largely 
found what they were looking for upon their arrival in the USSR.”473  He concluded that, 
after reading numerous accounts of a Soviet distaste for (American) racism,  
one gets a distinct impression that the anti-racist rhetoric of the 
government, the lofty internationalism of the Comintern did in fact 
penetrate the fabric of Soviet society.  Not only the majority of Soviet 
citizens appeared to their black visitors to be immune to Western-style 
racism, but they also apparently set out to shame and educate by example 
an occasional American or European racist wading into their midst.474 
 
Though Soviet anti-racism may have been borne of genuine racial tolerance, we should 
be careful not to assume the same about the East German case.  There were indeed many 
African Americans, as we have seen in earlier chapters, who attested to the “fact” that 
East Germans lived out the anti-racism its government so enthusiastically advertised.  
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Yet, as the black military deserters or Aubrey Pankey, for example, also attested to, 
racism was certainly alive and well in East Germany.       
 Instead, the East German case is most similar to that of Matusevich’s second 
wave of “black travelers” to arrive in the USSR, those who came in the 1960s and later.  
At that point, argued Matusevich, much of the anti-racist propaganda that had 
characterized the Soviet Union’s early days had, under “Stalin’s reign of terror,” become 
“ossified and streamlined to represent the official Soviet line in ongoing cold war 
bickering with the West….”  As such, it failed to correspond to any real feelings held by 
Soviet populations.475  Also similarly, both East Germany and the Soviet Union shared a 
sense of unease, and sometimes distaste, for certain elements of the African American 
civil rights movement, though, according to Matusevich this Soviet distaste seemed to be 
more far-reaching.  “[T]hough the Soviet regime rarely failed to showcase its anti-racist 
and anti-colonial credentials it harbored ambivalent attitudes towards liberation 
movements whose direction it couldn’t control and whose rhetoric evoked sentiments 
(i.e., strong religious undertones of the Civil Rights movement in the US) alien to the 
Soviets.”476   
On the African American side, their approach was generally a reactive one.  There 
were some who were proactive in reaching out to East Germany, but by and large Black 
Americans came into the relationship on the heels of an East German expression of 
solidarity or an invitation to the state.  While the relationship would never have reached 
the heights it did without the involvement of African Americans, it was in large part the 
SED that kept the relationship going.  The SED’s superficial understanding of the civil 
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rights movement, the use of an anti-racist rhetoric that did not always ring true, and the 
limits surrounding the motivations on both sides (the achievement of black rights in the 
US and East German legitimacy, for Black America and the SED, respectively), meant 
that it was never a relationship that would maintain the fervor of the Robeson and Davis 
years.477  For all of the discussion about Black Americans and East Germans being on 
parallel tracks in their struggles, there was actually little else to connect them.   
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 The 1960s and early 1970s in East Germany saw a parade of well-known African 
American visitors.  In the years that followed, all of that came to a fairly abrupt halt; very 
few Black Americans set foot on East German soil, and though the SED always had their 
familiar refrain of anti-racism and solidarity with the civil rights movement at the ready, 
the energy that had previously accompanied the relationship was no longer there.  This 
was no longer the relationship as Paul Robeson and Angela Davis knew it.  As the 
intensity of the civil rights movement began to wane, so too did a continued East German 
interest in the struggle for black rights.  At the same time, the East German need for their 
Black American friends also began to fade, though it did not disappear completely.   
 There were still benefits to be had from preserving the legacies of Paul Robeson 
and Martin Luther King, Jr., as opportunities to showcase the GDR’s progressive nature 
were always welcome.  With these efforts to memorialize Robeson, however, one finds 
the SED’s intellectual stagnation laid bare.  Preserving the legacy and image of a figure 
from a much earlier period contrasted with East German interest in a contemporary Black 
                                                 
477 The limits of the self-interested motivations, in this case, refer to the decline of the civil rights 
movement in the US and the achievement of diplomatic recognition for the GDR. 
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American cultural product, hip-hop.  Ironically, after years of (hollow) exhortations for 
East Germans to stand in solidarity with oppressed Black Americans, some East Germans 
were finally doing so.  Yet, this appropriation of hip-hop and its struggle was a means for 
East Germans to protest their own oppression, and to “escape” from the confines of the 
East German borders, even if only in their minds.  Meanwhile, King’s integration into the 
SED’s rhetoric, culminating in several celebrations of Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, only 
served to highlight the distance between the Party and the citizens of the GDR.  The very 
reasons for which East Germans had eagerly absorbed King’s message in 1964 were 
glossed over in the late 1980s by the SED.   
 Removing the veil of anti-racism, an examination of the SED’s approach to its 
relationship with Black America reveals a fairly debilitating misunderstanding of the 
African American civil rights movement and the various alliances formed within the 
movement.  The SED’s decision to appeal to elite black leftists within the civil rights 
movement—in the hopes that these individuals would then use their influence to spread 
positive information about the GDR and how it deserved legitimacy—was flawed.  It 
assumed a level of authority that many of the civil rights activists on the far left simply 
did not have, and was based on the assumption that the CPUSA had a far better 
relationship with the civil rights movement than it really did.   
 Soon enough, though, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the eventual unification of 
East and West Germany rendered the alliance between Black America and East Germany 
moot, though it seems unlikely that anything of importance would have developed had 
the GDR survived.  The remnants of the relationship were, in East Germany, relegated to 
the archives, while many of the African Americans involved in the relationship had by 
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1989 either passed away or chose not to revisit in any significant way their interactions 
with the communist Germany.478  In the years that followed the unification of the two 
Germanys, the racism that came to characterize Germany, most especially in the eastern 
portion of the state, seemed to contemporaries to be at intense odds with the anti-racist 
state the SED had long touted.  The following chapter, the conclusion, will address these 
tensions.   
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
A Racism Retrospective 
 
“…as a person who came from a country where racial discrimination is regarded as a law and is 
being practiced publicly, I say honestly that there is nothing like racial discrimination in the 
German Democratic Republic.” 
—David O. Ongiro479 
 
“Propaganda told an entirely different story about socialist relationships with Blacks, which was 
a completely false story.”  
—Oliver Harrington480 
 
In 1989, the political and ideological landscape of Eastern Europe changed 
drastically as communist governments lost their hold in the Eastern Bloc.  After the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, there was no arguing against the reality of race 
tensions in eastern Germany—or in all of Germany, for that matter.  As the two 
Germanys began the process of deciding what would come next politically, 
economically, and socially, people of color—whether German citizens or foreign 
residents—became the target of what many considered a surprisingly violent and virulent 
form of racism.  Upon unification of East and West Germany, one incident that has long 
stood out in public memory took place in Hoyerswerda, an important industrial town in 
what had been East Germany, near the border with Poland.  During this period of 
transition, the status of immigrants and asylum seekers was uncertain, and while they 
awaited the government’s response to their requests for political asylum, some of these 
individuals were assigned temporary housing at shelters in Hoyerswerda.   
There, for five nights in September 1991, a gang of young skinheads attacked the 
shelters, throwing Molotov cocktails, stones, bottles, and explosives.  Eventually the 
                                                 
479 David O. Ongiro, “Racial Discrimination,” Information Bulletin, FDGB, 5/63, 8, clipping located at 
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Berlin, 21. 
205 
 
foreigners were forced to leave the shelter, to the approval and delight of their attackers 
and onlookers.  This particular attack was followed by still more assaults on foreigners, 
as well as those perceived as foreigners, in the newly united Germany.  These 
confrontations and assaults, and others like them, gave rise to a spirited discussion about 
racism and xenophobia in Germany, as well as its root causes.   
As observers—the media, German citizens, academics, and international 
onlookers alike—considered the underlying motives for these attacks, many could not 
help but notice that the majority of the confrontations seemed to occur in the eastern part 
of the country (and too late, many would subsequently note that western Germany saw its 
fair share of racist incidents as well).  That this would be the case was particularly 
remarkable, given the anti-racist society that the SED had claimed to have built.  Fairly 
quickly, the notion of the racist East German developed, and was implicitly, and 
sometimes explicitly, compared to the idea of the racially-enlightened West German.481  
This characterization took hold, a trope that exists within German society today, leading 
many to depict the eastern portion of Germany as unwelcoming to those perceived as 
non-German, i.e., non-white.482   
                                                 
481 This stereotype has had negative consequences, as Jonathan Zatlin has noted: “The notion that racism 
among East Germans is somehow more virulent than among West Germans conveniently understates the 
daily instances of aggression and violence toward foreigners tolerated in the urban centers of West 
Germany.”  Zatlin, “Scarcity and Resentment: Economic Sources of Xenophobia in the GDR, 1971-1989,” 
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unification racism, de-valuing and even “erasing” the racism many blacks experienced in West Germany. 
482 For example, in preparation for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, a former government spokesman and 
the head of an anti-racism lobby, Uwe-Karsten Heye, advised visitors with dark skin to avoid the eastern 
part of Germany, because of its racism.  “There are small and medium-sized towns in Brandenburg, as well 
as elsewhere,” he said, “which I would advise a visitor of another skin color to avoid going to….It is 
possible he wouldn’t get out alive.”  “Racism Warning Has German Hackles Raised,” Spiegel Online 
International, 18 May 2006, www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,416904,00.html, accessed 18 April 2011.  
Heye’s statement was seemingly backed up with evidence.  In April 2006, an Ethiopian-born man was 
attacked in Potsdam, beaten so viciously that he fell into a coma.  Meanwhile, in Berlin, a German 
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Amid the considerable speculation as to how an allegedly anti-racist state could 
become the hotbed of German racism seemingly overnight, early academic work on the 
topic was problematic.  In an effort to explain post-1990 racism, many turned to the study 
of East German racism with a tunnel vision of sorts that concentrated primarily on the 
1980s and the foreign laborers who came to work in the GDR in those years.  As Damian 
Mac Con Uladh has noted, “Many 1990 publications were teleological attempts to 
explain the rise in violent and open racism in the East.  Taking state directives and labor 
agreements at face value and focusing on the situation in the late 1980s, they have 
produced an unrepresentative picture of the historical experience of foreigners in the 
GDR.”483  This teleological and historically short-sighted examination of racism in East 
Germany dominated the academic approach until historians began to apply a longer 
historical eye to the question, which in itself involved the admission that East Germany’s 
history with people of color stretched back further than previously believed.484   
                                                                                                                                                 
politician of Turkish ancestry was attacked, suffering “serious head injuries.”  His attackers were said to 
have shouted “‘dirty foreigner’” as he was mugged.  Heye was not the only one to issue a warning; the 
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areas for non-white visitors to avoid during the World Cup.  Laura Smith-Spark, “Racism fears dog World 
Cup build-up,” BBC News Online, 26 May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5012182.stm, accessed 
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What has resulted is a general agreement among historians on the importance of 
the SED’s anti-racist rhetoric in understanding the nature of East German racism.  Many 
have highlighted the fact that because the SED’s justification for the state’s existence and 
the Party’s rule centered on an elaborate anti-fascist myth that encompassed anti-racism, 
racism “officially” did not exist in the GDR.  Since racism allegedly did not exist, there 
was nothing to “fix,” even though in reality there was plenty to which East German 
officials needed to attend.  This meant that, as Mac Con Uladh has observed, East 
German functionaries worked within an ideological rhetoric that not only made racist 
rehabilitation impossible, but also allowed them to hide their own discriminatory beliefs 
behind empty proclamations of solidarity and support for the GDR’s black “brothers and 
sisters.”  This refusal to accept that racism was in fact a problem within East Germany 
meant that officials left “racist prejudice to fester among the East German public,” Mac 
Con Uladh has argued.485   
What follows will examine more closely what the relationship between East 
Germany and Black America can indicate or confirm about East German conceptions of 
race and racism.  Throughout the 1950s, the notion of a kinship between Black America 
and East Germany existed largely in theory, with members of the East German elite 
discussing, intellectually and politically, the ways in which both groups were on similar 
paths.  In these discussions, the elite argued that East Germans and African Americans 
were both engaged in a struggle against racism that would necessitate the ruin of the 
capitalist West.  These elite were sure to note that only certain African Americans—those 
                                                                                                                                                 
Resentment: Economic Sources of Xenophobia in the GDR, 1971-1989”; Dennis, “Asian and African 
Workers in the Niches of Society.”  
485 Mac Con Uladh, “Guests of the Socialist Nation?” 184. 
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who subscribed to an ideological worldview similar to that of the SED—were considered 
kindred spirits, however.  African Americans who, in the minds of the elite, emphasized 
the race struggle to the detriment of the class struggle were often treated to a racism that 
was reminiscent of German views of earlier years.  Whatever the value in utilizing 
America’s race problem to further their own goals, discussions about race were always to 
be subsumed by class, as the SED’s Marxist-Leninist ideology demanded.486    
In these years, the relationship that the GDR elite envisioned was largely 
theoretical.  These discussions about Black America, generally based off of readings of 
African American literature, often did not spill over into the citizenry.  On the African 
American side, what engagement there was with East Germany was not understood as an 
expression of solidarity.  What was needed, ultimately, to make this professed 
“brotherhood” attractive was an individual who not only satisfied the SED’s own 
definition of the ideal African American, but who appealed to the East German citizenry, 
and could enthusiastically spur the interest of African Americans as well.  Paul Robeson 
would fill this role beautifully.  When Robeson was finally granted his passport after 
nearly a decade of effective imprisonment within the borders of the US, his visit to the 
GDR would prove to be the spark needed to take what had largely existed as a proposed 
bond of friendship and turn it into a relationship with participants in East Germany and 
Black America.   
East German citizens, attracted by the appeal of a Western, well-known figure on 
East German soil, began to embrace the notion of a relationship, even if only for the 
access it gave them to figures like Robeson.  That his popularity, rather than his ideology, 
                                                 
486 Despite the distinctions made between African Americans, officials spoke in broad terms about their 
support for the civil rights movement, rather than labeling those they supported as black leftists.   
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was the draw for many citizens did not deter the SED as it sought to capitalize on East 
German interest.  Citizens’ attraction to the celebrities of the American black freedom 
movement allowed East German officials to present to others the image of East German 
citizens engaging in productive conversations about race.  This affection for Robeson 
often created a point of entry for African Americans to join the discussion, if not also the 
relationship, about the GDR. 
In turn, the SED utilized the official East German rhetoric professing support for 
Black America, as well as Black America’s support for East Germany’s allegedly anti-
racist society, as a substitute for any significant conversations about the Nazis, the 
Holocaust, and elements of Germany’s racist/racial past.  By supporting the American 
civil rights movement, the SED was at pains to convey that only a state that had fully 
rejected the legacy of the Nazis could and would bind itself so closely to the struggle for 
black rights.  As much as this was a show put on for international observers, it was also a 
show for East Germans themselves, a self-justification for the existence of the state and, 
most importantly, the SED as well. 
While Robeson was not the first African American to venture into East Germany, 
he was the first to truly attract the interest of East German citizens while also thoroughly 
fulfilling the image the SED had created of the ideal African American.  After Robeson 
made his first visit to East Germany, the next decade-and-a-half represented the peak of 
the friendship between East Germany and Black America.  With visits from well-known 
civil rights activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., Ralph Abernathy, Angela Davis, and of 
course, Robeson and his wife Essie, the SED asserted itself in propaganda and rhetoric as 
presiding over a state that mattered enough to draw the likes of such civil rights 
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celebrities.  East Germany was without a doubt, according to the SED, a legitimate state, 
and deserved the international community’s diplomatic recognition, for (among other 
reasons) the state’s commitment to anti-racism.  The relationship with Black America 
was offered as proof of this commitment and the improvements the SED alleged East 
German society had made through communism.  
 Of course, the African American experience(s) in and with East Germany reveal 
that East Germany’s stance on racism was not as clear-cut as officials made it out to be.  
Despite the hearty rhetoric, though authentic anti-racist attitudes existed, they were not as 
widespread as propaganda suggested.  Certainly, anti-racist programs, policies, and 
pedagogy were spread throughout the East German state, but their existence did not 
translate into their application in a consistent or necessarily genuine manner.  In reality, 
an anti-racist East Germany was an image that the SED could only sustain if one did not 
examine East German society too closely or remain in the country for long.  As we have 
seen, African American visitors were rarely in East Germany long enough to see the 
cracks in East Germany’s anti-racist armor (nor would their itineraries planned by East 
German officials have allowed them to).  Meanwhile, those who were residents of the 
GDR learned quite intimately that East Germany was not nearly as racially-enlightened 
as the SED would have had the world believe.   
The voices that traveled the furthest, however, were those of the visitors.  Most of 
these African American travelers to the GDR supported the SED’s assertions of an anti-
racist society based on what they had witnessed during their visit.  Those who knew the 
least about East German racism and anti-racism would paradoxically be the ones to speak 
most confidently about the improvements made in the GDR.  The comfortable and anti-
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racist experience in East Germany of figures like the Robesons and Angela Davis 
contrasts quite starkly with the experiences of Aubrey Pankey and the African American 
military deserters.  While the Robesons and Davis praised East Germany’s racial 
tolerance, the latter knew all too well the reality for people of color in the GDR.  Even 
when Pankey—an accomplished international musician and celebrity—twice informed 
the SED of racist incidents, nothing was done by East German officials to rectify the 
situation.  The SED’s disinclination to address East German racism meant that, as in 
Pankey’s case, acts of discrimination often went unpunished.  This had far-reaching 
effects.  This silence marked, if not the SED’s explicit approval, then the fact that the 
SED was at least willing to accept such behavior.   
East German racism, however, did not find its genesis with the creation of the 
East German state.  Though some incidents of racism in the GDR could certainly be 
traced back to particular developments within East German society, competition for 
goods being one example, there are many other instances of racism—like that of 
Pankey—where it was clear that such beliefs were long-ingrained in the way Germans 
viewed or perceived the Other.487  These beliefs quite clearly drew upon earlier German 
interpretations of race and views on blackness, revealing a continuity in thinking that 
stretched beyond the divide that 1945 provided.  For East German racism to bear a 
lineage of sorts that descends from earlier types of German racism signifies that we must 
remove the essentialized lens through which East German racism is often viewed, if we 
are to better understand it.  Much of the recent historiography on racism in the GDR has 
made attempts to de-essentialize East German racism, by noting similarities shared with 
                                                 
487 This emphasis on Germans is placed here not to suggest a special type of German racism, but rather to 
draw the connection between East German and West German racism as having the same roots. 
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West Germany or by pointing out the ways in which the essentialization of East German 
racism neglects the West German experience for minorities.488  This examination of the 
relationship between Black America and East Germany provides another means of de-
essentializing East German racism in a rather simple, yet important way: by providing the 
evidence necessary that allows one to compare and contrast the ways in which African 
Americans experienced racism in East Germany with the scholarship available on West 
Germany.   
While the relationship between Black American leftists and the East German elite 
brings into relief certain aspects of East German racism, the particular nature of the 
friendship only tells a part of the story.  In the realm of economics and the rise of 
particular far-right groups, the relationship can tell us little.  The reason for why this is, 
however, underlines an important element of the SED’s views on blacks.  A continuation 
of a theme found throughout Germany’s history with blacks, the SED distinguished 
between blacks who were considered insiders and those who were outsiders.  African 
Americans occupied a place of relative importance (among people of color) for the East 
German elite, because they were, with few exceptions, not residents of the GDR.  Though 
citizenship should not be ignored—as Americans, African Americans occupied a position 
in the West that gave their struggle an added poignancy for the GDR’s anti-Western 
propaganda—one’s status as insider or outsider was important.  Viewing African 
Americans as outsiders, the SED regarded its relationship with them as one of moral 
support—not financial support—and beyond the (relatively modest) costs of solidarity, 
African Americans were not considered to be a “drain” on society.  Black African 
                                                 
488 For the latter, see footnote 481 above.  
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workers and students residing in the GDR, the “insiders” in this formulation, were often 
viewed competitively in economic and sexual terms, leading to, as some argue, a build-up 
of racist sentiment that would eventually overflow.489  As African Americans living in 
East Germany as insiders could attest to, they were not immune either. 
 
Further Research 
As noted at the start of this work, the parameters of this research project were 
such that a detailed assessment of East German citizens and their personal views on 
African Americans, the African American civil rights movement, and racism more 
generally, were difficult to pinpoint in great detail.  This and other works have often 
extrapolated, based on the governmental archival material available, in order to postulate 
how the average (white) East German viewed people of color.  Yet, there is very little 
currently available that allows historians to draw conclusions that are based directly on 
the peoples’ own words.  Problems range from issues with archival sources (many East 
Germans knew well enough how to “speak” to the SED, making the truth of recorded 
statements about race and racism difficult to decipher) to a general lack of said archival 
sources (having ascertained that racism was not an East German problem, there were to 
                                                 
489 Many of the arguments that dominated in the years after unification focused on economic dislocation, 
both before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  These arguments concentrated on job competition, which 
became heightened with the collapse of the East German economy.  Jonathan Zatlin has argued that we 
should refocus our attention: instead of job competition—given the population drain suffered by the GDR, 
there was no shortage of jobs—Zatlin maintains that we should focus on competition for scarce consumer 
goods.  While such competition contributed to the growth and intensification of ill-will toward the apparent 
consumer interlopers, Zatlin holds that it was the SED’s attitude toward non-white workers that encouraged 
a translation of this ill-will into racist violence.  Perceptive to the SED’s “barely concealed disdain for 
people of color,” there was little, aside from a rhetoric many viewed as hollow, to suggest that the 
government would seek to seriously punish anyone for racist attacks.  Such actions passively encouraged—
or at the very least failed to discourage—the public’s racism.  That it was fairly well hidden from the public 
discourse is a testament to the compartmentalization within the society the SED built.  Panayi, “Racial 
Violence in the New Germany, 1990-93,” 265.  Zatlin, “Scarcity and Resentment,” 703-4. 
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be no wide-reaching surveys on racism prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall) to new, post-
unification influences on official surveys and research projects (just as the presence of a 
communist government could influence one’s statements, its sudden demise could also 
have a similar effect). 
 As has likely become clear, much more than archival research will be necessary in 
order to complete a study that more intimately details East German views on race, racism, 
and blackness in the GDR—quite likely an oral history study.  There are several 
commonly-held assumptions that this dissertation has called into question that would be 
useful avenues of investigation.  Firstly, it is commonly held that East Germans who 
worked toward establishing solidarity between East Germany and Black America did so 
because it was expected of them.  However, as this work has discussed, there were some 
who did so willingly.  Jennifer Ruth Hosek also suggests that such solidarity was actually 
a means of protest against the state.490  In that case, the relationship becomes more 
complicated, as we must consider more thoroughly what their personal motivations were 
for supporting African Americans and their struggle for civil rights, what drove those 
motivations, and the ways in which they were or were not successful in pursuing their 
own goals within the context of a socialist society.  Even if their number was small, they 
still represented a group of East Germans who deviated from the “norm” (even while 
adhering to SED propaganda) and why they would do so in a society that discouraged 
bucking trends is an important question to answer. 
 Similarly, future research should consider the impact of East Germans’ anti-
fascist and anti-racist educations upon the evolution and development of East German 
                                                 
490 Hosek, Sun, Sex, and Socialism, 26. 
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racism.  Though much of this education consisted of propaganda, its effects regarding 
racism still need to be measured.  Not only does the acceptance of the tenets offered in 
this education need to be considered, but so does the effect that a general rejection of this 
education had upon East Germans’ views of blacks.  For example, an East German who 
chafed at the SED’s intrusion into their life with pro-black propaganda entwined in anti-
fascist and anti–racist education could very well have viewed the African American 
subjects of the propaganda as the SED’s willing cohorts.  This perceived cozy connection 
could spur the transference of negative attitudes towards the SED onto the GDR’s black 
friends, or serve to simply reinforce and underline one’s existing racist beliefs.  Though 
the GDR never had an honest discussion about race and racism in East Germany, 
discussions about race and racism in the West did occur, and their impact still needs to be 
measured.   
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to make the assumption that the 
relationship between Black America and East Germany failed to achieve its goals in any 
significant manner, certainly when one considers the long-term impact (or lack thereof) 
of the relationship.  For scholars of both East Germany and Black America, this 
relationship is one that tends to be filed under interesting but ultimately unimportant, 
because there are few clearly evident lasting effects of the friendship.  East Germany had 
a negligible impact on any of the achievements of the civil rights movement, beyond any 
sort of personal benefits the visiting activists may have received.  In turn, African 
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Americans bore no direct responsibility for the American—or more generally, Western—
diplomatic recognition of East Germany.   
What this view assumes, however, is that what both sides received was less than 
what they actually wanted.  East German leaders utilized a variety of approaches to 
acquire legitimacy and change international opinion about the GDR.  The relationship 
with Black America was never intended to be the sole means of acquiring diplomatic 
recognition, but rather one avenue of chipping away at international resistance to the East 
German state.  In that regard, the relationship was useful.  For African American 
leftists—specifically those who visited the state—they never expected their relationship 
with the communist Germany to result in equal rights at home, but rather appreciated the 
solidarity and support offered by the GDR.  Those who advocated a change in 
government and the way society functioned saw in East Germany an example, a model 
that supported their arguments.  Those who were likely the most disappointed and whose 
goals were not fully met were the African Americans who settled in the GDR.  Despite 
promises of an anti-racist society, they were met with a racism that ran throughout 
society and the government.  That was not all, however.  Life in East Germany was far 
from ideal, even in the best of circumstances; at the core of things, they lived in a 
crumbling, poor, and repressive state.    
For the SED and the African American visitors, in the short-term, there were 
enough positive outcomes to keep the relationship going, and for that reason, we should 
consider their goals ultimately fulfilled.  The friendship provided African Americans with 
an outlet, a place to turn when the civil rights movement at home began to shift toward 
the political right.  For a group that placed an emphasis on the value of solidarity and 
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encouragement in fighting the civil rights struggle, the proclamations of support were 
vitally important.  For the SED, this relationship provided them with the necessary 
propaganda, which would find repeated use even in later years as the friendship’s earlier 
interactions were recalled and referred to as if they had just recently occurred.  
Regardless of the lack of long-term achievements stemming from the relationship 
between the SED and Black American leftists, the friendship marked an effort by two 
groups, both pushed to a secondary position and considered the “other,” to navigate the 
Cold War world.  These efforts were just as important as those put forth by members of 
the political West.   
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